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Vulnerabilities372,641–372,680 · 372,926

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CVE-2026-89703—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: set SC_STATUS_FREED in nfsd4_drop_revoked_stid for delegations nfsd4_drop_revoked_stid() handles FREE_STATEID for admin-revoked delegations but does not set SC_STATUS_FREED before releasing cl_lock. revoke_delegation() uses this flag to detect whether FREE_STATEID has already processed the delegation -- without it, the freed delegation is added to cl_revoked via list_add(), producing a use-after-free when cl_revoked is later traversed in __destroy_client(). The SC_STATUS_REVOKED path in nfsd4_free_stateid() (line 7983) already sets SC_STATUS_FREED correctly. Apply the same pattern to the SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED path in nfsd4_drop_revoked_stid().9h CVE-2026-89523—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: cancel pending mlo_pm_work If the device is reset, suspended or unregistered within that window, the pending work can still run and access vif/bss data that may already be freed, or send MCU commands while the firmware is not available. Add cancel_delayed_work_sync(&dev->mlo_pm_work) in all relevant teardown and suspend paths: - mt7925_mac_reset_work() (chip reset recovery) - mt7925e_unregister_device() (PCIe unbind) - mt7925_pci_suspend() (PCIe bus suspend) - mt7925_suspend() (mac80211 suspend) - mt7925u_suspend() (USB bus / runtime suspend) This ensures the work is stopped before the device state becomes invalid.9h CVE-2026-89704—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: sample writeback error cursor before async COPY loop _nfsd_copy_file_range() samples dst->f_wb_err into "since" after the copy loop, then uses it to detect writeback errors via filemap_check_wb_err() once vfs_fsync_range() returns. Because the nfsd_file cache reuses a single struct file across requests targeting the same inode, a concurrent COMMIT or stable WRITE on dst advances dst->f_wb_err to the current mapping->wb_err via file_check_and_advance_wb_err() during its own vfs_fsync_range(). If that advancement lands between the writeback error appearing in mapping->wb_err and the COPY worker sampling "since", the worker captures the already-advanced cursor, errseq_check() sees cur == since and returns zero, and NFSD4_COPY_F_COMMITTED is set even though writeback failed. CB_OFFLOAD then encodes wr_stable_how = FILE_SYNC4, the client treats the copied data as durable, and the failure becomes silent data loss. Sample since once at the start of the function. The cursor then reflects state in effect before this COPY issues any writes, and filemap_check_wb_err() detects any error that occurs during the copy regardless of which thread first observes it. This matches the pattern used by nfsd_vfs_write() and nfsd4_clone_file_range().9h CVE-2026-89522—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: staging/ipu7: fix async notifier UAF on probe error path isys_register_devices() registers the V4L2 async notifier via isys_notifier_init(). If a subsequent probe step such as isys_fw_log_init() fails, isys_probe() jumps to the out_cleanup label which only calls isys_unregister_devices(). That helper tears down the video devices, subdevices, V4L2 device and media device, but never unregisters or cleans up the async notifier. As a result the notifier stays chained in the global notifier_list while the enclosing struct ipu7_isys is freed by devres, leading to list corruption and a use-after-free the next time the list is walked. The remove path already does the right thing by calling isys_notifier_cleanup() before isys_unregister_devices(). Mirror that on the probe error path so the notifier is unregistered and cleaned up before the device is torn down.9h CVE-2026-89705—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: restore rq_status_counter to even on all nfsd_dispatch() exit paths nfsd_dispatch() sets rq_status_counter to an odd value once a request has been decoded, and back to an even value once it has been fully processed, forming a seq-lock like protocol with the lockless reader in nfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit(). Only the fully successful path restored the counter to even. The cache-hit (RC_REPLY), drop (RC_DROPIT / RQ_DROPME) and encode-error paths all return after the odd-valued store without ever bringing the counter back to even. Once one of those paths is taken, rq_status_counter is left odd: the next request's decode ORs in 1 (still odd) and only a subsequent successful encode restores even. While stuck odd, the dumpit reader treats the rqstp fields as stable and its retry check compares against the same unchanging odd value, so it never detects concurrent mutation. This exposes actively mutating fields (e.g. args->ops / args->opcnt during compound decode and release) to the lockless reader, which can read past the end of the 8-element inline ops array. Add a helper that advances the counter to the next even value and call it on every return path that follows the odd-valued store. The decode-error path is left untouched as it is reached before the counter is set odd.9h CVE-2026-90460—

