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Vulnerabilidades417,801–417,840 · 418,259
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CVE-2026-99521—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rapidio: mport_cdev: fix use-after-free in mport_mm_close() A use-after-free vulnerability was identified in mport_mm_close() in drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c, identical to the pattern previously addressed in dma_req_free(). This is observable from userspace when an application creates an mmap mapping via the RapidIO character device and subsequently unmaps it (or terminates, triggering exit_mmap()). During munmap, mport_mm_close() is invoked and drops the mapping reference via kref_put(). If kref_put() drops the last reference, mport_release_mapping() is called, which frees the underlying rio_mport_mapping structure. The subsequent mutex_unlock() then dereferences map->md to unlock buf_mutex, leading to a use-after-free: mport_mm_close() -> mutex_lock(&map->md->buf_mutex); ... -> kref_put(&map->ref, mport_release_mapping); /* map is freed */ -> mutex_unlock(&map->md->buf_mutex); /* UAF: map used */ Fix this by caching map->md before kref_put() and using the cached pointer for mutex unlocking, ensuring that freed memory is not accessed.11h
CVE-2026-99516—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-fc: fix use-after-free in nvmet_fc_ls_create_connection() nvmet_fc_ls_create_connection() looks up the association with nvmet_fc_find_target_assoc(), which returns it with a reference held, and drops that reference as soon as the target queue has been allocated. iod->assoc is then dereferenced again by nvmet_fc_makeconnid() while building the connection id. The queue only borrows the pointer and takes no reference of its own. Once the lookup reference is dropped the association is kept alive solely by the reference taken when it was created, so a disconnect LS or a remote port unregister running concurrently can free it before nvmet_fc_makeconnid() reads it: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:193 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1841 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888179f1b000 by task kworker/u9:2/1167 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:193 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1841 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3322 kernel/workqueue.c:3405) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (archkernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) </TASK> Freed by task 1167 on cpu 0 at 405.998150s: kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:57 mm/kasan/common.c:78) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285) kfree (include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2705 mm/slub.c:6405 mm/slub.c:6720) nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1808 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3322 kernel/workqueue.c:3405) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (archkernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888179f1b000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff888179f1b000, ffff888179f1b800) Hold the lookup reference until the response has been built, and drop it on the error path as well.11h
CVE-2026-126086—
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———In Eclipse Dataspace Components (EDC) – Connector (`org.eclipse.edc:decentralized-claims-*`, `org.eclipse.edc:jwt-verifiable-credentials`, `org.eclipse.edc:ldp-verifiable-credentials`) there's a credential verification bypass in Decentralized Claims Protocol (DCP) presentation handling: a participant can present credentials appearing to be issued by any trusted issuer without holding them.11h
CVE-2026-99514—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Fix superblock use-after-free in release_inode() Without this fix, release_inode() (task 1) can race with a umount operation in hook_sb_delete() (task 2). The order of operations in which the race occurs is: * task 2: hook_sb_delete() arrives at the end of the function, waiting for landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs to become zero. * task 1: release_inode(): does atomic_long_dec_and_test(), decrementing inode_refs to zero. * task 2: gets woken up through some other means, sees that inode_refs is zero and returns. The caller is the unmount operation and proceeds to release the superblock. * task 1: Runs wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs), *dereferencing the sb_security on the freed-up superblock*. Notably, wake_up_var() does not dereference the pointer passed to it, and only uses it to determine an overapproximated set of tasks to wake up. So while it's potentially possible for an attacker to provide a different value for that pointer, this only results in the wrong set of tasks getting woken up, and in this scenario, no further tasks are actually waiting. Nevertheless, KASAN detects it as a slab-use-after-free read on sb->s_security: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in release_inode+0x196/0x290 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888103b6c0a8 by task repro/217 release_inode+0x196/0x290 landlock_put_object+0x71/0x90 landlock_free_rules+0x38/0xc0 landlock_put_ruleset+0x47/0x130 fop_ruleset_release+0x33/0x40 __fput+0x305/0x780 Freed by task 54: kfree+0x11c/0x390 process_scheduled_works+0x766/0xe50 worker_thread+0x7bc/0xb20 The fix is to determine &landlock_superblock(inode->i_sb)->inode_refs only once earlier in release_inode(), and later use that precalculated address for the wake_up_var() call, without having to dereference through the superblock.11h
