Vulnerabilities exploitable today
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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2024-13710—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-595678.8 HIG4.1%
——1Multiple vulnerabilities on affected versions of Zscaler Client Connector allow local privilege escalation, giving an unprivileged user the ability to execute arbitrary code in a privileged context.18dCVE-2020-36652—4.1%
——1——CVE-2025-400617.8 HIG4.1%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix race in do_task() when draining
When do_task() exhausts its iteration budget (!ret), it sets the state
to TASK_STATE_IDLE to reschedule, without a secondary check on the
current task->state. This can overwrite the TASK_STATE_DRAINING state
set by a concurrent call to rxe_cleanup_task() or rxe_disable_task().
While state changes are protected by a spinlock, both rxe_cleanup_task()
and rxe_disable_task() release the lock while waiting for the task to
finish draining in the while(!is_done(task)) loop. The race occurs if
do_task() hits its iteration limit and acquires the lock in this window.
The cleanup logic may then proceed while the task incorrectly
reschedules itself, leading to a potential use-after-free.
This bug was introduced during the migration from tasklets to workqueues,
where the special handling for the draining case was lost.
Fix this by restoring the original pre-migration behavior. If the state is
TASK_STATE_DRAINING when iterations are exhausted, set cont to 1 to
force a new loop iteration. This allows the task to finish its work, so
that a subsequent iteration can reach the switch statement and correctly
transition the state to TASK_STATE_DRAINED, stopping the task as intended.11dCVE-2025-47620—4.1%
——1——CVE-2025-12852—4.1%
——1DLL Loading vulnerability in NEC Corporation RakurakuMusen Start EX All Verisons allows a attacker to manipulate the PC environment to cause unintended operations on the user's device.12dCVE-2023-5339—4.1%
——1——CVE-2019-25293—4.1%
——1——CVE-2025-683407.8 HIG4.1%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: Move team device type change at the end of team_port_add
Attempting to add a port device that is already up will expectedly fail,
but not before modifying the team device header_ops.
In the case of the syzbot reproducer the gre0 device is
already in state UP when it attempts to add it as a
port device of team0, this fails but before that
header_ops->create of team0 is changed from eth_header to ipgre_header
in the call to team_dev_type_check_change.
Later when we end up in ipgre_header() struct ip_tunnel* points to nonsense
as the private data of the device still holds a struct team.
Example sequence of iproute2 commands to reproduce the hang/BUG():
ip link add dev team0 type team
ip link add dev gre0 type gre
ip link set dev gre0 up
ip link set dev gre0 master team0
ip link set dev team0 up
ping -I team0 1.1.1.1
Move team_dev_type_check_change down where all other checks have passed
as it changes the dev type with no way to restore it in case
one of the checks that follow it fail.
Also make sure to preserve the origial mtu assignment:
- If port_dev is not the same type as dev, dev takes mtu from port_dev
- If port_dev is the same type as dev, port_dev takes mtu from dev
This is done by adding a conditional before the call to dev_set_mtu
to prevent it from assigning port_dev->mtu = dev->mtu and instead
letting team_dev_type_check_change assign dev->mtu = port_dev->mtu.
The conditional is needed because the patch moves the call to
team_dev_type_check_change past dev_set_mtu.
Testing:
- team device driver in-tree selftests
- Add/remove various devices as slaves of team device
- syzbot11dCVE-2026-47078—4.1%
——1Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in Erlang OTP (stdlib zip module) allows writing files outside the intended extraction directory via a crafted zip archive.
zip:unzip/1,2 and zip:extract/1,2 validate entry paths using zip:check_dir_level/2, which tracks directory depth as a running integer counter: .. decrements it, normal path components increment it. The caller rejects only paths where the final counter value is less than zero. A path such as ../x/y causes the counter to go negative mid-traversal then recover to zero, passing validation while resolving to a location outside the extraction directory when joined with the current working directory via add_cwd.
