CVE Watch5 ago 2026

CVE-2026-70488

Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.6 until 0.11.0, the sync cleanup endpoint aut

CVSS

4.3

Medio

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

0-100

Publicado: 4 ago 2026 · Última mod.: 5 ago 2026 · CWE-639 · CWE-863

EPSS · 30d

Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.

Descripción técnica

Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.6 until 0.11.0, the sync cleanup endpoint authorized write access to the knowledge base in the URL but then acted on directory and file ids supplied in the request body without checking that those objects belonged to that knowledge base. A user with write access to one knowledge base could delete directories and remove file embeddings from another knowledge base, causing documents to drop out of retrieval results and breaking chat-with-file for targeted documents without disclosing contents. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.

Referencias oficiales

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