CVE-2026-99511—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx23885: Fix use-after-free in cx23885_finidev due to race condition In cx23885_v4l2_dev_notify_init, &dev->cx25840_work is bound with cx23885_av_work_handler, and &dev->ir_rx_work and &dev->ir_tx_work are bound with cx23885_ir_rx_work_handler and cx23885_ir_tx_work_handler. cx23885_irq can schedule these works on system_wq when an AV_CORE interrupt is received, and the IR subdevice can also schedule the IR works from its interrupt service routine via the v4l2_device notify callback. If we remove the device, cx23885_finidev makes cleanup and the memory allocated for dev is released by kfree(dev), while the works mentioned above may still be pending or running. The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows: CPU0 CPU1 | cx23885_irq | schedule_work(&dev->cx25840_work) cx23885_finidev | cx23885_input_fini(dev) | cx23885_ir_fini(dev) | cx23885_shutdown(dev) | free_irq(pci_dev->irq, dev) | pci_disable_device(pci_dev) | cx23885_dev_unregister(dev) | v4l2_device_unregister(v4l2_dev) | kfree(dev) | // dev is freed | | cx23885_av_work_handler | // use dev (use-after-free) Fix it by canceling the works after the IRQ handler that can schedule them has been stopped, and before proceeding with the remaining cleanup in cx23885_finidev. Note that the flush_work() calls in cx23885_input_ir_stop() do not close this race: they only wait for works that are already queued or running at that moment, they do not prevent the IRQ handler, which is still registered at that point, from scheduling the works again afterwards, and they are skipped entirely when dev->sd_ir is NULL. The cancel_work_sync() calls are therefore placed after free_irq(), the only point at which no new work can be scheduled.11h
CVE-2026-1215935.0 MED
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———Mattermost Plugins versions <=12.-1 11.0.11 11.11.7 11.2.10.0 fail to verify that the caller can post in a run's channel when executing a checklist slash command which allows an authenticated run participant to post arbitrary messages into a private channel they are not a member of via the checklist item run endpoint. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-007309h
CVE-2026-879779.8 CRÍ
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———IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to SQL injection in the edge-controller component. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to access or modify sensitive database information.4h
CVE-2026-99506—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb: fix use-after-free of a new anon folio For a fault in a private mapping with nothing in the page cache, hugetlb_no_page() allocates a folio, locks it and maps it. The folio has one reference, which belongs to the page table entry from then on. After dropping the page table lock the function still sets the migratable flag of the folio and unlocks it. Whoever zaps the entry in between frees the folio. The fault holds the fault mutex and the lock of the vma. MADV_DONTNEED and the first unmap of a hole punch, hugetlb_vmdelete_list(), do not take the fault mutex, and a private vma only has a lock if it owns a reservation map: not with MAP_NORESERVE, and not in the child after fork(). Then the flag is set in, and folio_unlock() is called on, a folio that is free or has a new owner. A surplus page goes back to the page allocator while it is locked: BUG: Bad page state in process init pfn:108e00 flags: 0x200000000000059(locked|uptodate|dirty|head|node=0|zone=2) page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set A page of the pool can be given to the next user, of any file, who locks it and loses the lock to the late folio_unlock(): kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1532! hugetlb_no_page+0x111b/0x23e0 hugetlb_fault+0x3a9/0x14a0 An unprivileged process is enough: threads that write to a MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_NORESERVE hugetlb mapping, threads that call MADV_DONTNEED on it, and one that takes the freed pages for another file. Until commit 3a47c54f09c4 ("hugetlbfs: revert use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization") the fault held i_mmap_rwsem for reading, which everybody who zaps takes for writing. The lock that commit bf4916922c60 ("hugetlbfs: extend hugetlb_vma_lock to private VMAs") gave to private vmas closed the window again, but only for those with a reservation map. Be done with the folio before the page table lock is dropped, as hugetlb_wp() is with its copy. The function already unlocks page cache folios under that lock. Original fix generated by an LLM and sent in private by Josef. [david@kernel.org: simplify+move comment]11h
CVE-2026-99503—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv: static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host) { struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host->private_data; iounmap(host_priv->hcr_base); kfree(host_priv); } ->host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop() devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been started. The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree(). Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop(). Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL.11h
CVE-2026-99495—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies. Add length validation before accessing reply message structures in zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to prevent out-of-bounds reads and potential kernel memory disclosure. Also rework these three functions to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment. Additionally improve some of the later invoked evaluation functions which further check the payload. Add comments about length assumptions and for the type50 processing rework the payload processing completely with removing a misplaced BUG_ON().11h
CVE-2026-99490—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Fix Use-After-Free in wacom_bamboo_pad wacom_bamboo_pad_pen_event() accesses wacom->shared->pen locklessly relative to wacom_remove_shared_data() which nullifies it. This can lead to a Use-After-Free if the sibling device is removed while events are being processed. Resolve this by introducing RCU protection for pen and touch pointers: - Annotate 'pen' and 'touch' in wacom_shared struct with __rcu. - Wrap lockless readers in wacom_bamboo_pad_pen_event() with rcu_read_lock() and rcu_dereference(). - Update writers in wacom_sys.c using rcu_assign_pointer(). - Use rcu_dereference_protected for comparisons under wacom_udev_list_lock. - Also use rcu_access_pointer in wacom_sibling_pending() and wacom_mode_change_work() to avoid warnings (while lockless access in the latter remains a pre-existing issue).11h
CVE-2026-929065.5 MED
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———IBM watsonx.data 2.4.0 through 2.4.0 patch 8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to client-side enforcement of business rules.5h