This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/stdlib/src/zip.erl.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.1 before OTP 27.3.4.15, OTP 28.5.0.4, and OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to stdlib from 6.1 before 6.2.2.4, 7.3.0.1, and 8.0.3.6dCVE-2025-399385.5 MED4.1%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: qcom: q6apm-lpass-dais: Fix NULL pointer dereference if source graph failed
If earlier opening of source graph fails (e.g. ADSP rejects due to
incorrect audioreach topology), the graph is closed and
"dai_data->graph[dai->id]" is assigned NULL. Preparing the DAI for sink
graph continues though and next call to q6apm_lpass_dai_prepare()
receives dai_data->graph[dai->id]=NULL leading to NULL pointer
exception:
qcom-apm gprsvc:service:2:1: Error (1) Processing 0x01001002 cmd
qcom-apm gprsvc:service:2:1: DSP returned error[1001002] 1
q6apm-lpass-dais 30000000.remoteproc:glink-edge:gpr:service@1:bedais: fail to start APM port 78
q6apm-lpass-dais 30000000.remoteproc:glink-edge:gpr:service@1:bedais: ASoC: error at snd_soc_pcm_dai_prepare on TX_CODEC_DMA_TX_3: -22
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a8
...
Call trace:
q6apm_graph_media_format_pcm+0x48/0x120 (P)
q6apm_lpass_dai_prepare+0x110/0x1b4
snd_soc_pcm_dai_prepare+0x74/0x108
__soc_pcm_prepare+0x44/0x160
dpcm_be_dai_prepare+0x124/0x1c011dCVE-2024-38304—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-31890—4.1%
——1——CVE-2025-31970—4.0%
——1——CVE-2025-116424.0 MED4.1%
——1A vulnerability was identified in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. Affected is an unknown function of the component Registration Handler. Such manipulation leads to denial of service. The attack can be executed directly on the physical device. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.12dCVE-2025-384867.8 HIG4.1%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soundwire: Revert "soundwire: qcom: Add set_channel_map api support"
This reverts commit 7796c97df6b1b2206681a07f3c80f6023a6593d5.
This patch broke Dragonboard 845c (sdm845). I see:
Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f20003e8 [#1] SMP
pc : qcom_swrm_set_channel_map+0x7c/0x80 [soundwire_qcom]
lr : snd_soc_dai_set_channel_map+0x34/0x78
Call trace:
qcom_swrm_set_channel_map+0x7c/0x80 [soundwire_qcom] (P)
sdm845_dai_init+0x18c/0x2e0 [snd_soc_sdm845]
snd_soc_link_init+0x28/0x6c
snd_soc_bind_card+0x5f4/0xb0c
snd_soc_register_card+0x148/0x1a4
devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x50/0xb0
sdm845_snd_platform_probe+0x124/0x148 [snd_soc_sdm845]
platform_probe+0x6c/0xd0
really_probe+0xc0/0x2a4
__driver_probe_device+0x7c/0x130
driver_probe_device+0x40/0x118
__device_attach_driver+0xc4/0x108
bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xf0
__device_attach+0xa4/0x198
device_initial_probe+0x18/0x28
bus_probe_device+0xb8/0xbc
deferred_probe_work_func+0xac/0xfc
process_one_work+0x244/0x658
worker_thread+0x1b4/0x360
kthread+0x148/0x228
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Kernel panic - not syncing: BRK handler: Fatal exception
Dan has also reported following issues with the original patch
https://lore.kernel.org/all/33fe8fe7-719a-405a-9ed2-d9f816ce1d57@sabinyo.mountain/
Bug #1:
The zeroeth element of ctrl->pconfig[] is supposed to be unused. We
start counting at 1. However this code sets ctrl->pconfig[0].ch_mask = 128.
Bug #2:
There are SLIM_MAX_TX_PORTS (16) elements in tx_ch[] array but only
QCOM_SDW_MAX_PORTS + 1 (15) in the ctrl->pconfig[] array so it corrupts
memory like Yongqin Liu pointed out.