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———An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.7h CVE-2026-89706—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: Reset write verifier when async COPY writeback fails Async COPY captures nn->writeverf at request time and reports it to the client via CB_OFFLOAD after the worker kthread completes. When the post-copy vfs_fsync_range() or filemap_check_wb_err() in _nfsd_copy_file_range() reports an error, the worker correctly leaves NFSD4_COPY_F_COMMITTED clear so that CB_OFFLOAD encodes wr_stable_how as NFS_UNSTABLE, but the server's write verifier is not rotated. A client that receives NFS_UNSTABLE in CB_OFFLOAD follows up with COMMIT to make the copied data durable. With the verifier unchanged, COMMIT returns the same value the client just received via CB_OFFLOAD, and the client concludes the copy is durable -- silently dropping the data whose writeback in fact failed. This violates the UNSTABLE+COMMIT durability contract (RFC 7862 section 15.1, RFC 8881 section 18.32) and matches the bug just fixed in nfsd_vfs_write() and nfsd_commit(). Rotate nn->writeverf at the writeback-failure site. The async COPY worker has no svc_rqst, so commit_reset_write_verifier() is not available here; calling nfsd_reset_write_verifier() directly mirrors the trace-less reset already used by nfsd_file_check_write_error() for the same purpose. Filter out -EAGAIN and -ESTALE, matching commit_reset_write_verifier(), since neither indicates a durable-storage failure.9h CVE-2026-89521—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Handle pick_task() releasing the rq lock Core scheduling's pick_next_task() breaks when a ->pick_task() implementation can release the rq lock. The selection state derived on entry is only valid while the lock is held continuously. Once a pick can drop the lock, an interleaving selection can invalidate all of it: the single-CPU fast path can commit an uncookied pick although the core went cookied during the release, and forceidle committed by the interleaving selection skews the restarted pass's accounting. Fix it by restarting the whole selection when a pick returns RETRY_TASK after releasing the lock: a single restart point above the state derivation replaces the per-loop restart labels, so a retry picks up state committed by interleaving selections and accounts and resets forceidle like a fresh selection would. need_sync and fi_before latch across retries. Clock validity can't be re-derived - there is no program-ordered way to tell whether the own and core rq clocks are still updated after the lock was released, as other lockers' pin cycles may or may not have invalidated them. When restarting, clear core_clock_updated so that the sibling loop re-updates the core rq, and update the own rq clock if invalidated.9h CVE-2026-89707—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: release path refs on follow_down() error nfsd_cross_mnt() initializes a local struct path with mntget() and dget() before calling follow_down(). On a negative return the error arm jumps to out without releasing those references: err = follow_down(&path, follow_flags); if (err < 0) goto out; follow_down() never drops the caller's entry-time refs on any error sub-case; for example a pre-cross d_manage() failure leaves path untouched, so the mntget()/dget() taken on entry survive the call. Every other early-exit arm in nfsd_cross_mnt() (other-namespace return, IS_ERR(exp2), and the success tail after the swap) already calls path_put(&path); the err < 0 arm is the lone omission. The leak inflates mnt_count and d_count on each failed cross-mount, blocking umount and pinning dentries against the shrinker, and is reachable by any authenticated NFS client through nfsd_lookup_dentry or the NFSv4 READDIR encode path. Fix by calling path_put(&path) before the goto out in the err < 0 arm so the entry-time refs are released on all follow_down() error returns.9h CVE-2026-89708—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: RCU-protect cl_cb_session to fix use-after-free on session teardown After a DESTROY_SESSION the per-session teardown path can free a session while rpciod still holds an inflight callback rpc_task that dereferences clp->cl_cb_session. nfsd4_probe_callback_sync() flushes cl_callback_wq, but once nfsd4_run_cb_work() has called rpc_call_async() the rpc_task lives on rpciod; flushing the workqueue does not wait for it. rpc_shutdown_client() does drain rpciod tasks, but uses a 1-second wait_event_timeout — tasks stuck in rpc_delay() (e.g. 2-second NFS4ERR_DELAY retries) can outlive the drain. destroy path rpciod ------------ ------ unhash_session(ses) nfsd4_probe_callback_sync(clp) flush_workqueue(cl_callback_wq) /* returns; rpc_task still live */ nfsd4_put_session_locked(ses) free_session(ses) -> kfree(ses) nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() reads cb_clp->cl_cb_session /* freed slab */ A second window exists in nfsd4_process_cb_update(). When __nfsd4_find_backchannel() returns NULL because unhash_session() has already removed the destroyed session from cl_sessions, setup_callback_client() takes the v4.1 early return so clp->cl_cb_session = ses never fires and the field retains a pointer to the about-to-be-freed session. Fix both by converting cl_cb_session to an RCU-protected pointer: - Move the cl_cb_session = ses assignment in setup_callback_client() to after rpc_create() succeeds, so it is only published when a working backchannel exists. Clear cl_cb_session on the error return in nfsd4_process_cb_update(). Both stores use rcu_assign_pointer(). - Annotate cl_cb_session with __rcu. All rpciod-side readers use rcu_read_lock()/rcu_dereference() and check for NULL, bailing to the appropriate error or requeue path: encode_cb_sequence4args(), decode_cb_sequence4resok(), nfsd41_cb_get_slot(), nfsd41_cb_release_slot(), nfsd4_cb_prepare(), and nfsd4_cb_sequence_done(). - Switch __free_session() from kfree() to kfree_rcu() so the session slab is not reclaimed until after an RCU grace period, guaranteeing that rpciod readers inside rcu_read_lock() never dereference freed memory. - Pass the session pointer to the nfsd_cb_seq_status and nfsd_cb_free_slot tracepoints instead of having them re-read cl_cb_session. - nfsd4_cb_prepare() calls rpc_exit() when the session is NULL, routing