CVE-2026-99489—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Redesign shared sibling data lifecycle The Wacom driver coordinates state between sibling interfaces of the same physical device using a shared structure 'wacom_shared' inside 'wacom_hdev_data'. The driver kept a volatile representative pointer 'data->dev' pointing to a sibling 'hid_device' for physical path comparisons during sibling matching. This pointer management is fragile. When the representative device is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() failed to clear/update 'data->dev', leading to a Use-After-Free vulnerability when subsequent sibling probes dereference the dangling 'data->dev' pointer. Resolve this issue by redesigning the sibling data lifecycle: - Eliminate the volatile 'data->dev' representative pointer completely - Redesign 'wacom_hdev_data' to store stable static copies of the required attributes upon first allocation: 'phys' path string, 'vendor', 'product' IDs and the sibling's 'device_type' - Use these static attributes for stable sibling matching in wacom_are_sibling() and wacom_get_hdev_data() This ensures sibling matching remains safe and stable even if individual siblings are dynamically added or removed. To secure the lifecycle against concurrent probe/disconnect races: - Switch kref_put() to kref_put_mutex() in wacom_remove_shared_data() to serialize refcount drops with list traversal and lookup - Modify wacom_release_shared_data() to assume the list lock is already held Also, do not accumulate the 'device_type' capability flag during subsequent sibling probes. Keeping only the first probed sibling's device_type exactly preserves the original sibling matching behavior without introducing side effects.11h
CVE-2026-99485—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a failed start frees it again: hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox); ... ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...); if (ret) goto free_channel; ... free_channel: xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann); hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL, aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them. It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live, after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every later user of it takes the non-NULL branch: - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(), - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() -> aie2_destroy_context(), - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() -> aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() -> aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(), and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel() followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel. The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly - aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing it. Do the same here. The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails, xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling ->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer never outlives the structure holding it. Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and request_irq() can fail.11h
CVE-2026-99484—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: emux: Fix UAF of soundfont zones at note-on snd_emux_note_on() looks up the matching zones via snd_soundfont_search_zone(), which takes sflist->lock only during the lookup and returns the raw zone pointers after releasing it. The caller then stores them in vp->zone without any protection. Meanwhile, a concurrent SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_REMOVE_LAST_SAMPLES ioctl may unlink and free those zones in snd_soundfont_remove_unlocked(); this leads to a use-after-free in snd_emux_note_on(), and later at accessing the cached vp->zone, e.g. in snd_emux_send_effect(). Fix it by holding sflist->lock in snd_emux_note_on() over the whole zone lookup and voice setup, and let snd_soundfont_search_zone() require the caller to hold the lock, instead. snd_soundfont_lock_preset() takes sflist->lock for setting presets_locked, so the removal path now syncs with the note-on finish.11h
CVE-2026-99482—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: amd: ps: fix snd_acp63_remove() teardown ordering The ACP IRQ handlers dereference the SoundWire, SoundWire DMA, and PDM child platform devices, but snd_acp63_remove() unregisters them while the interrupt is still held by devres, which frees it only after remove returns. An interrupt in this window is a use-after-free. Mask the ACP interrupt sources and call devm_free_irq() before the first child device is unregistered. The masking goes through the new acp_hw_ops->disable_interrupts callback, keeping the remove path platform-agnostic. The interrupt line is shared, and acp_hw_deinit() clears the sources only after the children are gone, which would leave the line raised with no handler left to ack it. The window predates the tagged refactor, which only reshaped the dereferences. devm_free_irq() waits for in-flight handlers, but not for work the hardirq has already queued: acp63_irq_handler() schedules amd_sdw_irq_thread on the SoundWire manager. Draining that work in the manager's remove path is a soundwire-side change and follows separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.11h
CVE-2026-99477—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: pin mm_users in do_pagemap_scan() The PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl takes mmap_read_lock() on an mm obtained from /proc/<pid>/pagemap without holding a reference to mm_users. proc_mem_open() deliberately grabs only mm_count, so a consumer that touches the address space has to call mmget_not_zero() first. Every other consumer in this file does -- m_start(), do_procmap_query(), show_smaps_rollup() and pagemap_read() -- but do_pagemap_scan() does not. Without that reference the target can reach exit_mmap() concurrently, and exit_mmap() calls unmap_vmas() while holding mmap_lock only for reading, which does not exclude the scanner. For ordinary VMAs this is harmless, as free_pgtables() and remove_vma() run afterwards under mmap_write_lock. A shared hugetlb VMA is different: __hugetlb_zap_end() frees the VMA's hugetlb_vma_lock inside the read-locked phase. walk_hugetlb_range() can therefore load vma->vm_private_data, have the lock freed underneath it, and then down_read() a freed rw_semaphore. The load happens before the freeing side clears the pointer, so this is a use-after-free and not a NULL dereference. Any unprivileged user can reach it with no huge pages configured, as hugetlb_reserve_pages() allocates the lock before the VM_NORESERVE early return. Pin mm_users across the scan, the way the other consumers do. mmput() from the exiting task can then no longer reach exit_mmap() while a walk is in progress. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded & undesirable test for !mm]11h
