CVE-2026-37270
Trueview Security camera T18161- AF v4.9.60.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability caused by improper password validation and the
CVSS
9.8
Crítico
EPSS
0.4%
p30
KEV
—
Exploit Today
9
0-100
Publicado: 7 jul 2026 · Última mod.: 10 jul 2026 · CWE-287 · CWE-798
0.2%EPSS · 30 días0.4%
2026-07-082026-07-21
Trueview Security camera T18161- AF v4.9.60.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability caused by improper password validation and the presence of hard-coded credentials in the firmware.
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CVE-2026-8983——
——0Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51 contains a hard-coded authentication token that bypasses authorization checks for multiple management endpoints. An attacker can supply the special token value to invoke privileged functionality without valid authentication.9hCVE-2026-8982——
——0Two undocumented privileged accounts exist in Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51. The accounts use vendor-defined password derivation mechanisms based on device-specific values, allowing an attacker with knowledge of the algorithm and required inputs to authenticate to the web management interface with administrative privileges.9hCVE-2026-474109.8 CRÍ—
——0PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.12hCVE-2026-472558.2 ALT7.5%
——2AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.32 and @agenticmail/core prior to version 0.9.10 had weakness related to validation and and binding of inactive-agent hour filtering; storage SQL identifier validation; metadata-backed ownership checks for raw storage SQL; blocking direct storage metadata access through raw SQL; fail-closed outbound worker secret handling; SMTP envelope/header control-character validation before command construction; and TLS certificate verification as the default for MailSender with an explicit opt-out for local development. @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.32 and @agenticmail/core prior to version 0.9.10 are patched.15hCVE-2026-535959.4 CRÍ22.3%
——7FreeScout is a free help desk and shared inbox built with PHP's Laravel framework. Prior to version 1.8.224, the public endpoint `POST /user-setup/{hash}/{invite_sent_at}` (`OpenController@userSetupSave`) selects the target account solely by its `invite_hash` column, then overwrites that account's email and password and logs in as it. No authentication, cookie, or prior session is required. After a user activates, FreeScout sets `invite_hash` to the empty string. On MySQL and MariaDB, `VARCHAR` equality ignores trailing spaces, so a single URL-encoded space (`%20`) matches the stored empty string and selects the lowest-id activated user. The expiry guard decrypts `invite_sent_at` with the target's password hash, but `Helper::decrypt` returns its raw input unchanged when decryption fails. A plaintext numeric value such as `9999999999` therefore passes the time-to-live check without any secret. The result is that an anonymous attacker sets the email and password of the lowest-id activated FreeScout account (a support agent, or an administrator if one was added by invitation) and authenticates as that account. Version 1.8.224 contains a fix.11hCVE-2026-535918.6 ALT12.0%
——4FreeScout is a free help desk and shared inbox built with PHP's Laravel framework. Prior to version 1.8.223, an unauthenticated attacker can inject messages into any existing support conversation by sending a single email to the helpdesk's public address with a crafted `In-Reply-To` header. No credentials, tokens, or prior access are required. The injected message is rendered in the agent UI as a legitimate customer reply, the conversation is automatically reopened, and the `last_reply_from` field is set to the attacker's identity. Version 1.8.223 contains a fix.11h