CVE-2026-106078
A vulnerability allowing an unauthenticated attacker to bypass REST API authentication with a forged federation token and receive responses
CVSS
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Sin CVSS
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Publicado: 27 oct 2026 · Última mod.: 27 oct 2026 · CWE-347
Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.
A vulnerability allowing an unauthenticated attacker to bypass REST API authentication with a forged federation token and receive responses from REST API endpoints that do not call the Veeam Backup for Microsoft 365 backup service.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-1176028.4 ALT—
———Electrum 4.6.0 before 4.7.2 contains an authorization bypass in the external plugin loader, which executes a plugin's __init__.py module when the plugin is marked enabled in the config file, without verifying its plugin-password signature. A rogue local process with write access to the Electrum data directory can place plugin code in the plugins/ folder and mark it enabled, causing arbitrary code execution inside the Electrum process.3hCVE-2026-1176017.5 ALT—
———Electrum before 4.8.3 fails to verify signatures of wallet-owned inputs in unconfirmed mempool transactions, allowing malicious servers to replace a just-broadcast transaction with a conflicting one. Attackers can swallow the user's transaction and display an invalid zero-fee copy paying an attacker address, tricking users into RBF fee-bumping and signing it.3hCVE-2026-65632——
——0The jose library accepts ECDSA (ES256, ES256K, ES384, and ES512) JWS signatures of a non-canonical length. When verifying an ECDSA signature, jose_jwk_kty_ec:verify/4 in src/jwk/jose_jwk_kty_ec.erl splits the raw signature in half by its actual byte length (split_binary(Signature, byte_size(Signature) div 2)) instead of enforcing the fixed length required by RFC 7518 §3.4, and then decodes each half with crypto:bytes_to_integer/1, which ignores leading zero bytes.
As a result, an attacker who holds one valid token can prepend leading zero bytes to each of the R and S halves to produce longer signatures that still split evenly and decode to the same (r, s) pair, so many distinct signature byte strings all verify against the same key (signature malleability). This does not allow forging new payloads or impersonating a signer, because the underlying (r, s) values are unchanged. It does defeat any security control that assumes a valid token or its signature is unique, such as token-revocation-by-hash, replay or idempotency caches, and deduplication logic.
This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.4hCVE-2026-1161168.2 ALT0.4%
——0A vulnerability was detected in Yoosee GM8135S Camera 21.00.01.36. Affected is an unknown function of the component Secure Boot. Performing a manipulation results in improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack needs to be approached locally. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.1dCVE-2026-1161897.5 ALT4.1%
——1rclone from 1.55.0 before 1.75.2 contains a signature verification bypass in stable selfupdate that trusts checksums from unsigned bytes preceding the PGP-clearsigned SHA256SUMS block. Attackers controlling the release distribution path can prepend an unsigned checksum line matching a malicious archive, causing selfupdate to install an attacker-controlled rclone executable.1dCVE-2026-568378.6 ALT8.3%
——2PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.6.56 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on 0.0.0.0 and treats LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs a warning and _handle_webhook() skips Linear-Signature verification entirely. An unauthenticated network caller who can reach the webhook endpoint can submit a forged Linear-Event: AgentSession request. The forged request is parsed, scheduled for background processing, dispatched to _handle_agent_session(), and passed into BotSessionManager.chat(). The bot then attempts to post the agent response back to Linear under the configured bot token. The PoV is offline and deterministic. It does not contact Linear. It calls the webhook handler directly, monkey-patches the outbound Linear comment path, and proves both sides of the boundary. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.4d