CVE-2026-119980
The UsersWP – Front-end login form, User Registration, User Profile & Members Directory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized a
CVSS
6.5
Medio
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
0
0-100
Publicado: 31 oct 2026 · Última mod.: 31 oct 2026 · CWE-287
Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.
The UsersWP – Front-end login form, User Registration, User Profile & Members Directory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized account access via Use of Predictable Password in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.78 The vulnerability exists because `get_dummy_user_passowrd()` derives the shared password for all 25 built-in dummy user accounts as the first 15 characters of `substr(hash('SHA256', AUTH_KEY . site_url()), 0, 25)`, while the full 25-character value of that same hash is simultaneously embedded in the hidden `uwp_register_hash` field rendered on every registration form response — reachable without authentication via both the public `/register/` page and the `wp_ajax_nopriv_uwp_ajax_register_form` AJAX handler, even when user registration is disabled. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to recover the dummy user password directly from a single HTTP request and use it to authenticate as any of the 25 built-in dummy accounts (such as antawn, chynna, or kiki) through `wp-login.php`, potentially achieving privilege escalation if any dummy account holds an elevated role. Exploitation requires that an administrator has previously created dummy users via the plugin's Tools page.
- github.comhttps://github.com/AyeCode/userswp/archive/refs/heads/master.zip
- plugins.trac.wordpress.orghttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.78/includes/class-forms.php#L5244
- plugins.trac.wordpress.orghttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.78/includes/class-templates.php#L850
- plugins.trac.wordpress.orghttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.78/includes/class-tools.php#L606
- plugins.trac.wordpress.orghttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.78/includes/class-userswp.php#L565
- plugins.trac.wordpress.orghttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3774438/userswp/trunk/includes/class-tools.php
- www.wordfence.comhttps://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/7c458034-9c44-4b46-8845-4c05bea043a0?source=cve
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-1190969.8 CRÍ—
——0The Uncanny Toolkit for LearnDash plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in versions up to, and including, 3.8.2 via the `email` parameter of the `uo_login_action()` function. This is due to a parser-differential flaw in which the plugin's account-verification gate resolves the submitted `email` value using the raw, unsanitized string passed to `get_user_by()`, while the subsequent `wp_signon()` call relies on WordPress core's internal `sanitize_user()` to strip appended junk characters — causing the gate lookup to fail and be skipped entirely while the real account is still resolved and authenticated. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in to unverified or administrator-suspended accounts whose credentials they already possess, obtaining a valid `wordpress_logged_in` session cookie and defeating the plugin's account-approval and account-suspension controls. The nonce required to reach the handler is freely obtainable in the same request from the unauthenticated `ult-refresh-nonce` endpoint, making exploitation trivial for any attacker with network access to the site and knowledge of a target account's credentials.5hCVE-2026-1038988.1 ALT—
——0The Wp Social Login and Register Social Counter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.2. This is due to the social login REST callback registered at `/wp-json/wslu-social-login/type/{provider}/` with `permission_callback => __return_true` locating an existing WordPress account solely by the email string returned from the OAuth provider and calling `wp_set_auth_cookie()` without a password check, while the only verification guard — `!empty($getProfile->emailVerified)` in `inc/admin-create-user.php` — is a no-op for the bundled Hybridauth Facebook and Twitter adapters, both of which assign the raw email string rather than a boolean verified flag to `emailVerified`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain a fully authenticated session as any existing WordPress user, including Administrators, whose registered email address can be presented through a configured Facebook or Twitter login on the target site. Exploitation requires only that the attacker control an OAuth account whose provider-returned email matches the target account's registered WordPress email address; no local credentials, nonce, or prior foothold is needed.5hCVE-2026-1191665.3 MED—
——0The Welcart e-Commerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 2.12.5 via the 'member[ID]' parameter due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite any existing Welcart shop-member account's email address and password by supplying that member's numeric ID, then authenticate as that member to achieve full account takeover. The only authentication barrier is a wp_verify_nonce() check against a nonce printed to every unauthenticated visitor on the auto-published New Enrollment Form, meaning no existing account, no WordPress login, and no non-default configuration is required to exploit this vulnerability.6hCVE-2026-63398——
——0Coop is an open source review and moderation tool from ROOST. Prior to 1.0.2, the SAML strategy's verify callback resolved the authenticated user by email alone using `kyselyUserFindByEmail`, without binding the lookup to the organization in `/saml/login/:orgId/callback`. An attacker who administers an organization and controls its SAML IdP signing key can submit an assertion for a victim email to another organization's callback when that target organization has registered the same signing certificate. The assertion verifies against the target certificate, and the email resolves to the target user, creating a session as that user and allowing full cross-tenant account takeover without privileges in the target organization. Exploitation requires the unusual configuration in which the target certificate matches a signing key controlled by the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.14hCVE-2026-1162398.5 ALT—
——0In server mode pgAdmin 4 keeps an account per authentication source, so the same username can exist as, for example, an internal account and an LDAP account. After LDAP or Kerberos authenticated a user, pgAdmin chose the account to log in by username alone, or took the account Flask-Security's login form had looked up, without checking that it came from the source that authenticated the user. The session therefore belonged to another account, with its role, its servers and its saved database passwords:
- An LDAP or Kerberos user whose username matched an internal account was logged in as that internal account, including the administrator account created when pgAdmin is first set up.
- With internal authentication listed before LDAP or Kerberos in AUTHENTICATION_SOURCES, the login form's internal validation looks up the account whose email was typed and keeps it even though its password does not match. A Kerberos user could type another Kerberos user's principal and be logged in as that user, and an LDAP user could do the same with an LDAP account whose email is their username.
Exploitation requires valid credentials for an LDAP directory or Kerberos realm that pgAdmin is configured to use.
The fix looks the account up by the authenticated username and the source that authenticated it, and no longer uses the account the login form found for any source but internal authentication. Internal authentication logs in that account only if it is an internal account. Desktop mode is not affected.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.17hCVE-2026-622647.5 ALT—
——0PDF Reader MCP is a Model Context Protocol server for reading PDF documents. In versions 2.2.0 and later prior to 3.0.1, when `MCP_TRANSPORT=http` enables the opt-in HTTP server, `@sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp` reads `MCP_API_KEY` and logs that `X-API-Key` authentication is enabled but never validates the `X-API-Key` header on incoming requests. The `/mcp` endpoint consequently accepts unauthenticated clients. With the default bind address of `0.0.0.0`, any client able to reach the port can invoke every PDF tool and read any PDF the server process can open on the host, despite the misleading authentication-enabled startup log. URL-based sources additionally permit limited server-side request forgery; private and loopback destinations are blocked by default unless `--allow-private-ips` is set. The default `stdio` transport is unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1.18h