Bug 3:
Like Jie Gan pointed out, it erases all the tx information with the rx
information.93dCVE-2021-25415—4.1%
——1——CVE-2025-22843—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-1078903.3 LOW4.1%
——1OpenPrinting CUPS before 2.4.20 contains a NULL pointer dereference caused by repeated IPP group tags in job-creation requests. IPP parsing creates unnamed separator attributes with IPP_TAG_ZERO, but add_job() converts these separators to IPP_TAG_JOB. During job startup, get_options()/ipp_length() subsequently calls strlen() on a NULL attribute name, terminating cupsd and disrupting all queues. A single crafted Print-Job request can trigger the crash when the client can reach the scheduler and submit jobs to an accepting, enabled queue supporting the submitted document format. Anonymous submission is possible when permitted by listener and access-control configuration.10dCVE-2026-1083326.3 MED4.1%
——1Tanium addressed an improper link resolution before file access vulnerability in Threat Response Client Extension.2dCVE-2025-4417—4.1%
——1——CVE-2020-27039—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-1098297.4 HIG4.1%
——1undici is an HTTP client library for Node.js. In versions 7.0.0 through 7.30.0 and 8.0.0 through 8.12.1, when an originless Agent composes the redirect and cache interceptors in that order with a shared cache store, the cache builds its key from the original request URL before the redirect handler changes the origin, so a response produced after a cross-origin redirect is stored under the original key. An attacker who controls the target of a redirect from a trusted URL can have their response cached under that trusted URL and served to later callers, allowing persistent cache poisoning, and the same key confusion lets a private, non-stored redirect response to a user-specific resource be stored under the original URL and served to a later unauthenticated caller, disclosing private data. Applications are affected only when an originless Agent, a shared cache store, and the redirect-then-cache composition are all used. The issue is fixed in undici 7.30.1 and 8.12.2, which verify the producing origin still matches the cache key and preserve each redirect hop's cache-control policy before storing, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, compose the cache interceptor before the redirect interceptor, use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests.11dCVE-2025-379887.8 HIG4.1%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fix a couple of races in MNT_TREE_BENEATH handling by do_move_mount()
Normally do_lock_mount(path, _) is locking a mountpoint pinned by
*path and at the time when matching unlock_mount() unlocks that
location it is still pinned by the same thing.
Unfortunately, for 'beneath' case it's no longer that simple -
the object being locked is not the one *path points to. It's the
mountpoint of path->mnt. The thing is, without sufficient locking
->mnt_parent may change under us and none of the locks are held
at that point. The rules are
* mount_lock stabilizes m->mnt_parent for any mount m.
* namespace_sem stabilizes m->mnt_parent, provided that
m is mounted.
* if either of the above holds and refcount of m is positive,
we are guaranteed the same for refcount of m->mnt_parent.
namespace_sem nests inside inode_lock(), so do_lock_mount() has
to take inode_lock() before grabbing namespace_sem. It does
recheck that path->mnt is still mounted in the same place after
getting namespace_sem, and it does take care to pin the dentry.
It is needed, since otherwise we might end up with racing mount --move
(or umount) happening while we were getting locks; in that case
dentry would no longer be a mountpoint and could've been evicted
on memory pressure along with its inode - not something you want
when grabbing lock on that inode.
However, pinning a dentry is not enough - the matching mount is
also pinned only by the fact that path->mnt is mounted on top it
and at that point we are not holding any locks whatsoever, so
the same kind of races could end up with all references to
that mount gone just as we are about to enter inode_lock().
If that happens, we are left with filesystem being shut down while
we are holding a dentry reference on it; results are not pretty.
What we need to do is grab both dentry and mount at the same time;
that makes inode_lock() safe *and* avoids the problem with fs getting
shut down under us. After taking namespace_sem we verify that
path->mnt is still mounted (which stabilizes its ->mnt_parent) and
check that it's still mounted at the same place. From that point
on to the matching namespace_unlock() we are guaranteed that
mount/dentry pair we'd grabbed are also pinned by being the mountpoint
of path->mnt, so we can quietly drop both the dentry reference (as
the current code does) and mnt one - it's OK to do under namespace_sem,
since we are not dropping the final refs.
