Vulnerabilidades explotables hoy
418,259en la vista actual
Score único combinando CVSS, membresía KEV y EPSS. Cada CVE con su ficha propia — timeline desde publicación hasta explotación activa.
En catálogo KEV1,786
Nuevos KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,715
Distribución · última ventana
- Crítico4,719
- Alto18,240
- Medio17,989
- Bajo1,975
Filtros
Ventana
Severidad
Filtros
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2026-99395——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: bound inode fork length against the fork size during log recovery
xlog_recover_inode_commit_pass2() copies an inode log item's data/attr
fork region into the inode buffer using the on-log region length without
bounding it against the fork capacity, e.g.:
len = item->ri_buf[2].iov_len;
memcpy(XFS_DFORK_DPTR(dip), src, len);
The only guard is an ASSERT, which is a no-op on production kernels
(CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG off), and xfs_dinode_verify() runs only after the copy.
A crafted image with a dirty log can therefore drive a heap out-of-bounds
write at mount time. The XFS_ILOG_DBROOT sibling already passes
XFS_DFORK_DSIZE as a bound; the DDATA/DEXT and ADATA/AEXT memcpy paths
did not.
Bound each logged fork region against the destination fork size before
copying it, and reject the log item with -EFSCORRUPTED when it does not
fit. Because the recovered inode is only verified after the fork data has
been copied in, the checks are done up front, before any memcpy into the
on-disk inode.11hCVE-2026-99394——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: complain loudly when dirtree checker finds broken links
LOLLM observed that the directory tree walk code bails out if it finds
broken parent pointers along the way. However, it flattens the return
code to zero, which means that we can end up in the repair code having
not completed the scan. We should never proceed with a repair in this
state, so let's mark the scrub incomplete and exit.11hCVE-2026-99392——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't subtract excess usage twice when computing agf_btreeblks
LOLLM noticed that the free space btree repair code calculates
agf_btreeblks from the number of blocks we wrote to rebuild the free
space btrees (minus the roots). That's correct. However, it observes
that we subtract the "excess" reservation, which is not correct. Fix
this accounting problem.11hCVE-2026-99391——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't try to scrub self-referential dirent in metapath checker
LOLLM observes that the _ilock_both helper will loop forever trying to
double-lock the same inode if mpath->dp == sc->ip. Callers are not
supposed to call us with parent == child because that makes no sense.
Trigger an assertion, mark the scan incomplete, and return IO error
so that this fails noisily.11hCVE-2026-99390——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix correction of unwritten extents in quota file data fork
LOLLM noticed a couple of problems with the code that fixes unwritten
mappings in the quota file's data fork: first, we should zero the ondisk
contents as part of converting them to "unwritten" just in case we crash
shortly after the conversion. Second, and more importantly, it noticed
that we fail to resynchronize the iext tree cursor after modifying the
iext tree. If the tree shape changes, we could be in a world of hurt.
Third, we should force a quotacheck if we reset an ondisk dquot. Fix
all issues.11hCVE-2026-99389——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: size directory name conversion buffer correctly
A 2048-byte ASCII directory name needs 4098 bytes when converted to
UTF-16, including the terminator. ksmbd_convert_dir_info_name() caps
its allocation at PATH_MAX and writes past the end of that buffer.
Allocate space for one UTF-16 code unit per input byte plus the
terminator. Use kmalloc_array() to check the size calculation.11hCVE-2026-99388——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: smbdirect: fix buffer length underflow in RDMA transfers
When a remote buffer descriptor is larger than the remaining local
buffer, smbdirect_connection_rdma_xmit() clamps its length and sets
buf_len to zero. The common accounting code then subtracts the clamped
length from buf_len, causing it to underflow. If another descriptor
follows, the loop processes it with a wrapped remaining length and
includes memory beyond the local buffer in the RDMA transfer.
A client can trigger an out-of-bounds kernel write with an SMB WRITE
request, or an out-of-bounds kernel read with an SMB READ request, by
supplying multiple RDMA buffer descriptors with an oversized descriptor
before the last one.
Remove the premature assignment to buf_len. Subtracting the clamped length
already consumes the remaining buffer, so the next iteration stops and
only descriptors within the local buffer are used to build work requests.11hCVE-2026-99386——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: don't resurrect an exiting tcon from cached dir workers
cfids_laundromat_worker() bumps tcon->tc_count for every expired open
cfid and queues cached_dir_offload_close() without checking whether the
tcon is already being torn down. Racing with the final cifs_put_tcon(),
the tcon comes back from zero and gets torn down twice:
T1 T2
cifs_put_tcon()
--tc_count == 0, TID_EXITING
tconInfoFree()
free_cached_dirs()
cancel_delayed_work_sync() cfids_laundromat_worker()
++tc_count == 1
queue_work(serverclose_wq)
kfree(tcon->origin_fullpath)
kfree(tcon)
cached_dir_offload_close()
close_cached_dir() [UAF]
cifs_put_tcon()
tconInfoFree() [double free]
cached_dir_lease_break() also bumps tc_count without tc_lock, racing with
the laundromat's locked update.
Take the tcon reference through a helper that refuses once the tcon is
TID_EXITING or its refcount has dropped to zero. Queued put_work and
close_work then always hold a tcon reference, so tconInfoFree() can't
run before they finish and free_cached_dirs() doesn't need to flush any
workqueue. If the laundromat can't get a reference, put the cfid back on
the dying list for free_cached_dirs() to free; its handle goes away with
the tree connection.
