CVE-2026-124005
XWEB EVO 4.3.0 through 5.8.8 contains a weak password generation vulnerability that allows remote attackers to derive the Administrator code
CVSS
8.1
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EPSS
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Exploit Today
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Publicado: 12 nov 2026 · Última mod.: 12 nov 2026 · CWE-330
Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.
XWEB EVO 4.3.0 through 5.8.8 contains a weak password generation vulnerability that allows remote attackers to derive the Administrator code-of-the-day password using only the device MAC address and date, with no server secret involved. Attackers can analyze the firmware binary xwpasswd, which itself functions as the password generator, to compute valid Administrator credentials offline and authenticate to the device without authorization. This product line reached it's end of service date in March 2026.
- webapps.copeland.comhttps://webapps.copeland.com/Dixell/Pages/SystemSoftwareUpdate
- webapps.copeland.comhttps://webapps.copeland.com/dixell/Content/Pages/AdvertisingMaterials/ProductNews/XWEB%20EVO%20EoS%20-%20Product_Bulletin_March_2026.pdf
- www.vulncheck.comhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dixell-copeland-xweb-evo-predictable-administrator-password-generation
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-863644.7 MED—
——0Dell Live Optics Collector, versions prior to 27.3.8.317 contains a Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information exposure.8hCVE-2026-946185.4 MED8.7%
——3FileGator is a multi-user file manager. Prior to 7.15.0, GET /batchdownload in backend/Controllers/DownloadController.php uses batchDownloadStart() to stream a shared temporary archive selected by the request-supplied uniqid without checking that the current session created it. In deployments with distinct per-user home directories, a valid user with read, download, and batchdownload permissions who obtains another user's active archive id can cross that boundary and retrieve the victim's batch archive. The archive lifetime and id-acquisition requirement limit exploitation, but a successful replay also deletes the victim's pending archive. This issue is fixed in version 7.15.0.6hCVE-2026-870434.8 MED8.0%
——2The entropy-device random number generator in subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c returned early with -ENODEV from rand_get() as soon as device_is_ready() failed, before reaching the non-cryptographic system-timer fallback further down the same function. Because z_impl_sys_rand_get() returns void and discards that error — and the public sys_rand_get() syscall is itself declared void, so it cannot report failure — the caller's output buffer was left untouched and its previous contents were handed back as random data. The thin wrappers make this a plain uninitialized read: sys_rand32_get() declares uint32_t ret;, calls sys_rand_get(&ret, sizeof(ret)) and returns ret.
The "not ready" state is a normal runtime condition rather than a fault. Entropy drivers initialise at PRE_KERNEL_1 with CONFIG_ENTROPY_INIT_PRIORITY (default 50), so any earlier initialiser — kernel objects run at priority 30 — observes an unready device; the sibling generator subsys/random/random_xoshiro128.c and z_early_rand_get() in kernel/init.c both already carried an explicit timer fallback for exactly this case. The state is also permanent for the boot when an entropy driver's init hook fails, which several in-tree drivers can do on real hardware (entropy_stm32 on an RNG clock configuration error, entropy_psa_crypto when psa_crypto_init() fails, entropy_nrf_cracen, entropy_esp32, entropy_virtio).
When this occurs, every non-cryptographic random value in the system is either a constant or stale memory. coap_next_token() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap.c fills a static buffer, so every CoAP token becomes the same .bss constant; tcp_init_isn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c returns an uninitialized stack word as the TCP initial sequence number; DHCPv4/DHCPv6 transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys and RTP SSRCs are similarly degraded, and arch/arm64/core/pac.c derives per-thread Pointer Authentication keys from the same source. Where the bytes are transmitted directly — SSH packet padding, the netmidi2 session nonce, a DTLS connection ID on builds without CONFIG_CSPRNG_ENABLED — stale caller stack or heap contents are disclosed on the wire.
The fix initialises ret to -ENODEV and only calls entropy_get_entropy() when the device is ready, so the not-ready case now falls through to the timer fallback and the buffer is always written. The cryptographically secure path is unchanged: sys_csrand_get() still propagates the error to the caller and never silently degrades. An attacker cannot induce the unready state, but can observe and exploit the resulting non-random values remotely on an affected device.3dCVE-2026-1202233.1 BAJ24.9%
——7A vulnerability was identified in Oray Pugongying X5 Pro up to 7.6.1. This impacts the function session_get of the file session.lua of the component Session ID Handler. The manipulation of the argument _user leads to insufficiently random values. The attack can be initiated remotely. The attack's complexity is rated as high. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.10dCVE-2026-799816.5 MED2.2%
——1The DNS stub resolver in subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c binds one UDP socket per configured server when the resolver context is initialised (dns_resolve_init_locked() -> register_dispatcher() -> dns_dispatcher_register()), with the local port left at 0 so the stack picks an ephemeral port exactly once. dns_write() then sends every subsequent query from that same socket without re-binding, so the source port is constant for the lifetime of the resolver context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier (ctx->queries[i].id, drawn with sys_rand16_get()) varies per query. RFC 5452 section 9.2 requires both to vary; with a fixed port, an off-path attacker has to guess only the identifier.
The stable port is cheap to learn. Any single observed query reveals it permanently, and it can also be found by probing the ephemeral UDP range: subsys/net/ip/connection.c answers unmatched unicast UDP with an ICMP port-unreachable, so the resolver's socket is the one port in that range that stays silent. Acceptance of a reply is decided solely by get_slot_by_id() matching the transaction identifier and a CRC-16 of the queried name — the reply's source address is never checked (dispatcher_cb() does ARG_UNUSED(addr)), so forged answers need not even be spoofed to appear to come from the configured server; they only need to reach the resolver's port.
An attacker with UDP reachability to the device (same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment, or a globally routable device address) can therefore flood answers for a predictable query name across the 16-bit identifier space during a query window and race the legitimate server. A win makes the application resolve an attacker-chosen address, and with CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_CACHE enabled the forged record is retained for its attacker-chosen TTL. The attack still requires winning that race, and applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected.
The fix draws a fresh local port before each query to a server that has nothing outstanding: dns_randomize_source_port() unregisters the dispatcher, closes and reopens the socket, and re-registers it bound to port 0 so the system selects a new port, raising the per-query guessing space from roughly 16 to roughly 31 bits. Multicast DNS and LLMNR are excluded because their ports are protocol-fixed. The behaviour is controlled by CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT (default y).11dCVE-2026-1060744.8 MED27.1%
——8A flaw in Node.js `crypto` causes the internal entropy caches used by `crypto.randomUUID()`, `crypto.randomUUIDv7()`, and `crypto.randomInt()` to be saved into user-land startup snapshots (`--build-snapshot`) and single executable applications built with `useSnapshot`.
If any of these functions, or an API that relies on them such as `URL.createObjectURL()`, is called while the snapshot is built, every process started from that snapshot returns the same values until the cache is refilled: up to 127 UUIDs and about 1,000 `randomInt()` values. Identifiers expected to be unique can collide across processes, and values issued by one process can be predicted by observing another.
This vulnerability affects Node.js **26.x**, **24.x**, and **22.x**.10d