CVE-2026-52731
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, an attacker authenticated to an enabled Zebra RPC endpoint can terminate zeb
CVSS
6.5
Medio
EPSS
0.4%
p30
KEV
—
Exploit Today
9
0-100
Publicado: 18 ago 2026 · Última mod.: 18 ago 2026 · CWE-248
0.4%EPSS · 30 días0.4%
2026-08-192026-08-27
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, an attacker authenticated to an enabled Zebra RPC endpoint can terminate zebrad by supplying a getblocktemplate LongPollId containing multi-byte UTF-8 characters. In zebra-rpc/src/methods/types/long_poll.rs, LongPollId::from_str originally checked the input byte length and then sliced fixed byte ranges to parse encoded fields. A slice boundary can land inside a multi-byte character and trigger Rust's byte index is not a char boundary panic. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so one malformed authenticated RPC request terminates the entire node process and can be repeated after restart. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-554847.5 ALT—
———ALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.9hCVE-2026-822547.5 ALT—
———gitoxide before 0.69.0 contains unchecked array indexing in delta application and uncapped allocation from attacker-controlled size headers in gix-pack. Attackers can send crafted pack data during clone or fetch operations to trigger panics or out-of-memory process kills.13hCVE-2026-777817.5 ALT14.6%
——4Tie::Hash::Regex versions before 2.0.0 for Perl will throw an exception on unparseable lookup keys.
The FETCH, EXISTS and DELETE methods throw an exception when on malformed regular expressions.
Each method falls back to a regex match when the key is not already stored in the hash, compiling the caller's key with a bare qr// and no eval guard. A key that is not a valid regular expression pattern, such as a single unmatched bracket, dies.
An application that looks up externally supplied strings in a tied hash will die on an invalid key.1dCVE-2026-53530—16.5%
——5RaTeX is a KaTeX-compatible math rendering engine written in Rust. Prior to version 0.1.11, the public parser entrypoint `ratex_parser::parse(&str)` panics on the 9-byte input `\verbéxé` (i.e. `\verb` followed by the non-ASCII delimiter `é`). When handling a `\verb` command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (`arg[1..arg.len() - 1]`); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index `1` lands inside that character and Rust panics with *“byte index 1 is not a char boundary”*. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets `panic = "abort"` (`Cargo.toml:48`), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX. Version 0.1.11 fixes the issue.4dCVE-2026-527395.9 MED32.3%
——10ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.10dCVE-2026-52738—30.0%
——9ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.10d