CVE-2026-57135
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.2.3 until 1.7.2, SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode in src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/
CVSS
7.6
Alto
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Publicado: 15 sept 2026 · Última mod.: 15 sept 2026 · CWE-653 · CWE-693
Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.2.3 until 1.7.2, SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode in src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts uses buildEnv() only to inject invalid http_proxy and https_proxy environment variables and does not establish an operating-system network boundary. Programs that ignore those proxy variables can open sockets directly, allowing supposedly isolated commands to reach localhost, internal services, cloud metadata, or external hosts and potentially exfiltrate data. An initial remediation was released in version 1.7.2.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-571389.9 CRÍ—
——0PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.4.0 until 1.7.2, codeMode in src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts executes untrusted JavaScript with new Function() inside with(sandbox) and relies on a small source-code blocklist plus shadowed process and require properties. Code can use ({}).constructor.constructor to recover the real Function constructor, obtain process and process.mainModule.require, and reach host filesystem and subprocess APIs despite the advertised sandbox. Attackers who control codeMode input can read secrets, modify files, execute commands, or exhaust the host process. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.2hCVE-2026-571378.8 ALT—
——0PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.4.0 until 1.7.2, createAgentLoop() in src/praisonai-ts/src/ai/agent-loop.ts passes executable tools to generateText() before invoking the onToolCall approval callback. Because the wrapped AI SDK executes tool handlers during generation, a callback that returns false records tool_rejected only after the denied tool has already produced side effects and populated toolResults. Applications using onToolCall as a human or policy approval boundary can therefore execute rejected file, command, API, or data-modifying operations. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.2hCVE-2026-571368.8 ALT—
——0PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.2.3 until 1.7.2, CommandValidator in src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts validates only the first whitespace-delimited executable against allowedCommands, then SandboxExecutor passes the complete command string to sh -c. A command beginning with an allowed executable can append a non-allowlisted command through shell metacharacters, causing arbitrary commands to run with the PraisonAI process privileges. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.2hCVE-2026-571338.8 ALT—
——0PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.5.1 until 1.7.2, the shell() helper exported from src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts checks only the first whitespace-delimited token against safeCommands and then passes the complete original string to child_process.exec(). A string that starts with an allowed read-only command can append a second non-allowlisted command through shell syntax, allowing arbitrary command execution with the PraisonAI process privileges. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.2hCVE-2026-47424——
——0Open Access Management (OpenAM) is an access management solution. Prior to 16.1.1, GroovySandboxValueFilter permits an authenticated server-side script author to escape the scripting sandbox despite the default class allow and deny lists. A user such as a sub-realm RealmAdmin who can create or edit a script in an executed context can invoke operating-system commands as the OpenAM application server account, crossing the realm-scoped administration boundary and compromising the JVM and every realm it serves. This issue is fixed in version 16.1.1.3hCVE-2026-571206.5 MED—
——0PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, execute_code sandbox mode permits runtime assembly of blocklisted dunder names and allows str.format or str.format_map to resolve dotted fields through C-level attribute access that bypasses _safe_getattr. This exposes class, qualified-name, base-class, globals, and object-dictionary attributes to prompt-influenced code when approval is automatically granted, producing a high-impact read primitive without establishing a complete in-process execution chain. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.22h