CVE Watch15 oct 2026

CVE-2026-108820

A weakness has been identified in agno-agi agno up to 3.0.6/3.1.1. This issue affects the function member_agent.run in the library libs/agno

CVSS

6.3

Medio

EPSS

0.3%

p18

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Publicado: 12 oct 2026 · Última mod.: 15 oct 2026 · CWE-250

EPSS · 30d

0.3%EPSS · 30 días0.5%

2026-10-122026-10-20

Descripción técnica

A weakness has been identified in agno-agi agno up to 3.0.6/3.1.1. This issue affects the function member_agent.run in the library libs/agno/agno/team/_default_tools.py of the component Delegation Feature. Executing a manipulation can lead to execution with unnecessary privileges. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.

Referencias oficiales

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