CVE Watch28 ago 2026

CVE-2026-55834

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes

CVSS

4.3

Medio

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Publicado: 28 ago 2026 · Última mod.: 28 ago 2026 · CWE-601

EPSS · 30d

Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.

Descripción técnica

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts reads the redirect_uri query parameter and frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte uses the raw callbackURL in redirectWithError when prompt=none cannot complete silent authorization. The client-side path only blocks javascript and data schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, so an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid client_id can redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.

Referencias oficiales

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