CVE-2026-123988
A vulnerability has been found in SililaWijesinghe Food Ordering System up to ba314e897e3365600461e5ea59432e39ceaa0fa5. This issue affects s
CVSS
5.3
Medio
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Publicado: 7 nov 2026 · Última mod.: 7 nov 2026 · CWE-548 · CWE-552
Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.
A vulnerability has been found in SililaWijesinghe Food Ordering System up to ba314e897e3365600461e5ea59432e39ceaa0fa5. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /Food-Ordering-System/admin/. Such manipulation leads to exposure of information through directory listing. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-1197579.8 CRÍ45.4%
——14BTCPay Server before 2.4.2, including 2.4.2 release candidates, contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to retrieve .macaroon credential files for an LND (Lightning Network Daemon) node. Attackers can use the exposed macaroon to gain full control of the LND node, including moving funds, resulting in theft of funds from affected deployments.2dCVE-2026-659837.5 ALT9.0%
——3OpenEMR is a free and open source electronic health records and medical practice management application. Prior to 8.2.0, interface/modules/custom_modules/oe-module-faxsms/src/Controller/SignalWireClient.php decrypts a selected patient document with Document::get_data() and SignalWireClient::uploadFileForFax() writes the plaintext bytes under sites/{siteId}/fax. The module returns the resulting public URL to SignalWire, protects it only with a predictable uniqid() filename, and never removes the staged file. An unauthenticated network actor who obtains or guesses the URL can retrieve persistent patient documents even when drive encryption is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.0.19hCVE-2026-1231975.3 MED36.0%
——11WPPConnect Server through 2.10.76 contains a missing authentication vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read decrypted sticker media through the /files static mount. Attackers can enumerate Unix timestamps in GET /files/file<timestamp>.webp requests to retrieve stickers from any session, bypassing per-session token checks.2dCVE-2026-906325.5 MED12.8%
——4Apache OpenOffice documents can include multimedia content (audio, video, etc.)
A crafted document could exploit the GStreamer multimedia component of Apache OpenOffice version through 4.1.16 to load the contents of any local file, and include them when the document is saved or exported, for example as PDF.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.1.17, which fixes this issue.3dCVE-2026-906275.5 MED12.8%
——4The flat file database driver in Apache Openoffice versions through 4.1.16 allows a crafted document to read the contents of any local file without asking the user.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.1.17, which fixes this issue.2dCVE-2026-829767.1 ALT14.4%
——4A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.
### Evidence
**pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names**
```go
func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
result := []fs.FileInfo{}
for _, im := range f.images {
result = append(result, im)
}
return result, nil
}
func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {
f.log.Info("Open", "path", name)
if name == "/" {
return f, nil
}
...
```
**cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS**
```go
http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))
go func() {
server := &http.Server{
Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084"
ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
err := server.ListenAndServe()
```
**pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image**
```go
func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {
source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)
return ignition_config_types_32.File{
Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"},
...
```
### Attack Pattern
Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.4d