CVE Watch23 sept 2026

CVE-2026-67232

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The cowboy WebSocket options at l

CVSS

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EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Publicado: 23 sept 2026 · Última mod.: 23 sept 2026 · CWE-409

EPSS · 30d

Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.

Descripción técnica

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The cowboy WebSocket options at line 117 set compress => true, enabling RFC 7692 permessage-deflate negotiation. The handler does not set max_frame_size, so cowboy's default of infinity applies. cowlib's cow_ws:parse_payload/9 calls zlib:inflate/2 on the compressed payload with no output-size limit. An attacker can negotiate permessage-deflate during the WebSocket upgrade and send a frame containing a zlib bomb (e.g. 50 KB → 5 GB). Decompression occurs in the connection process before websocket_handle/2 ever sees the MQTT bytes. An unauthenticated attacker can crash a RabbitMQ node running the Web-MQTT plugin by sending a single highly-compressed WebSocket frame (a few KB on the wire) that inflates to gigabytes in memory. The cowboy WebSocket handler decompresses the entire frame before the MQTT CONNECT packet is processed, so no credentials are required. Preconditions include rabbitmq_web_mqtt plugin enabled (not default, but common for browser clients) Network reachability to port 15675/15676 No authentication required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

Referencias oficiales

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