CVE-2026-111450
Wheels through 4.1.1 derives its default production error-email address from the Host header of the request that starts the application. If
CVSS
5.9
Medio
EPSS
0.1%
p3
KEV
—
Exploit Today
1
0-100
Publicado: 16 oct 2026 · Última mod.: 19 oct 2026 · CWE-348
0.1%EPSS · 30 días0.1%
2026-10-162026-10-19
Wheels through 4.1.1 derives its default production error-email address from the Host header of the request that starts the application. If no explicit error-email recipient is configured, a mail server is configured, and the server accepts an attacker-chosen Host, an attacker whose request triggers a cold start can direct later error emails to an address under their control for that application's lifetime. Emails disclose error and request metadata; on engines/versions where scope dumps render, they may also disclose configuration secrets and other users' session/cookie data. On the Lucee 7 engine, scope dumps fail to render, limiting disclosure to header fields. This is fixed in 4.1.2.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-1075677.5 ALT—
——0Use of a less trusted source in the DKIM signing of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have mail they write signed with the DKIM key of a domain the server hosts, so that it passes DKIM and DMARC for that domain at other receivers. With DKIM signing enabled for a hosted domain, the server signed every message on its first delivery pass as the domain named in its From header, before local delivery, whatever the message's origin and without checking that its sender had authenticated. A sender anywhere could therefore send the server, as ordinary inbound mail, a message whose From is any address at such a domain, and the server signed it with that domain's key. Every copy the server then sent on to an address outside carried a valid signature aligned with the forged From, whatever the domain's DMARC policy: an account's forward, a mail rule's forward or copy, a Sieve redirect, an alias or distribution list with an outside member, the mirror copy, a managed-list or journal copy, or a message released from quarantine. A signed copy can also be re-sent to other recipients while the domain's key is unchanged. Exploitation needs DKIM signing to be enabled for the hosted domain (it is off until configured) and, for the forgery to leave the server, a forward, alias, list or rule that carries the domain's mail to an outside address. The signer likewise signed a message submitted over authenticated SMTP as whatever hosted domain its From header named, a header authenticated SMTP does not hold to the submitting account, so that an account of one hosted domain could have mail written in the name of another hosted domain signed with that domain's key; this mattered where the server holds signed-in senders to their own envelope addresses (SmtpAuthenticatedSenderCheck, off by default), as the signature was then the remaining way for such mail to pass the other domain's DMARC policy.1dCVE-2026-1119343.7 BAJ1.9%
——1Coder before 2.34.7 contains an IP spoofing vulnerability in the ExtractRealIPAddress middleware that trusts the leftmost, client-supplied X-Forwarded-For value instead of the client IP appended by a reverse proxy. Attackers can send forged X-Forwarded-For values through appending proxies to bypass per-IP rate limits on login, one-time passcode, and password validation endpoints, enabling brute-force attacks, and to falsify IP addresses recorded in audit logs.23hCVE-2026-1114436.5 MED4.8%
——1Wheels 4.0.6 through 4.1.2 lets an unauthenticated client switch a request into a separate test application context, including in production, by supplying an X-Wheels-Test-Context header or WHEELS_TEST_CONTEXT cookie with any value, or including a test-runner path anywhere in the URL, even the query string. The alternate application uses the same configuration, environment, datasource and debug settings: this is not an authentication bypass or data/debug escalation. It can bypass maintenance mode enabled only at runtime, provide a second set of in-memory rate-limit counters, and trigger additional application-startup side effects and memory use. This is fixed in 4.2.0.4dCVE-2026-1107266.5 MED8.3%
——3In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.5dCVE-2026-93483—13.4%
——4In Znuny through 7.3.6, an attacker can bypass specific standard login procedures and gain unauthorized access to sensitive system functions by manipulating a specific HTTP request header. Because the application incorrectly trusts this header, an attacker can impersonate any user, including administrators, without requiring a password. This grants full access to confidential data and system controls. More specifically, the HTTPBasicAuth modules for the agent (Kernel::System::Auth::HTTPBasicAuth) and customer (Kernel::System::CustomerAuth::HTTPBasicAuth) interfaces read the username to log in not only from $ENV{REMOTE_USER} (set by the web server after successful authentication), but also, as a fallback, from $ENV{HTTP_REMOTE_USER}, which is populated directly from an attacker-controllable "Remote-User" request header. On systems where HTTPBasicAuth was configured as the authentication backend, this allowed an attacker to log in as any existing user by sending a request with a forged Remote-User header, without providing any credentials.1dCVE-2026-1087363.7 BAJ10.0%
——3Speedtest Tracker through 1.15.0 contains an IP allowlist bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to evade ALLOWED_IPS and Prometheus allowlists by spoofing X-Forwarded-For headers. Because bootstrap/app.php trusts every peer as a proxy, attackers can supply an allowlisted address to read /prometheus metrics and reach protected web and API endpoints.4d