through the done/release path to requeue the callback.9h CVE-2026-89709—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lockd, nfsd: RCU-protect nlmsvc_ops dispatch nlmsvc_ops is published by nfsd_lockd_init() and cleared by nfsd_lockd_shutdown() with plain stores, while lockd dereferences it unguarded from dispatch sites in fs/lockd/svcsubs.c. The pointer targets nfsd's .rodata and the fopen/fclose callbacks live in nfsd's .text, so a stale load after rmmod nfsd results in either a NULL deref or a module-text use-after-free. Declare nlmsvc_ops as __rcu, publish via rcu_assign_pointer(), clear via RCU_INIT_POINTER() + synchronize_rcu(). Add a struct module *owner field to nlmsvc_binding and pin the module across indirect calls with try_module_get/module_put. When the binding is torn down, fall back to fput() to avoid leaking struct file references.9h CVE-2026-904616.3 MED

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———OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.7h CVE-2026-89520—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Make core-sched flips wait for in-flight selections Core scheduling's pick_next_task() operates on all sibling rqs under one acquisition of the shared core-wide lock. A ->pick_task() that releases the rq lock leaves every sibling __lock momentarily free, letting __sched_core_flip(false) complete mid-selection and rebind rq_lockp() under it. The selection resumes on the split locks, touching sibling state it no longer protects, and __schedule() finally releases a lock that was never taken while leaking the one that was. Count in-flight core-wide selections in the leader's rq->core_pick_in_flight and make __sched_core_flip() wait for the count to drain. The count only changes under the shared lock, which the flip holds while sampling, so no other ordering is needed. The wait can repeat while selections overlap, but the flip backs off between samples and flips are rare cookie-lifetime events. sched_core_cpu_deactivate() moves the count to the new leader - a stale copy left behind would bias it forever if that CPU later returns as its own leader.9h CVE-2026-89519—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Replace SCX_RQ_BAL_KEEP with a dispatch verdict return SCX_RQ_BAL_KEEP tells the pick to keep running the previous task, a leftover from when balancing and picking were separate operations. An rq-level flag only works while dispatches and picks pair up one to one, which core scheduling breaks: selections interleave through dispatch's lock drops and a pick can consume a stale flag, keeping a task that has since been dequeued. Fixing core scheduling support requires the decision to travel with the dispatch that made it. Make scx_dispatch_sched() and balance_one() return an explicit verdict instead and drop the flag's plumbing from the tools autogen enum headers. Also factor the pick-side invocation, its follow-up queueing and the post-dispatch checks out of do_pick_task_scx() into dispatch_pick(). No functional changes intended. v2: Drop the SCX_RQ_BAL_KEEP plumbing from the tools autogen enum headers as well (Andrea).9h CVE-2026-89518—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Fix this_rq() assumptions in dispatch kfuncs Under core scheduling, dispatch runs from within the core-wide pick and can target a sibling rq, so ops.dispatch() may execute on a CPU different from the dispatched rq's. Several kfunc paths assumed the two always coincide: - scx_dsq_move() decided whether an rq lock is held by testing this_rq()'s rq flags and lock-danced accordingly. A dispatch for a sibling took the unlocked-context branch and acquired the source rq lock on top of the already held dispatched rq lock which could deadlock. - scx_bpf_sub_dispatch() dispatched this_rq() with its stashed sub_dispatch_prev, which is NULL when dispatching for a sibling. - finish_dispatch(), scx_bpf_dsq_reenq() and scx_bpf_dsq_nr_queued() resolved SCX_DSQ_LOCAL to this CPU's local DSQ rather than the dispatched rq's. The latter two are callable from other rq-locked operations too, where SCX_DSQ_LOCAL now likewise resolves to the op's rq. This changes behavior also without core scheduling, e.g. for ops.enqueue() running a remote wakeup on the waking CPU, and is intended: which CPU happens to execute an operation is incidental, the op's rq is what it is operating on, and the resolution now matches the insert side where SCX_DSQ_LOCAL dispatches land on the task's rq. Use the rq tracked by scx_locked_rq(), which is set to the dispatched rq around ops invocations and NULL in unlocked contexts.9h CVE-2026-89517—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Fix rq->core_pick corruption under core scheduling Core scheduling's pick_next_task() picks what to run on every SMT sibling of the core in a single pass under the shared core-wide rq lock. The selection state is consistent only while the lock is held continuously, so ->pick_task() originally could not release it. However, since 4c95380701f5 ("sched/ext: Fold balance_scx() into pick_task_scx()"), sched_ext runs dispatch from inside the pick and dispatching can drop the rq lock. To support this, pick_next_task() has been updated to restart the whole selection when a pick returns RETRY_TASK after releasing the lock. When selections on the same core interleave through the dropped lock, they corrupt each other's state: one clears the other's rq->core_pick leading to a NULL deref, or invalidates its keep-the-previous-task decision leaving a dequeued task running, which deadlocks the next wakeup and matches the reported hard hangs. A cookied ping-pong load on an SMT machine makes the interleavings frequent and kills the kernel within seconds. Fix it by making the pick return RETRY_TASK whenever dispatch released the rq lock, so