CVE Watch24 jul 2026

CVE-2026-34452

The Claude SDK for Python provides access to the Claude API from Python applications. From version 0.86.0 to before version 0.87.0, the asyn

CVSS

5.3

Medio

EPSS

0.1%

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Publicado: 31 mar 2026 · Última mod.: 24 jul 2026 · CWE-59 · CWE-367

EPSS · 30d

0.1%EPSS · 30 días0.1%

2026-06-302026-07-25

Descripción técnica

The Claude SDK for Python provides access to the Claude API from Python applications. From version 0.86.0 to before version 0.87.0, the async local filesystem memory tool in the Anthropic Python SDK validated that model-supplied paths resolved inside the sandboxed memory directory, but then returned the unresolved path for subsequent file operations. A local attacker able to write to the memory directory could retarget a symlink between validation and use, causing reads or writes to escape the sandbox. The synchronous memory tool implementation was not affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.87.0.

Referencias oficiales

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