CVE-2026-71205
changedetection.io's /login route checks the submitted password against a single PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash with no per-IP or per-session rate
CVSS
6.5
Medio
EPSS
0.2%
p6
KEV
—
Exploit Today
2
0-100
Publicado: 5 ago 2026 · Última mod.: 5 ago 2026 · CWE-307
Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.
changedetection.io's /login route checks the submitted password against a single PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash with no per-IP or per-session rate limiting, failed-attempt counter, or lockout (no rate-limiting library is present in requirements.txt). Because the entire application is protected by one shared password with no per-user accounts, a successful brute-force guess grants full administrative access, including the ability to view/regenerate the API token.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-480847.4 ALT—
———OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Versions prior to 1.0.2 don't throttle failed passphrase login attempts. An attacker can submit unlimited wrong passphrase guesses against any known email address, capped only by the Argon2 verification cost (about 100 milliseconds per attempt on the tested host, giving 10 attempts per second sustained). The same backend implements a working per-account throttle on the WebAuthn challenge endpoint, which returns HTTP 429 after roughly 19 attempts. The passphrase branch simply does not invoke that throttle, leaving a supported high-value login path unprotected against credential stuffing and dictionary attacks. The asymmetry confirms this is an oversight rather than a design choice. The throttle infrastructure exists, is wired into the same auth backend, and works on the WebAuthn path. The passphrase branch in `/api/auth/login` was not updated to record failed attempts. Combined with the application's minimum-passphrase policy (12 characters, no entropy or dictionary checks), accounts using common base patterns such as `Spring2026!XX` or words from a leak corpus are realistically reachable in days on a single CPU, hours on a small GPU farm. Version 1.0.2 patches the issue.11hCVE-2026-480715.8 MED—
———OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the PIN-type challenge throttle uses `emailHash` as the only key. The throttle rows live in the central `challenge_throttle` table, which is shared across all tenants. Every tenant's `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/verify-challenge` endpoint increments the same row when a PIN response fails, and every tenant's `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/challenge` endpoint reads the same row when deciding whether to issue a new challenge. When the same `emailHash` exists in multiple tenants on the same OpenReception instance (the same patient holding tunnels in two different clinics that share the platform), an attacker who knows the patient's email can lock out that patient on tenant B by issuing failed challenge responses against tenant A. The attacker needs no relationship to tenant B; the lockout propagates through the shared throttle row. The lockout escalates with repeated failures. The first lockout triggers at 4 failed attempts and lasts approximately 60 seconds. Subsequent failures escalate the lockout duration to 5 minutes, 30 minutes, and 60 minutes per the throttle service's escalation logic. Repeated bursts produce sustained denial of service against the targeted email. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue.11hCVE-2026-712139.1 CRÍ28.5%
——9Typemill's login endpoint (POST /tm/login, ControllerWebAuth::login()) performs no rate-limiting, failed-attempt counting, or account lockout when captcha is disabled, which is the default configuration. An unauthenticated attacker can send unlimited password-guessing requests against any account, including administrators, with no throttling. The only attempt-counting/lockout logic present in the same file protects an optional secondary email-authcode step and does not apply to the primary password check.2dCVE-2026-8793—49.0%
——15PaperCut NG/MF does not properly restrict excessive authentication attempts within its login component. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform unrestricted brute-force or credential-stuffing attacks without triggering account lockout or rate-limiting mechanisms in some configurations.4dCVE-2026-151447.3 ALT16.6%
——5@fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option.2dCVE-2026-163478.8 ALT14.3%
——4MikroTik RouterOS contains a weakness in its API authentication handling that lacks effective safeguards against excessive login attempts. The system does not enforce meaningful rate-limiting, account lockout, or source-based restrictions, allowing repeated authentication failures to proceed without defensive response. In some versions, a fixed per-connection delay is present, but it can be bypassed through concurrent sessions, resulting in continued high-volume attempts. This deficiency increases the risk that an attacker could eventually obtain valid credentials and gain unauthorized access to administrative services.8d