that a selection only ever commits picks made under a continuously held lock. The previous patch's rq->scx.lock_drop_seq counts the releases. A dispatch that touched nothing never releases the lock and its verdict, including "nothing to run", stands: retries are bounded, each following a dispatch that actually did something, and an idle CPU does not loop. If another dispatch is already in flight on the rq, skip dispatching and pick from what is already queued locally - the in-flight dispatch has released the lock, so its own selection will retry and re-pick this rq, while returning RETRY_TASK here would only spin on the lock that dispatch needs to finish. Balance callbacks must run in the context that queued them, so they can only be queued on the CPU's own rq. When dispatching for another rq, run the deferred work directly instead - that rq may consume all its picks through the core-sched fast path and never queue the callback itself. The put_prev_task_scx() warning about a runnable task being left behind assumed that dispatch ran as part of the very pick that is switching away. That now only holds on the non-core path, so gate it and drop the cookie-match test, which is always true without core scheduling, from its condition.9h CVE-2026-89710—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4.1: fix layout segment leak on the pnfs_layout_process() forget path When the server returns a new layout stateid while a valid one is still held, pnfs_layout_process() calls pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return() on the on-stack free_me list and jumps to out_forget. Segments whose reference count drops to zero are unlinked from lo->plh_segs and moved to free_me by mark_lseg_invalid(); for an idle cached segment the layout header holds the only reference, so this happens on the first decrement. out_forget never drains free_me -- only the success path calls pnfs_free_lseg_list(). Commit 814b84971388 ("pNFS/NFSv4: Fix a layout segment leak in pnfs_layout_process()") added the drain; commit 08bd8dbe8882 ("pNFS/NFSv4: Try to return invalid layout in pnfs_layout_process()") removed it while switching the destination to lo->plh_return_segs, which is drained elsewhere. Commit fb700ef02676 ("NFSv4.1: Simplify layout return in pnfs_layout_process()") switched the destination back to free_me without restoring the drain. Restore the pnfs_free_lseg_list() call.9h CVE-2026-80971—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: bcd2000: clear the URB pointers on disconnect bcd2000_free_usb_related_resources() frees both URBs and leaves the pointers behind: usb_kill_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb); usb_kill_urb(bcd2k->midi_in_urb); usb_free_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb); usb_free_urb(bcd2k->midi_in_urb); The rawmidi device outlives that call. A substream that is still open when the device is unplugged reaches bcd2000_midi_send() from the trigger path on close. That function writes to the freed URB and then hands it to the USB core: bcd2k->midi_out_urb->transfer_buffer_length = BUFSIZE; ... ret = usb_submit_urb(bcd2k->midi_out_urb, GFP_ATOMIC); usb_kill_urb() does not stop a later submission either, so a submit that races the disconnect can requeue the URB after it has been reaped. midi_in_urb is exposed the same way: bcd2000_input_complete() resubmits it from the completion handler. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcd2000_midi_send [snd_bcd2000] Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001827d388 by task bpoc/168 __asan_store4 bcd2000_midi_send [snd_bcd2000] bcd2000_midi_output_trigger [snd_bcd2000] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1 close_substream.part.0 Freed by task 168: usb_free_urb bcd2000_disconnect [snd_bcd2000] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usb_submit_urb Read of size 8 at addr ffff00001827d3b8 by task bpoc/168 Clear both pointers after freeing and test them on the paths that can still run. Poison the URBs before freeing them: usb_poison_urb() waits for a running completion handler and rejects any later submission, so after it returns the input path is quiesced and only the rawmidi trigger path can still reach bcd2000_midi_send(). No unpoison is needed; the URBs are freed on the next line. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>9h CVE-2026-80982—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix use-after-free in smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() smc_rx_splice() hands RMB pages to a pipe and takes a socket reference per entry so the smc_sock stays alive until the reader finishes. The connection does not: a concurrent close runs smc_conn_free(), which releases the receive buffer back to the link group pool. smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() tests sk_state before taking the socket lock. The state can change between the test and the lock, and smc_rx_update_cons() then dereferences conn->rmb_desc and walks conn->lgr, which smc_conn_free() has already released. On the is_reg_err path smcr_buf_unuse() frees the descriptor outright, so this is a use-after-free. Take the socket lock first and test conn->freed instead. smc_conn_free() sets that flag before releasing anything, and every caller holds the socket lock. The two paths exclude each other: either the pipe release runs first with everything valid, or it sees the flag and skips the update.9h CVE-2026-89711—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: remove flawed WARN_ON_ONCE from nfsd_mode_check The header for commit e75b23f9e323 ("nfsd: check d_can_lookup in fh_verify of directories") details the assumption that justified adding the WARN_ON_ONCE to nfsd_mode_check(), that assumption is invalid (in the case of NFS reexport). When NFSD exports an NFS