That solves the problem on do_lock_mount() side; unlock_mount()
also has one, since dentry is guaranteed to stay pinned only until
the namespace_unlock(). That's easy to fix - just have inode_unlock()
done earlier, while it's still pinned by mp->m_dentry.93dCVE-2025-33196—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-106677.8 HIG4.1%
——1Zephyr's dynamic kernel-object tracking (kernel/userspace/userspace.c, formerly kernel/userspace.c) maintains a doubly-linked list (obj_list) of dynamically allocated kernel objects. Iteration over this list in k_object_wordlist_foreach() was performed under lists_lock using the SAFE iterator (which caches the next node), but list removal and freeing of nodes was performed under different, disjoint spinlocks: objfree_lock in k_object_free() and obj_lock in unref_check(). On an SMP system, while one CPU iterated obj_list under lists_lock, another CPU could unlink and k_free() the dyn_obj node that the iterator had cached as its next pointer, causing the iterator to dereference freed kernel memory (use-after-free / dangling list traversal). All of the racing operations are reachable from unprivileged user-mode threads via system calls: k_object_alloc/k_object_alloc_size and k_object_release drive removals through unref_check() (under obj_lock), while k_thread_abort and thread creation drive the iteration through k_thread_perms_all_clear()/k_thread_perms_inherit() (under lists_lock). A deprivileged user thread on a CONFIG_SMP + CONFIG_USERSPACE build can therefore corrupt the kernel's object-tracking structures across the userspace security boundary, yielding kernel memory corruption (potential privilege escalation) or a kernel crash (denial of service). The fix removes objfree_lock and serializes every obj_list modification under lists_lock, including holding it across find+remove in k_object_free() and around unref_check() in k_thread_perms_clear(). Affects CONFIG_SMP+CONFIG_USERSPACE+CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS configurations; the defect dates to the 2019 spinlockification (commit 8a3d57b6cc6, first released in v1.14.0) and shipped through v4.4.0.6dCVE-2025-23972—4.1%
——1——CVE-2025-49975—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-231085.5 MED4.1%
——1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: usb_8dev: usb_8dev_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak
Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").
In usb_8dev_open() -> usb_8dev_start(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are
allocated, added to the priv->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the
complete callback usb_8dev_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and
resubmitted. In usb_8dev_close() -> unlink_all_urbs() the URBs are freed by
calling usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->rx_submitted).
However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors
the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an
in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not
released in usb_kill_anchored_urbs().
Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the
usb_8dev_read_bulk_callback() to the priv->rx_submitted anchor.11dCVE-2024-53753—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-47937.3 HIG4.1%
——1An incorrect default permissions vulnerability in Synology Assistant before 7.0.7-50095 allows local users to read or write arbitrary files and conduct denial-of-service during installation.7dCVE-2026-156837.5 HIG4.1%
——1Lorex 2K Indoor Wi-Fi Security Camera Device Management Server Improper Certificate Validation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Lorex 2K Indoor Wi-Fi Security Cameras. User interaction is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the device management functionality. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the certificate presented by the server. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-26851.6dCVE-2026-801127.8 HIG4.1%
——1PassMark PerformanceTest before 11.1 build 1012, BurnInTest before 11.1 build 1000, and OSForensics before 11.1 build 1016 contain an improper access control vulnerability in the DirectIo64.sys kernel driver that allows unprivileged local users to perform privileged hardware operations by opening a handle to the device object created without a security descriptor. Attackers can issue IOCTLs through the permissive default Windows ACL applied to the device to access restricted hardware operations regardless of privilege or integrity level.52dCVE-2024-28607—4.1%
——1——CVE-2025-53267—4.1%
——1——CVE-2025-620094.3 MED4.1%
——1Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Dmitry V. (CEO of "UKR Solution") UPC/EAN/GTIN Code Generator upc-ean-barcode-generator allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects UPC/EAN/GTIN Code Generator: from n/a through <= 2.0.2.23dCVE-2025-53270—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-572626.8 MED4.1%
——1A vulnerability has been identified in LOGO! Soft Comfort (All versions < V9). Affected products use a static, hardcoded AES master key to encrypt project files. This could allow a local attacker to extract the master key from the application files or memory and use it to decrypt project files or remove project passwords entirely without knowing the actual user-defined password.7dCVE-2021-1957—4.1%
——1——CVE-2026-565953.1 LOW4.1%
——1HCL BigFix Service Management is affected by a CORS Misconfiguration vulnerability due to improperly validated origin headers, which could allow an attacker to craft a malicious web page that interacts with the vulnerable application, enabling unauthorized access to protected resources and restricted APIs on behalf of a victim.16d