CVE-2026-97063
X-SpringBoot through 6.0 returns login verification codes in HTTP responses from unauthenticated endpoints GET /sys/mobile/code and GET /sys
CVSS
9.1
Crítico
EPSS
0.3%
p20
KEV
—
Exploit Today
6
0-100
Publicado: 25 sept 2026 · Última mod.: 25 sept 2026 · CWE-287
Sin historial EPSS suficiente todavía.
X-SpringBoot through 6.0 returns login verification codes in HTTP responses from unauthenticated endpoints GET /sys/mobile/code and GET /sys/email/code without sending them to account owners. Attackers can request codes using known mobile numbers or email addresses, read them from responses, and authenticate as victims via POST /sys/emailOrMobileLogin/login to hijack accounts.
- github.comhttps://github.com/LinYuanyi1/cve-request-poc/blob/master/x-springboot/02_sms-code-account-takeover.py
- github.comhttps://github.com/yzcheng90/X-SpringBoot
- github.comhttps://github.com/yzcheng90/X-SpringBoot/blob/d74ddba989c0449948ff1ddb0d211b6a7ce81bfa/src/main/java/com/suke/czx/modules/sys/controller/SysLoginController.java#L94-L134
- www.vulncheck.comhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/x-springboot-through-6.0-authentication-bypass-via-login-code
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-859849.8 CRÍ—
——0The miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via the mo_wp_login_intent parameter in all versions up to, and including, 5.5.5. This is due to a missing password-intent guard in the skip_pass_fallback-enabled configuration branch of the mo_by_pass_login() function, which treats administrator role membership alone as sufficient authentication whenever the unauthenticated, unverified POST parameter mo_wp_login_intent is submitted with the value otp, causing mo_get_user() to skip wp_authenticate_username_password() and resolve a WP_User purely from a username lookup. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing administrator account by supplying only a known username and an empty password alongside mo_wp_login_intent=otp, with no password or OTP verification required. Exploitation is conditional on a site administrator having simultaneously enabled the following plugin options: WP Login OTP, Login with Only OTP, Allow Users to Login with Username and Password, and Admin OTP Bypass.7hCVE-2026-1007097.5 ALT—
——0Froxlor through 2.3.10 stores only a numeric user ID in remembered-2FA tokens (panel_2fa_tokens) without recording the account namespace, and the remembered-token lookup during login is not constrained to the customer or administrator account type. Because customer and administrator IDs are allocated from separate namespaces, a remembered-2FA token legitimately issued to a customer with a given ID also matches an administrator with the same ID. An attacker who controls a customer account with a colliding ID, holds a valid remembered-2FA cookie for it, and already knows the target administrator's password can bypass the administrator's TOTP second factor and obtain an authenticated administrator session. This is a second-factor bypass only; it does not defeat password authentication. Fixed in 2.3.12.7hCVE-2026-1006848.1 ALT—
——0Budibase versions 3.41.0 before 3.45.0 contain an authentication bypass in the OIDC/SSO login path of @budibase/server. In sso.authenticate, when no existing user matches the incoming SSO subject, the server looks up pending user invites by the IdP-asserted email address alone — without validating an invite code and without an email_verified check (the email_verified gate protects only the existing-account lookup). An attacker who can register at an IdP that the tenant trusts for OIDC and assert a victim's invited email address (even with email_verified=false) claims the pending invite and inherits all of its granted privileges, including builder and admin.global, with no admin exclusion. This results in takeover of the invited principal and, for admin invites, full tenant compromise (access to all apps, datasources including production credentials, and automations); the invite is consumed, denying onboarding to the legitimate invitee.16hCVE-2026-1006077.7 ALT—
——0Flowise through 3.1.4 resolves SSO and local-password users solely by email without storing provider or subject identifier bindings, allowing attackers to authenticate as any existing user by claiming their email at any configured SSO provider. Attackers can gain complete account access including chatflows, credentials, and API keys by authenticating through a different SSO provider or local password than the victim's original registration method.16hCVE-2026-1006067.7 ALT—
——0Flowise through 3.1.4 (Enterprise/platform mode with SSO enabled) contains an authentication bypass in the SSO login path. When an SSO callback arrives with an email matching a user whose status is INVITED, verifyAndLogin (SSOBase.ts:80-94) copies the user record from the database — including the server-stored single-use invitation tempToken — into the data passed to AccountService.register(). The register handler's token lookup, email match, and expiry checks therefore pass trivially against the server's own token instead of a caller-supplied one, and the account and its organization membership are flipped to ACTIVE. As a result, anyone able to authenticate at any configured SSO provider using a pending invitee's email address as the email claim can take over that invitation and obtain the invited user's access to the organization without ever possessing the emailed invitation token, for as long as the invitation is valid (24 hours by default). At the time of the advisory no patched version was available.16hCVE-2026-84458—26.8%
——8Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, when the "Automatic account link on initial logon" setting is enabled, Zammad binds an incoming third-party (SSO) identity to an existing local account by matching the email address the identity provider reports, without verifying that the provider actually confirmed ownership of that email. An attacker who controls any identity at a configured provider, including, by default, any Azure AD tenant via Zammad's multi-tenant Microsoft 365 /common app registration, can set that identity's email to a victim's address, authenticate, and be logged in as the victim. This bypasses the victim's local password entirely and affects any existing account, including agents and administrators. Zammad will honor the xms_edov ID token claim when email verification is required in the Microsoft 365 setting, treating a missing claim as unverified. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2.1d