filesystem it is very possible for nfsd_mode_check() to encounter a @dentry that doesn't have i_op->lookup (see nfs_fhget()'s NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MOUNTPOINT and NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_REFERRAL handling, and d_flags_for_inode()). So remove nfsd_mode_check()'s WARN_ON_ONCE(). The nfserr_notdir return on that branch must stay. It guards the subsequent lookup_one_unlocked() -> __lookup_slow() path, which calls inode->i_op->lookup() with no NULL check, so returning nfserr_notdir is what keeps a client LOOKUP into such a @dentry from dereferencing a NULL method pointer.9h CVE-2026-80981—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix use-after-free of the LLC qentry in smc_llc_srv_add_link() smc_llc_srv_add_link() keeps add_llc pointing into the queue entry: add_llc = &qentry->msg.add_link; smc_llc.c:1482 ... smc_llc_save_add_link_info(link_new, add_llc); smc_llc.c:1494 smc_llc_flow_qentry_del(&lgr->llc_flow_lcl); smc_llc.c:1495 ... u8 *llc_msg = smc_link_shared_v2_rxbuf(link) ? (u8 *)lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2 : (u8 *)add_llc; smc_llc.c:1504 smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys(link, link_new, llc_msg); smc_llc.c:1506 smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() kfree()s the entry, so on a link without a shared v2 receive buffer the pointer handed to smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys() is already freed. Before the Fixes: commit that branch always used lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2 and add_llc was not used after the free. Reproduced on an unpatched tree over rxe, with KASAN, kasan_multi_shot and a link forced to max_recv_sge == 1: the entry is freed and read by the same call, and the freeing frame is smc_llc_srv_add_link() itself. [ 2.523161] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523499] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880052194de by task kworker/0:1/11 [ 2.523789] [ 2.523862] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-p0-g2c9dd296545d #35 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 2.523865] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 2.523866] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [ 2.523869] Call Trace: [ 2.523870] <TASK> [ 2.523871] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 2.523872] print_report+0xd0/0x630 [ 2.523874] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523876] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523878] kasan_report+0xce/0x100 [ 2.523879] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523881] smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523883] ? smcr_buf_reg_lgr+0x2a4/0x660 [ 2.523885] smc_llc_srv_add_link+0xaa2/0x1e50 [ 2.523888] ? _printk+0xba/0xf0 [ 2.523897] ? __pfx_smc_llc_srv_add_link+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523899] ? down_write+0xb0/0x130 [ 2.523903] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523905] smc_listen_work+0x489e/0x4d00 [ 2.523907] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c6/0x3a0 [ 2.523911] ? __pfx_smc_listen_work+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523913] ? release_sock+0x148/0x1d0 [ 2.523915] ? smc_tcp_listen_work+0xb4f/0xfc0 [ 2.523917] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0 [ 2.523918] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523920] process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 [ 2.523922] ? assign_work+0x11d/0x370 [ 2.523924] worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 [ 2.523926] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523928] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523929] kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 [ 2.523931] ? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0 [ 2.523934] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523935] ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 [ 2.523937] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523938] ? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0 [ 2.523943] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523944] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2.523947] </TASK> [ 2.523948] [ 2.531253] Allocated by task 48: [ 2.531399] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 2.531570] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 2.531737] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 2.531905] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 [ 2.532100] smc_llc_enqueue+0x72/0x560 [ 2.532268] smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn+0x474/0xa80 [ 2.532491] tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0 [ 2.532714] handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590 [ 2.532886] do_softirq+0x3b/0x60 [ 2.533036] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x61/0x70 [ 2.533221] __alloc_skb+0x732/0x890 [ 2.533384] rxe_init_packet+0x16b/0x4f0 [ 2.533567] prepare_ack_packet+0xb8/0x830 [ 2.533760] rxe_receiver+0x495/0x96e0 [ 2.533933] do_work+0x144/0x470 [ 2 ---truncated---9h CVE-2026-89712—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: restart ssc_expire_umount walk after dropping nfsd_ssc_lock nfsd4_ssc_expire_umount() walks nn->nfsd_ssc_mount_list with list_for_each_entry_safe(ni, tmp, ...). For each expired entry it sets nsui_busy = true, drops nfsd_ssc_lock to run mntput() on the source vfsmount, then reacquires the lock to list_del + kfree the entry and continue iterating via the macro's saved tmp pointer. The nsui_busy flag protects the current ni from concurrent nfsd4_ssc_setup_dul() finders during the lock-drop window, but it does not pin tmp. Another nfsd RPC thread that fails its source- server mount and reaches nfsd4_ssc_cancel_dul() will, during