CVE Watch2 oct 2026

CVE-2026-103764

Mooncake transfer engine before 0.3.13 contains an untrusted pointer dereference in ServerSession::readHeader that allows unauthenticated at

CVSS

9.8

Crítico

EPSS

0.8%

p57

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Publicado: 2 oct 2026 · Última mod.: 2 oct 2026 · CWE-822

EPSS · 30d

0.6%EPSS · 30 días0.8%

2026-10-022026-10-25

Descripción técnica

Mooncake transfer engine before 0.3.13 contains an untrusted pointer dereference in ServerSession::readHeader that allows unauthenticated attackers to read and write arbitrary process memory via the TCP transport data port. Attackers can send a crafted SessionHeader with arbitrary addr and size values using READ or WRITE opcodes to disclose KV cache contents, prompts and secrets or corrupt memory toward code execution.

Referencias oficiales

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