CVE-2026-107335
Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when
CVSS
6.5
Medio
EPSS
0.5%
p39
KEV
—
Exploit Today
12
0-100
Publicado: 8 oct 2026 · Última mod.: 13 oct 2026 · CWE-409
0.4%EPSS · 30 días0.5%
2026-10-092026-10-25
Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-1165795.9 MED—
———Autobahn Python is a WebSocket and WAMP implementation for Python that supports Twisted and asyncio. From 26.7.1 until 26.10.1, PerMessageBrotli.decompress_message_data in compress_brotli.py calls the Brotli decompressor without an output limit and checks maxMessagePayloadSize only after a complete frame has been inflated. An unauthenticated WebSocket client can send a small, highly compressed frame that allocates hundreds of MiB before rejection, causing memory-exhaustion denial of service on servers that enable the opt-in permessage-brotli feature through the compress extra. Deflate and bzip2 already enforce the remaining output budget and are outside this residual vulnerability. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.1.3hCVE-2026-65627——
———Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.
The jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.
Decompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.
This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.4hCVE-2026-938506.5 MED—
———Mattermost versions 11.9.x <= 11.9.1, 11.8.x <= 11.8.5, 11.7.x <= 11.7.10, 11.10.x <= 11.10.1 fail to bind the volume of text extracted from an uploaded PDF which allows an authenticated user to exhaust server memory and cause a denial of service via a crafted PDF whose compressed content stream expands into a very large amount of text.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-007697hCVE-2026-97200——
———Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in hackney_conn in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. hackney:request/5 and hackney:body/1 return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.
hackney_conn:read_full_body/2 and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With {auto_decompress, true} the buffered body is then inflated in one step with zlib:gunzip/1 or zlib:inflate/2, which return the whole output at once.
This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0.7hCVE-2026-109584——
———Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in the HTTP/2 implementation of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a small HPACK-compressed HEADERS block. The block stores one large cookie value in the HPACK dynamic table and then references it tens of thousands of times with 1-byte indexed fields. In the reporter's run, a 49 KB block made a server with default settings allocate a 183 MB cookie binary before any application code ran, and every concurrent stream can repeat the cost.
Bandit.HTTP2.Connection caps only the compressed block (max_header_block_size), and its check of the decoded list against max_header_list_size never fires because that setting defaults to :infinity. combine_cookie_crumbs/1 in lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex then joins every crumb into one binary.
This issue affects bandit: from 0.3.3 before 1.14.0.7hCVE-2026-1161756.5 MED—
——0vLLM from 0.19.0 before 0.24.0 contains a decompression bomb vulnerability because the AudioMediaIO multimodal path calls load_audio without the max_duration_s decoded-duration limit. Authenticated attackers can send small compressed audio via input_audio or audio_url in /v1/chat/completions requests that expands to huge decoded PCM, exhausting server memory.7h