that same window, take nfsd_ssc_lock, list_del + kfree its own ssc_umount item, and release the lock. If that item is the saved tmp of the expire walk, the next iteration dereferences a freed nfsd4_ssc_umount_item. Restart the walk from the head after the mntput() unlock window so no saved next pointer survives the lock-drop. The list is bounded by the number of active inter-server source mounts (typically small) and the expire delayed-work runs periodically rather than per-IO, so the restart is cheap.9h CVE-2026-89516—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Don't BUG_ON a destroyed DSQ in process_deferred_reenq_users scx_bpf_dsq_reenq() queues a deferred reenq (dru) that runs from run_deferred(), not ops.dispatch(). If the DSQ is destroyed before the dru runs, process_deferred_reenq_users() sees dsq->id == SCX_DSQ_INVALID and hits the BUG_ON. destroy_dsq() doesn't flush pending drus, so just skip. tj: Read dsq->id once with READ_ONCE(). Reading it separately in the INVALID check and the BUG_ON would leave a window where destroy_dsq() can invalidate the id between the two reads and still trigger the BUG_ON.9h CVE-2026-89713—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: check truncate permission under inode lock nfsd_setattr() checks whether a size update needs NFSD_MAY_TRUNC before it takes inode_lock(). The comparison uses the file size sampled by that unlocked read, but the actual ATTR_SIZE update is applied later under inode_lock() by notify_change(). This leaves a TOCTOU window for append-only files. If a client sends a SETATTR that does not shrink the file at the time of the unlocked sample, a concurrent append can extend the file before nfsd_setattr() takes inode_lock(). notify_change() then applies a real truncation without the NFSD_MAY_TRUNC check that rejects IS_APPEND(inode). The VFS truncate syscall paths perform their own append-only checks before calling notify_change(), so NFSD must make this decision against the locked size it is about to change. Split the write-count acquisition from the truncation permission check. Keep get_write_access() before the locked setattr work, then recheck whether the requested size is below i_size_read(inode) after inode_lock() has been acquired and before notify_change(ATTR_SIZE). This also avoids the plain unlocked inode->i_size load.9h CVE-2026-89714—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails nfs4_server_common_setup() allocates server->delegation_hash_table first, but server->destroy - the only path that frees the table via nfs4_destroy_server() - is not assigned until the very end of the function. If any intermediate step fails (the is_ds_only_client() check, nfs4_init_session(), nfs4_get_rootfh(), or nfs_probe_server()), the function returns with server->destroy still NULL, so the caller's nfs_free_server() skips the destroy callback and the hash table is leaked (4 KiB per attempt with the default delegation watermark). This is trivially reachable from userspace: every failed NFSv4 mount leaks one allocation. A client that persistently retries a mount that cannot succeed leaks kernel memory without bound. Observed in production where a Longhorn backup poller retried mount.nfs4 against an NFSv3-only server roughly 10 times per second, leaking ~3.4 GiB of unreclaimable slab (kmalloc-rnd-13-4k) per day; the node accumulated 12 GiB of leaked slab before the source was identified via the kmem:kmalloc tracepoint (call_site=nfs4_delegation_hash_alloc). Reproducer: # server exports NFSv3 only (or export path absent for v4) while :; do mount -t nfs4 <server>:/missing /mnt; done # watch SUnreclaim in /proc/meminfo grow 4 KiB per iteration Free the table on the error paths between the allocation and the assignment of server->destroy.9h CVE-2026-89715—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS/localio: fix ref leak on nfs_uuid_add_file failure When nfs_uuid_add_file() races with nfs_uuid_put() tearing down uuid->net, it returns -ENXIO without publishing nfl->nfs_uuid via rcu_assign_pointer(). nfs_open_local_fh() then enters its error branch and only releases the slot's file ref and its paired net ref plus its own entry-time net ref, while the close path is a no-op: nfs_close_local_fh() nfs_uuid = rcu_dereference(nfl->nfs_uuid); if (!nfs_uuid) { rcu_read_unlock(); return; } /* always */ nfsd_open_local_fh() returns localio holding a caller-owned +1 nfsd_file reference (from nfsd_file_get() after nfsd_file_acquire_local()) and an entry-time nfsd_net reference (from its first nfsd_net_try_get()) embedded as nf->nf_net. Both are leaked on the failure path, pinning one nfsd_file (and the underlying struct file, dentry, inode) and one nfsd_net_ref per occurrence, which blocks nfsd_net and netns teardown. Fix by releasing the caller-owned file ref and its net ref through the existing helper, using a stack-local RCU pointer so the helper can xchg it out, then returning -ENXIO so callers do not dereference a localio whose slot has been cleared: struct nfsd_file __rcu *tmp = RCU_INITIALIZER(localio); nfs_to_nfsd_file_put_local(pnf); nfs_to_nfsd_file_put_local(&tmp); localio = ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); The trailing nfs_to_nfsd_net_put(net) continues to release the outer net ref, so all three nfsd_net_try_get() increments are balanced on the error branch.9h CVE-2026-89515—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: Fill in DMA padding bytes in scsi_alloc_sgtables() During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __dma_map_sg_attrs+0x217/0x310 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0x217/0x310 dma_map_sg_attrs+0x4a/0x70 ata_qc_issue+0x9f8/0x1420 __ata_scsi_queuecmd+0x1657/0x1740 ata_scsi_queuecmd+0x79a/0x920 scsi_queue_rq+0x4472/0x4f40 blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1cca/0x3ee0 __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x458/0x630 blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x15b/0x340 __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xe5/0x250 __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x138/0x780 blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x4bb/0x7e0 blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x2a7/0x4c0 blk_execute_rq+0x497/0x8a0 sg_io+0xbe0/0xe20 scsi_ioctl+0x2b36/0x3c60 sr_block_ioctl+0x319/0x440 blkdev_ioctl+0x80f/0xd70 __se_sys_ioctl+0x219/0x420 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xe0 x64_sys_call+0x1d6c/0x3ad0 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Uninit was created at: __alloc_pages+0x5c0/0xc80 alloc_pages+0xe0e/0x1050 blk_rq_map_user_iov+0x2b77/0x6100 blk_rq_map_user_io+0x2fa/0x4d0 sg_io+0xad6/0xe20 scsi_ioctl+0x2b36/0x3c60 sr_block_ioctl+0x319/0x440 blkdev_ioctl+0x80f/0xd70 __se_sys_ioctl+0x219/0x420 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xe0 x64_sys_call+0x1d6c/0x3ad0 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Bytes 14-15 of 16 are uninitialized Memory access of size 16 starts at ffff88800cbdb000 When processing the last unaligned element of the scatterlist, it is supplemented with missing bytes in the amount of pad_len. These bytes remain uninitialized, which leads to a problem. Extend last_sg->length by pad_len first, then use sg_zero_buffer() to zero those pad_len bytes. sg_zero_buffer() uses sg_miter internally, which correctly handles sg entries spanning multiple pages and padding that crosses a page boundary. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.9h CVE-2026-80980—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: stop killed, freed and out_of_sync sharing a byte The three connection state flags are single-bit bitfields, so they occupy one byte of struct smc_connection and every store to one is a read-modify-write of the other two: u8 killed : 1; u8 freed : 1; u8 out_of_sync : 1; They are not written under a common lock. smc_cdc_msg_validate() sets out_of_sync from the receive tasklet, while smc_conn_kill() sets killed from process context under lock_sock(), and the receive path does not defer to the backlog when the socket is owned -- smc_cdc_msg_recv() takes only bh_lock_sock(). Give each flag its own byte so a store no longer touches its neighbours. All readers test them as booleans and are unchanged. struct smc_connection grows by two bytes.9h CVE-2026-89716—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: validate deflate params We must validate user-supplied deflate winbits before we pass it to zlib_deflate_workspacesize(), which triggers BUG_ON() if winbits value is outside of valid ranges.9h CVE-2026-89514—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: fnic: Use GFP_ATOMIC for VLAN alloc under spinlock fnic_fcoe_process_vlan_resp() allocates a VLAN descriptor with kzalloc_obj() (default GFP_KERNEL) while holding vlans_lock via spin_lock_irqsave(). GFP_KERNEL may sleep, which is not allowed in this atomic context and can trigger a sleeping-from-invalid-context warning or deadlock. Pass GFP_ATOMIC so the allocation is safe under the IRQ-safe spinlock.9h CVE-2026-89717—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: set default primary compressor in zram_destroy_comps() Patch series "zram: fix zram issues reported by sashiko". Sashiko drove by and reported [1] a couple of zram issues: a possible BUG_ON() in zlib code due to missing winbits range validation and one possible NULL-ptr dereference in zcomp. Both are low risk yet still worth fixing. This patch (of 2): zram_destroy_comps() resets all compressors and leaves them set to NULL, including the primary one, which is invalid device state, as now comp_algorithm_show()->strcmp() can be called on a NULL compressor. Set default primary compressor in zram_destroy_comps().9h CVE-2026-89718—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: fix out-of-bounds access in writeback_store() Patch series "zram: fix stale scan bounds after reinitialization". Both writeback_store() and read_block_state() derive their table scan bounds from zram->disksize before acquiring dev_lock. If the device is reset and reinitialized with a smaller disksize between that read and lock acquisition, the bound can describe the old table while the scan operates on the new one. This can lead to out-of-bounds slot accesses. Move both bound calculations under dev_lock so each bound remains consistent with the table throughout its scan. Keep the fixes separate because the affected interfaces originate from different commits and can be backported independently. This patch (of 2): writeback_store() calculates the table scan bounds before taking dev_lock. A reset followed by reconfiguration with a smaller disksize can therefore replace zram->table while writeback_store() is waiting for the lock. Once it acquires the lock, it sees an initialized device but scans the new table using the old upper bound, resulting in an out-of-bounds access. Calculate the number of pages while holding dev_lock so the scan bound matches the table protected by the lock.9h CVE-2026-89719—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: fix out-of-bounds access in read_block_state() read_block_state() calculates nr_pages before taking dev_lock. If the device is reset and reinitialized with a smaller disksize before lock acquisition, nr_pages still describes the old table. The subsequent loop can then call slot_lock() past the end of the newly allocated table. Read disksize after acquiring dev_lock and checking that the device is initialized. The read lock then keeps the table and its bound stable for the duration of the scan.9h CVE-2026-89720—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign: