CVE-2026-49860
Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, when a WebSocket connection was opened, Deno checked the destinat
CVSS
5.2
Medio
EPSS
0.1%
p3
KEV
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Exploit Today
1
0-100
Publicado: 23 jun 2026 · Última mod.: 25 oct 2026 · CWE-918
0.1%EPSS · 30 días0.1%
2026-09-302026-10-27
Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, when a WebSocket connection was opened, Deno checked the destination hostname against --deny-net rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the network restriction entirely. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-1185776.3 MED—
———A vulnerability was identified in maotoumao MusicFreeDesktop 0.0.6/0.0.7/0.0.8. Impacted is an unknown function of the component Request Forwarder. The manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The identifier of the patch is b0d3876247a0a64fa0e430e4b21870e41f503182. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue.6hCVE-2026-615728.6 ALT—
———AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0, `url_get_contents` in `objects/functions.php` accepts caller-controlled destinations after only `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` syntax validation, without rejecting private, loopback, or link-local addresses, and disables TLS peer verification. `Login::isLogged` reauthenticates using the attacker-settable `encoder_aVideoURL` cookie together with arbitrary nonempty `encoder_user` and `encoder_pass` cookies, and `Login::run` stores the raw fetched body in `result`. The unauthenticated `objects/login.json.php` endpoint returns that session object, enabling full-response exfiltration through a supplied `siteURL`; its `Streamer::isURLAllowed` gate allows all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, the default. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read internal HTTP and HTTPS responses, including cloud instance-metadata credentials, and reach internal TCP services. A further pre-authentication FTP variant in `view/youtubeDl.json.php` routes an ftp `videoURL` into `FTPDownloader`; `parseFtpUrl` in `objects/FTPDownloader.php` accepts its host and port for `ftp_connect`. This also enables requests to internal FTP services. Untrusted self-signed HTTPS certificates are accepted, and no account or operator interaction is required. Version 8.1.0 contains an initial remediation attempt that removes raw-response reflection and adds destination checks, but private-network exemptions and login TLS-verification defaults leave complete remediation of the described internal-network and TLS variants unresolved.7hCVE-2026-57448——
———Blombooru is a self-hosted personal booru for organizing and tagging private image collections. Prior to 1.40.0, the administrator-only `GET /proxy-image` endpoint, exposed as `/api/booru-import/proxy-image`, accepts a `url` query parameter and fetches it server-side without meaningful destination validation. `proxy_image()` in `backend/app/routes/booru_import.py` only checks whether the value starts with http, then uses `get_client_for_url` or `requests.get` and streams the response. Private, loopback and link-local addresses are not blocked, and automatically followed redirects can move a request from a trusted domain to an internal address. An authenticated administrator can enumerate internal services and access cloud instance metadata, potentially disclosing IAM credentials and crossing the application's intended cloud or network trust boundary. The reporter also observed a hanging recursive self-request. Administrator authentication remains a prerequisite; this is not an anonymous proxy. This issue is fixed in version 1.40.0.7hCVE-2026-1186608.6 ALT—
———Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. Prior to 21.0.0, Happy DOM loads iframe src URLs and link rel="stylesheet" href URLs by default while parsing untrusted HTML on the server because disableIframePageLoading and disableCSSFileLoading default to false. An attacker who controls parsed HTML can therefore cause server-side requests to arbitrary internal or cloud endpoints without an application opt-in and may expose confidential responses or credentials returned by those endpoints. This issue is fixed in version 21.0.0.8hCVE-2026-1186597.5 ALT—
———Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. Prior to 21.0.2, the Happy DOM server-renderer package's ServerRendererServer accepts unauthenticated HTTP/2 requests and resolves attacker-controlled :path values against server.targetOrigin in #onIncomingRequest in packages/@happy-dom/server-renderer/src/ServerRendererServer.ts without confirming that the resolved origin remains trusted before calling fetch. A protocol-relative path can change the destination to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS endpoint reachable by the server, including local and internal services, and the proxy relays the fetched response headers and body to the requester. This issue is fixed in version 21.0.2.8hCVE-2026-615294.7 MED—
———Endatix is a self-hosted form and survey management platform with a headless API. Prior to 0.7.0, the anonymous `POST /forms/{formId}/submissions` endpoint stores attacker-controlled `JsonData` after checking only that the JSON is well formed. A file object with `name`, `type` and `content` fields can contain an HTTP or HTTPS URL. When a staff member with `submissions.view` permission invokes `POST /forms/{formId}/submissions/{submissionId}/files`, `GetFilesHandler` passes the stored data to `SubmissionFileExtractor` in `src/Endatix.Infrastructure/Features/Submissions/SubmissionFileExtractor.cs`, which calls `HttpClient.GetAsync` without validating the destination URL, host or resolved IP addresses against internal address ranges. This permits stored, second-order server-side GET requests to internal services, cloud metadata, loopback and link-local addresses from the server's network position. The form must have `IsPublic` and `IsEnabled` set, and an anonymous submission must pass reCAPTCHA v3 when configured. The fetched response is placed in the staff viewer's ZIP, not returned directly to the attacker, so disclosure to the attacker is blind or indirect through observable request behavior or information exposed by the viewer. No integrity or availability impact is asserted; data: and raw-base64 `content` are decoded locally without network requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.7.0.9h