CVE-2026-1215926.5 MED
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———Mattermost Plugins versions <=12.-1 11.0.11 11.11.7 11.2.10.0 fail to check for a nil result after decoding the HTTP request body which allows an authenticated user to crash the Zoom plugin process, causing denial of service, via sending a JSON null body to the plugin's action endpoints. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-007229h
CVE-2026-99476—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsverity: Set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible Commit f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the fsverity_info") changed the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to make concurrent reads start going through fsverity verification slightly earlier than they did before. Instead of it happening when enable_verity() calls fsverity_set_info(), it now happens when ->end_enable_verity() sets S_VERITY. However, ext4 and btrfs can roll back verity after they set S_VERITY, causing a use-after-free. Fix that by making ext4 and btrfs set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible. On failure, don't roll back S_VERITY, but do roll back the filesystem-specific verity flag. Also update enable_verity() to handle any future instances of this bug more safely by warning and *not* freeing the fsverity_info. Finally, tweak some comments. Clarify one, and move information from another to its proper place in the comment for ->end_enable_verity().11h
CVE-2026-99472—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: pfncache: use a dedicated invalidation sequence for cache refresh The gfn_to_pfn_cache refresh path guards against mmu notifier invalidations which complete while it has dropped gpc->lock for the HVA->PFN lookup: hva_to_pfn_retry() samples kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq and retries if it changed, or if mn_active_invalidate_count is still elevated. That is insufficient for HVA-based caches. mmu_invalidate_seq is only advanced by kvm_mmu_invalidate_end() when the invalidated range overlaps a memslot, and an HVA-based cache (e.g. the Xen shared_info page mapped with KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO_HVA) need not be backed by any memslot at all. An invalidation of the cached HVA which starts and ends entirely within the lookup window is thus invisible to the retry check: mn_active_invalidate_count is back to zero and the sequence never moved. The refresh then publishes a mapping of a page which has already been freed, and the next reader dereferences it: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_xen_shared_info_init+0x3c6/0x440 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880599c2900 by task syz.2.383/7257 Since gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start() deliberately skips caches which are not currently valid (including one whose refresh is in progress, as the refresh clears the valid flag before dropping the lock), the retry check is the only line of defence, and it must fire for *any* invalidation, not just those hitting a memslot. Add a dedicated kvm->gpc_invalidate_seq, incremented by every kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end() under mn_invalidate_lock before mn_active_invalidate_count is decremented, and check it in hva_to_pfn_retry() instead of mmu_invalidate_seq. Incrementing in range_end() in the same critical section as the in-progress count also closes the variant where the cache is activated with the contested HVA only after invalidate_range_start() has run. The same bug is also reachable through the per-vCPU vcpu_info cache (KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO_HVA), where the stale mapping is then dereferenced by kvm_setup_guest_pvclock() on the next KVM_RUN: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_setup_guest_pvclock+0x5bf/0x660 This intentionally makes refresh retry on *unrelated* mmu notifier events; restoring precision (and reworking the GPC locking more generally) is left for a subsequent series. Reproducers: https://david.woodhou.se/xen_shinfo_race.c https://david.woodhou.se/vcpu_info_race.c11h
CVE-2026-99468—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: imx-jpeg: cancel timeout worker when streaming stops Each per-fd context ctx owns a delayed_work (ctx->task_timer, callback mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout) armed via schedule_delayed_work() at the end of mxc_jpeg_device_run() to recover a stalled encode/decode job. The only existing cancellation is cancel_delayed_work() in the frame-done IRQ handler, which de-queues a pending work item but does not wait for a callback that has already started, and it only runs when a frame completes. When the fd is closed while a job is in flight (the frame-done IRQ has not fired yet), nothing syncs the worker before mxc_jpeg_release() frees ctx with kfree() after v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(). A queued or executing mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout() can then recover ctx through container_of(&ctx->task_timer) and dereference it (ctx->mxc_jpeg, slot_data, dev_warn) after ctx has been freed. Cancel the worker from mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming(). The cancel cannot live in mxc_jpeg_release(): mxc_jpeg_device_run() arms the timer while holding only hw_lock, not the mxc_jpeg->lock mutex that release holds, so a cancel in release could still race a concurrent mxc_jpeg_device_run() that re-arms the timer afterwards. mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() instead runs inside v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() -> vb2_queue_release(), i.e. after v4l2_m2m_cancel_job() has set TRANS_ABORT and waited for any in-flight job to finish (so __v4l2_m2m_try_queue() will not queue and v4l2_m2m_try_run() will not run any further job for this context, which prevents mxc_jpeg_device_run() from re-arming the timer) and before the m2m context is freed. cancel_delayed_work_sync() removes a pending work item and waits for a running callback, so the worker can no longer race with the subsequent kfree(). The cancel is placed before the buffer-release loop so a concurrently running timeout callback cannot race with it over the same buffers. If the frame-done IRQ canceled a still-pending timer, this cancel is a no-op; if the timeout callback has already started, it waits for the callback to finish. The same mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() call is also reached from VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, which drains the worker early, although STREAMOFF itself does not free ctx -- the use-after-free arises only when the fd is later closed. This bug was found by static analysis.11h