if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size). verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder() is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked. snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is embedded in.9h CVE-2026-89513—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RISC-V: KVM: Fix PMU event info array size overflow SBI PMU EVENT_GET_INFO stores guest-controlled num_events * sizeof(*einfo) in a 32-bit integer. On RV64, num_events = 0x10000001 makes 0x100000010 truncate to 16. KVM then allocates one entry but loops over the original num_events, causing out-of-bounds reads and writes. A nested guest triggered: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0xa4/0x142 Read of size 4 at addr ff600000074d46b0 by task init/1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8006471c>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0xa4/0x142 [<ffffffff800690c0>] kvm_sbi_ext_pmu_handler+0xca/0x268 [<ffffffff8006779e>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_ecall+0xec/0x1e6 [<ffffffff8006008c>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_exit+0x48c/0x540 [<ffffffff8005ea0a>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x37e/0xc80 Allocated by task 1: __kmalloc_noprof+0x19e/0x4b0 kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0x72/0x142 kvm_sbi_ext_pmu_handler+0xca/0x268 kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_ecall+0xec/0x1e6 kvm_riscv_vcpu_exit+0x48c/0x540 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x37e/0xc80 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 16-byte region [ff600000074d46a0, ff600000074d46b0) Store the shared-memory size in size_t and reject multiplication overflow. Allocate the guest-driven array with GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT so it is charged to kmemcg, and use __GFP_NOWARN to suppress allocation failure warnings. Use kvcalloc() to allow vmalloc fallback and an unsigned long loop index to match num_events.9h CVE-2026-89512—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: remoteproc: scp: Fix device reference leak on failed lookup Make sure to drop the reference taken to the SCP device when attempting to look up its driver data before the driver has been bound. Note that holding a reference to a device does not prevent its driver data from going away.9h CVE-2026-89511—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: qede: Fix NULL pointer dereference in TPA fragment processing Under memory pressure, the qede driver encounters NULL pointer dereferences when processing TPA continuation fragments. Commit 8a8633978b84 ("qede: Add build_skb() support.") accidentally dropped the assignment of tpa_info->buffer.data in qede_tpa_start(). When memory pressure causes an SKB allocation failure in qede_tpa_start(), the driver sets tpa_start_fail = true and attempts to recycle the physical page later in qede_tpa_end() via qede_reuse_page(). However, because buffer.data was left uninitialized (NULL), qede_reuse_page() pushes a "ghost" BD (valid DMA mapping but NULL data pointer) back into the active Rx ring. The next time the hardware uses this ring slot, it passes a NULL page to qede_fill_frag_skb(), causing a kernel panic. Example crash from production system: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x8 RIP: qede_fill_frag_skb+0x96/0x430 [qede] Call Trace: qede_rx_int+0xb06/0x1de0 qede_poll+0x2f4/0x6c0 __napi_poll+0x2d/0x130 Fix the root cause by restoring the tpa_info->buffer.data assignment in qede_tpa_start(), ensuring valid pages are correctly tracked and recycled. Additionally, update the stale comment for struct qede_agg_info::buffer to reflect its current usage.9h CVE-2026-89510—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cxgb4: Cancel reg_work before freeing device on remove c4iw_uld_state_change() queues reg_work to register the RDMA device. c4iw_remove() can free ctx->dev while this work is pending or running, leaving c4iw_register_device() accessing the freed device. Cancel reg_work before removing the device. The registration work can tear down ctx->dev when registration fails, so do not unregister or deallocate it again in that case. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.9h CVE-2026-80979—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: unregister the connection before draining the rx tasklet smc_conn_free() calls smc_ism_unset_conn() only while the link group is still on its device list, and never sets conn->killed. smc_lgr_terminate_sched() unlinks the group immediately and defers killing its connections to a work item, so a connection freed in that window keeps its smcd->conn[] slot with both gates in smcd_handle_irq() open, and the device can re-arm the receive tasklet after tasklet_kill() has returned. On the DMB-nocopy path the ghost send buffer is freed right after that drain, so the re-armed tasklet dereferences it. Unregister unconditionally and drain before the detach at both teardown sites, mirroring rmb_desc, which smc_buf_unuse() releases after the drain. Clear conn->sndbuf_desc before freeing it as well, so a reader that samples the pointer cannot get one that is already freed.9h CVE-2026-89721—

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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phy: rockchip-samsung-dcphy: fix out-of-range max_register The PHY register block is 64KB, so with a register stride of 4 the last accessible register sits at offset 0xfffc. max_register names 0x10000, one register past the end of the mapping: dumping the registers through the regmap debugfs interface reads beyond the ioremapped region and oopses on the unmapped page. The oops fires with the regmap lock held, so later PHY operations deadlock.9h