CVE Watch29 jul 2026

CVE-2026-59243

The FAB auth manager's Azure AD OAuth login defaulted `verify_signature=False` when decoding the ID token, so an attacker able to present a

CVSS

—

Sin CVSS

EPSS

—

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Publicado: 29 jul 2026 · Última mod.: 29 jul 2026 · CWE-347

EPSS · 30d

Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.

Descripción técnica

The FAB auth manager's Azure AD OAuth login defaulted `verify_signature=False` when decoding the ID token, so an attacker able to present a forged or unsigned (`alg:none`) ID token to the OAuth callback could bypass authentication and log in as an arbitrary user, including one holding the Admin role (CWE-347). Deployments running the FAB auth manager with the Azure AD OAuth login path under its default configuration are affected; the Authentik path already defaulted to `True`. This issue affects `apache-airflow-providers-fab` before 3.7.3. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-fab` 3.7.3, which defaults `verify_signature=True`.

Referencias oficiales

CVEs relacionados

CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.

CVE-2026-656168.8 ALT

8.7%

——3Incorrect authorization validation in refresh token signature allows non-admin users to obtain a signed JFrog administrator token.2d CVE-2026-148377.8 ALT

0.3%

——0Multiple Lenze products are affected by an improper signature verification vulnerability in the SSH enablement mechanism. A low-privileged local attacker can bypass verification of the SSH enable file signature and enable SSH access on the device. Successful exploitation may result in unauthorized administrative access and complete system compromise.2d CVE-2026-480219.1 CRÍ

2.5%

——1In epa4all, prior to version 2026-05-20, an attacker who can intercept the TLS connection between epa4all and the ePA backend can complete the VAU handshake with attacker-controlled keys and obtain the session encryption keys. All inner HTTP traffic (patient consent decisions, medication data, document operations, authorization tokens, and entitlement queries) becomes readable and modifiable. The attacker can also inject arbitrary requests through the hijacked channel. This issue has been patched in version 2026-05-20.5d CVE-2026-526863.7 BAJ

1.7%

——1The issue is a DNSSEC validation bypass where wildcard expansion proofs (NSEC/NSEC3 records) are accepted without signature validation when the wildcard answer is a CNAME or DNAME record.6d CVE-2026-130897.5 ALT

15.3%

——5OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify. When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion). The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected. Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.2d CVE-2026-107236.8 MED

18.3%

——6BIND may accept incorrect child-zone NSEC3 records as valid, which could allow an attacker to forge authenticated NXDOMAIN responses. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.7d