CVE-2026-99463—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/rmap: don't discard lazyfree THPs at PMD level __discard_anon_folio_pmd_locked() clears a lazyfree THP's PMD before it determines whether the folio can be discarded, and restores it if the folio is dirty or has extra references. It is done under only the PMD lock and the anon_vma read lock inside try_to_unmap_one() and no mmap lock is held. The temporarily none PMD causes UAF. A parallel munmap() or mremap() is supposed to serialize with it on the PMD lock, but zap_pmd_range() (called by munmap()) and move_page_tables() (called by mremap()) do not take the lock when they see the temporarily none PMD and skip the PMD. There is no more page table walk after the none PMD is restored: - munmap(): free_pgtables() waits in unlink_anon_vmas() for the anon_vma lock, then free_pmd_range() drops the restored PMD as bad without removing the rmap, so the folio keeps a stale mapcount. - whole-VMA MREMAP_DONTUNMAP: dontunmap_complete() unlinks the source VMA from its anon_vma while the restored PMD still maps the folio. - plain mremap(): the THP is not moved but unmapped, so the THP's data is lost. In the first two cases, the folio stays mapped, but no VMA that maps it is linked to its anon_vma. When the anon_vma is freed, it is still reachable when one rmap walks the folio. Racing lazyfree reclaim against MREMAP_DONTUNMAP as an unprivileged user reproduces a KASAN use-after-free in folio_lock_anon_vma_read() as reported in the Closes link. One solution is to use an invalidated PMD instead of a cleared one until the discard is committed, but it needs arch fixes first. 1. GUP-fast still follows an invalidated PMD on riscv, LoongArch and s390. 2. sparc64 miscounts thp_pte_count when an invalidated PMD is set again or cleared. To keep the fix simple for backport, stop discarding lazyfree THPs at PMD level instead. try_to_unmap_one() splits the PMD and discards the folio at PTE level. unmap_huge_pmd_locked() and __discard_anon_folio_pmd_locked() are left in place, unused, to minimize this fix for backport and the invalidated PMD approach is planned as a follow-up series to use them again.11h
CVE-2026-99459—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mshv_vtl: detach poll waiter on POLLFREE MSHV_SET_POLL_FILE keeps a poll wait entry after the ioctl returns. A file reference does not always pin the registered waitqueue: signalfd_poll() uses current->sighand->signalfd_wqh, whose lifetime is tied to the task. signalfd_cleanup() sends POLLFREE before the sighand is freed. The MSHV callback currently leaves its entry linked, so __wake_up_pollfree() warns and a later replacement calls remove_wait_queue() through a stale wqh pointer. A source-equivalent KASAN run reproduced: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave _raw_spin_lock_irqsave remove_wait_queue harness_ioctl [mshv_pollfree_harness] The object belonged to sighand_cache and had been released through slab_free_after_rcu_debug() after __cleanup_sighand(). On POLLFREE, unlink the entry under the provider waitqueue lock. Preserve the existing CPU cancellation before publishing a NULL wqh, since a NULL load lets a racing replacement reuse the persistent poll state. Use a matching acquire load under RCU when removing a normal registration. The callback takes no mutex and does not sleep, so the existing mutex-to-waitqueue-lock order is unchanged. An LLM assisted the source audit, fix development, and validation of this issue.11h
CVE-2026-99455—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: core: shut down initialized port on removal When a serial port configured as a console is opened and subsequently closed, tty_port_shutdown() skips invoking port->ops->shutdown() because port->console is true. As a result, tty_port_initialized() remains true and the port's interrupt handler stays registered in the irq subsystem. If the underlying device is later unbound or removed (e.g. via sysfs driver unbind or device hot-unplug), serial_core_remove_one_port() unregisters the console, frees uport->name via kfree(), and tears down the port without shutting it down or freeing its IRQ. Consequently, the irqaction descriptor remains registered in genirq with action->name pointing to freed memory. This triggers a use-after-free read whenever genirq accesses action->name, such as when reading /proc/interrupts: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x476/0x570 Call Trace: string+0x476/0x570 vsnprintf+0x422/0x1300 seq_printf+0x... show_interrupts+... Fix this by acquiring port->mutex in serial_core_remove_one_port() after console unregistration, clearing port->console under the mutex to prevent data races with concurrent tty_port_shutdown(), and invoking uart_shutdown(NULL, state) if the port remains initialized. This ensures that port->ops->shutdown() is called and the IRQ is freed before kfree(uport->name).11h
CVE-2026-99453—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen-blkfront: unbind irq before tearing down ring and shadow requests In blkif_free_ring(), the driver tears down the ring's persistent grants, shadow request arrays, and shared ring structure (xenbus_teardown_ring), and only calls unbind_from_irqhandler() at the very end. While blkif_free_ring() is freeing persistent grants and clearing the shadow array, the event channel interrupt (blkif_interrupt) is still registered and active. If an interrupt arrives from the backend during this teardown window, blkif_interrupt() reads rinfo->ring.sring and, via blkif_completion(), accesses rinfo->shadow[id].grants_used and rinfo->shadow[id].sg. blkif_free_ring() tears these structures down without holding rinfo->ring_lock, and the handler only checks info->connected at entry, so this is a real race resulting in a use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference. Fix this by moving unbind_from_irqhandler() to the beginning of blkif_free_ring(). Calling unbind_from_irqhandler() first frees the IRQ and synchronizes with any in-flight interrupt handlers on other CPUs before ring memory and shadow request structures are deallocated, matching the teardown order in drivers/net/xen-netfront.c.11h
