CVE-2026-82644
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) contains a brute-force rate limiting bypass in enforceRateLimit(), which protects login.json.php
CVSS
7.5
Alto
EPSS
—
KEV
—
Exploit Today
0
0-100
Publicado: 30 ago 2026 · Última mod.: 30 ago 2026 · CWE-307
Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) contains a brute-force rate limiting bypass in enforceRateLimit(), which protects login.json.php and 13 other endpoints. The function stores its attempt counter via a cache layer (ObjectYPT::setCacheGlobal) that silently discards writes for any client identified as a bot by isBot(). Because isBot() treats a missing User-Agent header as a bot by default — and also matches common bot identifiers such as 'curl', 'bot', 'crawler', and 'spider' — the counter never increments for such clients, so the rate limit never fires. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore submit unlimited login attempts (e.g., by omitting the User-Agent header or using curl's default User-Agent), enabling unrestricted password-guessing attacks.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-826436.5 MED—
——0WWBN AVideo contains an unauthenticated credential submission vulnerability in plugin/Live/api/preauthorize.json.php that accepts credentials over GET without rate limiting. Attackers can submit correct credentials repeatedly to trigger uncapped two-factor confirmation emails and perform sustained password guessing attacks against user accounts.6hCVE-2026-78617—24.7%
——7WatchGuard Dimension's web login endpoint does not enforce effective rate-limiting or account lockout by default allowing a remote attacker to perform automated password guessing against user accounts. If the account lockout setting is enabled, brute-force attempts are blocked after a defined number of failed attempts, but this setting is not enabled by default.2dCVE-2026-769407.5 ALT28.6%
——9The affected Ebyte device does not restrict repeated authentication
attempts through rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms. This could
allow an attacker to perform automated authentication attacks against
deployments that rely on password based authentication.2dCVE-2026-786559.1 CRÍ40.5%
——12Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl allow the second-factor attempt limit to be reset by replaying an earlier session cookie because the challenge route counts failures in the session.
The POST handler on challenge_path keeps the failure count as tries inside the totp_pending record in the session, raising it on each rejected code and deleting the pending record once it reaches attempts, five by default. Punk::Session carries the session in a signed cookie unless the application declares a store, and keeps no server-side record, so an earlier value of the same session stays valid until the expiry stamped inside it. A client that saves the cookie before its failed attempts and presents it again gets the pending record back with its counter, and the limit never fires. The replayed record is accepted while its own expiry, pending_ttl seconds from the challenge and 300 by default, has not passed.
Sessions declared with a store are not affected: the pending record and its counter then live server-side.
The attempt limit does not bound guessing of the second factor, which is left to the per-address rate limit the plugin registers on the same path, 30 requests per 60 seconds.4dCVE-2026-78551—33.6%
——10RansomLook contains multiple weaknesses in its authentication endpoint that allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate valid usernames, perform unrestricted password-guessing attacks, and potentially exhaust application worker resources.
For local authentication, the login implementation previously checked whether a submitted username existed before invoking the password hash verification function. Requests containing a nonexistent username therefore returned significantly faster than requests for valid accounts, for which the computationally expensive password verification routine was executed. A remote attacker could measure these response-time differences to determine which usernames correspond to valid RansomLook accounts.
In addition, the /login endpoint did not restrict the number or frequency of failed authentication attempts. An attacker could consequently perform password brute-force, dictionary, password-spraying, or credential-stuffing attacks against known accounts without server-side throttling. For valid usernames, each authentication attempt also invokes the password key-derivation function, which consumes a significant amount of CPU time. A sufficiently high rate of login attempts could therefore occupy the application's synchronous Gunicorn workers and cause a denial of service affecting the entire application.
The issue has been addressed by always performing password verification using a randomly generated dummy password hash when the supplied username does not exist, eliminating the username-dependent timing discrepancy. Failed authentication attempts are additionally rate-limited per client IP address using Valkey/Redis, with five failed attempts within five minutes resulting in a one-hour block. The reverse-proxy configuration was also updated so that the application derives the client address from a trusted X-Forwarded-For value that cannot be overridden by a client-supplied header.6dCVE-2026-217555.3 MED11.6%
——3HCL Hive is affected by a missing rate limit which could allow an attacker unauthorized access via brute-force or credential stuffing attacks, or cause a denial of service.2d