CVE Watch26 ago 2026

CVE-2026-41292

NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 is vulnerable to a degradation of service attack related to parsing long lists of inco

CVSS

7.5

Alto

EPSS

0.7%

p51

KEV

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Exploit Today

0-100

Publicado: 20 may 2026 · Última mod.: 26 ago 2026 · CWE-407 · CWE-770 · CWE-1050

EPSS · 30d

0.6%EPSS · 30 días0.7%

2026-08-022026-08-30

Descripción técnica

NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 is vulnerable to a degradation of service attack related to parsing long lists of incoming EDNS options. An adversary sending queries with too many EDNS options can hold Unbound threads hostage while they are parsing and creating internal data structures for the options. Coordinated attacks can result in degradation and/or denial of service. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to limit acceptable incoming EDNS options (100).

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