CVE-2026-99451—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7996: unlink TWT flow if the MCU rejects the agreement mt7996_mac_add_twt_setup() links a new flow into dev->twt_list before asking the MCU to add the agreement, but exits without unlinking the flow if the request fails. The flow-ID and table masks are only committed after MCU success, so the still-linked flow is invisible to the mask-gated teardown paths. If the station retries the setup, the same slot is cleared and its embedded list node reinitialized while it is still linked, corrupting dev->twt_list. If the station disassociates instead, teardown skips the flow and station storage can be freed while the node remains linked. A later scheduling or debugfs twt_stats walk can then dereference the freed flow, resulting in a use-after-free. Unlink the flow when the MCU rejects the agreement. This restores the list to its pre-request state while leaving the unchanged mask and agreement accounting untouched.11h
CVE-2026-99449—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: fix refcount underflow in gadgetfs_bind() error path gadgetfs_bind() calls get_dev() only on the success path, but gadgetfs_unbind() called from the enomem error label unconditionally calls put_dev(). When bind fails (e.g. ENOMEM), put_dev() fires without a matching get_dev(), leaving the refcount unbalanced. A subsequent close of the ep0 file descriptor calls dev_release() -> put_dev() which hits zero and frees the object; then gadgetfs_kill_sb() calls put_dev(the_device) again on the already-freed pointer, triggering a refcount underflow and use-after-free. Fix by calling get_dev() at the start of gadgetfs_bind(), before any error path that invokes gadgetfs_unbind(), so the reference is always balanced regardless of whether bind succeeds or fails.11h
CVE-2026-99447—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: spi-pci1xxxx: quiesce DMA engines on transfer timeout If a DMA-mapped transfer times out waiting for DMA_TERM and neither DMA abort interrupt arrived, pci1xxxx_spi_transfer_with_dma() returns through the error label while both DMA engines are still enabled, the done/abort interrupt status is still armed and the transfer state (p->xfer, p->tx_sgl, p->rx_sgl) is still registered. The ISRs keep firing afterwards: they reprogram the DMA engines from p->tx_sgl / p->rx_sgl and signal completion through p->xfer and p->spi_xfer_done, all of which the SPI core is free to unmap or reuse once transfer_one() has returned, which is a use-after-free. A late done interrupt can also start the next transfer queued behind the failed one. Stop both DMA engines, drain the pending done/abort interrupt status and synchronize the DMA IRQs before dropping the in-progress state and the transfer pointers, and re-enable the engines afterwards so that subsequent transfers keep working. The engines are only turned back on once both were confirmed to have stopped: re-enabling an engine that failed to stop would cancel the pending stop request and let it keep running into buffers the SPI core is about to unmap or free, which is exactly the window this patch closes. An engine that failed to stop is left disabled, as the abort paths already do. The DMA interrupt status and mask registers are shared between the two SPI instances, so the cleanup drains only this instance's done/abort status bits instead of masking the interrupt lines, which would also suppress the peer instance's completion interrupts. Also make the DMA ISRs ignore interrupts while no transfer is in progress so that a stray MSI after the cleanup can no longer act on the cleared state. No PCI1XXXX hardware was available for testing and QEMU has no model of this PCIe part, so the timeout path was exercised with a userspace replica of the timeout branch and the DMA ISRs, with the register and interrupt accesses mocked: on the unfixed code both a wedged engine that clears after the timeout and a late done interrupt touch the freed transfer state, while with this fix applied neither does and an engine that failed to stop is left disabled. The module was also loaded and unloaded in a QEMU x86_64 guest running a kernel with this fix applied.11h
CVE-2026-99443—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pps: generators: don't use the driver's info after unregister A file that was opened before pps_gen_unregister_source() keeps pps_gen, and with it the pointer to the driver's pps_gen_source_info. PPS_GEN_SETENABLE and PPS_GEN_USESYSTEMCLOCK keep using that pointer after the driver has gone: - pps_gen_tio allocates its info with devm_kzalloc(), so after an unbind both ioctls read freed memory, and SETENABLE calls the driver's enable() with its freed private data. - pps_gen-dummy does not set info->owner, so it can be unloaded while the file is open, and the ioctls then read the unloaded module's data and call its code. TIO can't probe in a VM, as it needs ART. A test driver that registers its info in devm memory like TIO does, unbound while /dev/pps-gen0 is open, gives: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pps_gen_cdev_ioctl+0x4c1/0x580 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e647f38 by task ppsgen64/145 ... Freed by task 146: kfree+0x25a/0x6d0 release_nodes+0xd1/0x140 devres_release_all+0x10e/0x1a0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x71/0x250 device_release_driver_internal+0x41b/0x570 unbind_store+0xd9/0x100 and unloading pps_gen-dummy while its file is open oopses: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa0203040 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:pps_gen_cdev_ioctl+0x372/0x580 Protect info in the ioctl handler with a mutex, and clear it under the mutex on unregister, so that unregister waits for the ioctls using it and later ones fail with -ENODEV. PPS_KC_BIND does the same for a removed PPS device since commit 3649f9a6b897 ("pps: don't allow PPS_KC_BIND on removed devices"). The sysfs attributes need nothing new: they are removed, and their callbacks drained, before info is cleared.11h
CVE-2026-99438—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rc: mce_kbd: Fix inconsistent locking of keylock data->keylock is taken with spin_lock() in ir_mce_kbd_decode(), which runs in the raw IR decode kthread with local interrupts enabled, but with spin_lock_irqsave() in mce_kbd_rx_timeout(), the rx_timeout timer callback, which runs in softirq context. If the decode kthread is holding keylock via spin_lock() when a timer interrupt fires on the same CPU and the softirq runs mce_kbd_rx_timeout(), the softirq spins forever waiting for a lock that only the now-preempted kthread can release, while the kthread cannot run again until the softirq gives up the CPU. This deadlocks the CPU.11h
