CVE Watch14 sept 2026

CVE-2026-53716

Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.7.4 and

CVSS

6.5

Medio

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Publicado: 14 sept 2026 · Última mod.: 14 sept 2026 · CWE-789

EPSS · 30d

Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.

Descripción técnica

Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.7.4 and 1.8.1, getFileFromGZ in internal/wasm/httpfetcher.go calls io.ReadAll on a gzip.Reader without limiting decompressed output when a tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy.spec.wasm[].code.http.url points to a reachable compressed Wasm payload. The 256 MiB compressed-input cap does not constrain the expanded size, no operator Wasm URL allowlist exists, and the optional sha256 check occurs only after decompression, so a comparatively small gzip stream can force a multi-gigabyte allocation in the shared controller. The resulting out-of-memory termination restarts the controller, re-reconciles the persistent custom resource, and can create a persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.4 and 1.8.1.

Referencias oficiales

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