CVE Watch21 sept 2026

CVE-2026-73547

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy's

CVSS

7.5

Alto

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Publicado: 21 sept 2026 · Última mod.: 21 sept 2026 · CWE-20 · CWE-476

EPSS · 30d

Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.

Descripción técnica

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy's ext_authz filter assumes that a request contains a :path pseudoheader when applying query_parameters_to_set or query_parameters_to_remove from an authorization response. A path-less CONNECT request makes request_headers_->Path() return null, and Filter::onComplete dereferences that pointer while parsing the query string. An unauthenticated downstream client can crash the Envoy process when the filter and authorization response use query-parameter mutation. The relevant scope boundary is that the deployment must accept path-less CONNECT and configure ext_authz query-parameter mutation. This issue is fixed in versions 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1.

Referencias oficiales

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