CVE-2026-99437—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rc: Use after free in ir_raw_event_handle() If rc_unregister_device() is called while IR is being processed, then ir_raw_event_handle() could call wake_up_process(dev->raw->thread) after kthread_stop(dev->raw->thread). Avoid use after free by using get_task_struct().11h
CVE-2026-99432—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/dlm: hold the lookup reference across convert AST enqueue dlm_convert_lock_handler() drops the reference it took when it found the lock on res->granted at its leave label, one statement before it calls dlm_queue_ast(). dlm_free_dead_locks() takes res->spinlock and drops the list and base references, so a peer death landing in that gap leaves the handler's own put as the one that frees the lock, and __dlm_queue_ast() then reads lock->lockres from freed memory. The handler is registered next to dlm_create_lock_handler(), so a convert message buffered on a dying peer's socket arrives on the same o2net receive work that o2net_disconnect_node() does not wait for. The two can interleave as follows, with the reference counts as they are before this fix: Socket data-ready Node-down thread Receive worker ----------------- ---------------- -------------- o2net_data_ready() select sc under callback read lock o2net_disconnect_node() queue shutdown begin flush; new color queue sc_rx_work in the new color release callback lock shutdown socket flush returns read buffered convert_lock dlm_convert_lock_handler() find lock on res->granted dlm_lock_get() refs = 3 lock res->spinlock __dlmconvert_master() call_ast = 1 unlock res->spinlock DLM node-down cleanup lock res->spinlock dlm_free_dead_locks() unlink lock put list ref refs = 2 put base ref refs = 1 unlock res->spinlock dlm_lock_put() refs = 0 free lock dlm_queue_ast() __dlm_queue_ast() read lock->lockres (use-after-free) __dlmconvert_master() only moves the lock between lists, so the count entering the gap is base, list and lookup. Drop the lookup reference after the AST is queued instead of before it and the race ends with the one __dlm_queue_ast() took, which dlm_flush_asts() releases later with ast_pending cleared and ast_list unlinked. No extra get is needed, and the normal case ends with the same count as before. dlmconvert_master() has the same shape but is only reached from dlmlock() for a lock this node owns, which dlm_free_dead_locks() never matches.11h
CVE-2026-99423—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: take a snapshot of the name for copy up The copy up of a directory reads a freed dentry name when a lookup moves the directory at the same time. A pointer to the name of a dentry is only valid while something stops a move of the dentry. ovl_do_copy_up() keeps a plain copy of c->dentry->d_name in c->destname, and ovl_copy_up_start() only keeps ovl_rename() away. When a lookup finds the same directory under another name after a change to the lower layer, d_splice_alias() moves the dentry and frees its external name. With a delay in ovl_do_copy_up(), a chmod of a lower-only directory with a 60 byte name raced with a rename of that directory in the lower layer and a stat of the new name, and KASAN reported a use-after-free in lookup_noperm_common(). Fix this by using take_dentry_name_snapshot() for c->destname.11h
CVE-2026-99420—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: check that the parents of volatile/dirty are dirs An unprivileged user crashes the kernel by mounting overlayfs with the volatile option. A dentry that serves as the parent of a lookup must be a directory. ovl_create_volatile_dirty() walks work/incompat/volatile/dirty by name, and ovl_lookup_or_create() returns an existing entry whatever its type. A file or a symlink that another task creates during the mount becomes the parent of the next lookup, which calls a NULL ->lookup. An unprivileged user mounted overlayfs with "volatile" in a user namespace while a second process created a symlink named work/incompat, and the mount task oopsed on a NULL ->lookup call. Fix this by returning -ENOTDIR from ovl_lookup_or_create() when the caller asked for a directory and the existing entry is a non-dir.11h
CVE-2026-99417—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: fix a torn path in ovl_get_redirect() A hard link of a metacopy file that races with a rename of an ancestor stores a redirect to the wrong lower file. Each component of an absolute redirect must be the name that a dentry has in the parent that the walk continues with. ovl_get_redirect() copies the name under d_lock and calls dget_parent() after the unlock, and the callers for a hard link hold no lock that stops a rename across directories. A rename between the two steps combines the old name with the new parent. With delays in ovl_get_redirect(), an unprivileged user hard-linked a metacopy file while renaming its ancestor to another directory, the stored redirect named another lower path, and after a remount the file showed the data of a root-only file. Fix this by taking the parent first and checking it again under d_lock.11h
CVE-2026-99416—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: read the nlink xattr of every indexed non-dir With nfs_export=on, data written through a file handle to a lower file, i.e. a file that exists only in a lower layer of the overlay, can be lost on the next mount. A lookup of the file by name then returns -EIO. Also, a file with one name reports st_nlink 2 once it has been copied to the upper layer. After such a file is removed, its file handle can still open it until the next mount. Before a lower file is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up. The index directory is $workdir/index, where $workdir is the directory given by the workdir= option. Each entry is named after the file handle of a lower inode, so that overlayfs can get from the handle to the copied up inode. With nfs_export=on, copy up indexes every non-directory: it copies the file to an entry in the index directory and then hard links that entry into the upper directory. The index entry is an extra link to the upper inode, so overlayfs stores the link count that users should see in the overlay.nlink xattr. A file can also be opened by handle, either by an NFS client or by a process with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH calling open_by_handle_at(). If the file is not in the dcache, its overlay dentry is disconnected, i.e. it has no parent yet. Copy up then creates the index entry but no hard link in the upper directory. The index entry has i_nlink 1 and holds the only copy of the data written to the file. ovl_get_nlink() reads the stored count. Its caller passes a default, which the function returns if there is no stored count. If the lower inode has i_nlink 1, the function returns the default without reading the xattr. That was correct as long as only lower files with multiple links were indexed. On the next mount, ovl_verify_index() looks for orphans, i.e. index entries of files whose last name was removed. For an index entry with i_nlink 1, it passes a default of 0 to ovl_get_nlink() and treats a result of 0 as an orphan. Here the lower inode also has i_nlink 1, so the result is the default. ovl_indexdir_cleanup() then replaces the entry with a whiteout, which in the index marks a file as deleted. The written data is lost. A lookup by name then returns -EIO, because a whiteout as the index entry of a lower file that still exists is a bad index. ovl_get_inode() gets the wrong count the same way. Its default is the i_nlink of the upper inode, which includes the index entry, so a copied up file with one name reports st_nlink 2. When that name is removed, the count drops to 1 rather than 0. ovl_nlink_end() replaces the index entry with a whiteout only at a count of 0, so the entry stays, and the handle of the removed file still opens it. Reproduced by writing through open_by_handle_at() to an uncached lower file with one link. After a remount the data was lost, and the name returned EIO. Fix this by adding an argument to ovl_get_nlink() that says whether the caller found an index entry, and by skipping the xattr only if the caller found none. Known gaps: - An index entry that a kernel without this patch left behind for a removed file now stays, and the handle of that file keeps working. The entry has i_nlink 1 and a stored count of 1, just like the entry of a file that was only written by handle. Without this patch, the next mount treated it as an orphan.11h
CVE-2026-99412—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: avoid cross-rtgroup reaping after a repair LOLLM notices that the extents stored in a xrtb_bitmap (aka xfs_rtblock bitmap) can span multiple rtgroups due to two circumstances. The first is that the size of an rtgroup is an exact power of two, which means that rtgroups are adjacent in the segmented xfs_rtblock_t address space. This is fairly common to reduce the amount of multiplication and division needed to handle space on the rt volume. The second is that (unlike in the original rtgroups design), rtgroups do not have fixed-location metadata like AGs do, which means that there's nothing to force a break between rtgroups. Therefore, we must loop through the rtgroups in xreap_rtmeta_extent to avoid running off the end of an rtgroup while reaping.11h
CVE-2026-99410—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: always reset incore attr fork buffer when resetting fork LOLLM noticed that the local format attr fork verifier depends on if_bytes being set correctly. However, the fork reset function doesn't reset that correctly, which can cause post-repair verifier failures. Fix that.11h
CVE-2026-99401—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtnetlink: wait for RCU readers in rtnl_link_unregister() rtnl_link_ops_get() finds ops on link_ops under rcu_read_lock() and only then takes ops->srcu. rtnl_link_unregister() unlinks ops, then calls synchronize_srcu() and cleanup_srcu_struct() without first waiting for RCU readers. A reader that found ops before list_del_rcu() and has not yet taken ops->srcu is not waited for. Such a reader then locks a cleaned-up srcu_struct and keeps using ops after the module that owns it is gone. rtnl_newlink() and rtnl_dump_ifinfo() both look up ops without RTNL, the latter for any user that dumps links filtered by kind. With delays added between the lookup and srcu_read_lock() in rtnl_link_ops_get(), and before rtnl_link_ops_put() in rtnl_dump_ifinfo(), running "ip link show type dummy" alongside "rmmod dummy" on a KASAN kernel gives: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __srcu_read_unlock+0x57/0x70 Read of size 8 at addr ffffffffc02ff318 by task ip/147 Call Trace: __srcu_read_unlock+0x57/0x70 rtnl_dump_ifinfo.cold+0x30/0x3b rtnl_dumpit+0x7a/0x1b0 netlink_dump+0x486/0x11b0 __netlink_dump_start+0x661/0x910 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x611/0x9e0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x380 netlink_unicast+0x605/0x830 netlink_sendmsg+0x6d0/0xbb0 __sys_sendto+0x335/0x3a0 Call synchronize_rcu() before synchronize_srcu(), as rtnl_af_unregister() already does. This should be enough because rtnl_link_ops_get() is the only RCU walker of link_ops, and it takes ops->srcu before rcu_read_unlock(), so every reader that found ops is covered by synchronize_srcu() once the RCU grace period ends. The extra grace period only costs time at module unload. Readers and the writer were serialized by RTNL until link_ops got its own mutex, which is why the missing RCU wait did not matter before.11h
CVE-2026-99399—
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———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: reject remote xattr entries with an out-of-range value length xfs_attr3_leaf_verify_entry() validates a remote attribute entry's name but never bounds its on-disk value length (xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote. valuelen, a __be32). A crafted leaf with valuelen = 0x80000000 passes the verifier and the CRC. That length is later assigned into the signed int args->rmtvaluelen (xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue), becoming negative, which slips past the signed -ERANGE check in xfs_attr_copy_value(); a getxattr() with a small buffer then memcpy()s a full remote block into the small kvalue buffer (xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout) -- a heap out-of-bounds write with attacker-controlled content, from an unprivileged getxattr(2) on a mounted crafted image. Reject remote entries whose value length exceeds XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX in the leaf verifier, so the malicious block is rejected at read time.11h