The lease break path finds the tcon on ses->tcon_list under
cifs_tcp_ses_lock, so it can't see TID_EXITING, but it now takes tc_lock.11hCVE-2026-99385——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix buffer overflow in SMB2_tcon()
In SMB2_tcon(), unc_path is allocated with a fixed buffer size of
MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH * 2 bytes (672 bytes). However, the user-controlled
UNC path (tree) length is passed to cifs_strtoUTF16(), which assumes the
destination buffer is large enough and writes strlen(tree) + 1 UTF-16 code
units.
Commit 62a1a439e0fd ("cifs: clean up handling of unc= option") removed the
length check on UNC mount options, allowing mount paths to exceed
MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH while retaining the fixed-size buffer allocation in
SMB2_tcon(). Consequently, an oversized UNC string causes cifs_strtoUTF16()
to write past the end of the heap object, resulting in a slab-out-of-bounds
write. Furthermore, if a tree exceeds MAX_TREE_SIZE characters, strscpy()
truncates it in cifs_tcon::tree_name, causing subsequent reconnects or
failovers to fail.
Fix this by first verifying that the length of tree does not exceed
MAX_TREE_SIZE, returning -EINVAL if it does. Then, dynamically allocate
unc_path based on the length of tree so that it safely accommodates all
UTF-16 code units for paths within MAX_TREE_SIZE.
[pc: remove unused MAX_SHARENAME_LENGTH]11hCVE-2026-99384——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB read of the resume name sent in TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2
cifs_fill_dirent() reads the fixed part of a directory entry and the
name length it holds, or for SMB_FIND_FILE_UNIX scans the name for its
terminating NUL, without knowing where the response ends.
cifs_save_resume_key() calls it for the entry at the LastNameOffset the
server chose, after every FindNext and after the FindFirst of a search
rewind, and records the name it returns as the resume name of the
search without bounding it; the next CIFSFindNext() copies up to
PATH_MAX - 1 bytes from that name into its request and sends them to
the server. cifs_filldir() bounds
the name against the end of the response since
commit f8cf09a53a0d ("smb: client: bound dirent name against end of
SMB response in cifs_filldir"), but only after cifs_fill_dirent() has
read the entry, and nxt_dir_entry() checks the entries it walks only
against sizeof(FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO), for every level but
SMB_FIND_FILE_INFO_STANDARD, and never sees the first entry of a
response.
Bounding where last_entry starts, as the preceding patch does, does
not bound the read. A last entry that starts within the final bytes of
the response still has its fixed part read past the end of the
received data, and the name length it declares, a __le32 for every
level but SMB_FIND_FILE_INFO_STANDARD and SMB_FIND_FILE_UNIX, is
recorded without being checked against anything. CIFSFindNext()
rejects only a length of PATH_MAX or more, then copies the name, up to
4095 bytes, into its request and sends it, and as the report below
shows that copy can run past the end of the cifs_request allocation
that holds the response. For SMB_FIND_FILE_UNIX the name is in
addition scanned for its terminating NUL over up to PATH_MAX + 1
UTF-16 units, or PATH_MAX bytes, before any check. The FindNext that
carries the name is only sent by the SMB1 dialect, which is not
negotiated by default; reaching it requires an explicit vers=1.0
mount.
With KASAN enabled, a response whose last entry declares a name
longer than the bytes that follow it gives:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in CIFSFindNext+0x8ca/0x14c0
Read of size 4080 at addr ffff88807c823f98 by task ls/83
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: ls Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-00457-gf14572c203d5 #69 PREEMPT(lazy)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0
kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
CIFSFindNext+0x8ca/0x14c0
cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0
iterate_dir+0x1c0/0x570
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x133/0x270
do_syscall_64+0x109/0x5d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 83 on cpu 1 at 13.497119s:
cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x90
smb_init+0x4f/0x110
CIFSFindNext+0xf7/0x14c0
cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88807c820000
which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588
The buggy address is located 16280 bytes inside of
allocated 16588-byte region [ffff88807c820000, ffff88807c8240cc)
==================================================================
The read is the memcpy() that copies the recorded name into the next
request, so those bytes go to the server.
Pass the end of the response to cifs_fill_dirent() and have it reject
an entry whose fixed part does not fit or whose name extends past the
end, before either is used, so that both callers are covered;
cifs_save_resume_key() computes the end the same way cifs_readdir()
does. The name bound compares the bytes left between the name and the
end with the name length rather than adding the length to the name
pointer, since the length is a 32-bit value taken from the entry and
the sum could wrap on 32-bit systems. cifs_fill_dirent() is also used
on the SMB2 readdir path; there smb2_parse_query_directory() has
already checked every entry against the end of the response, so a
vali
---truncated---11hCVE-2026-99382——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject FIND data areas that run past the received response
CIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() take the directory entries of a
TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response from DataOffset for
DataCount bytes. validate_t2() bounds DataOffset at 1024 and
ParameterCount + DataCount by the byte count, and nothing compares
DataOffset + DataCount with the number of bytes SendReceive() copied
into the buffer.
smb_init() places the request and the response in the same
cifs_request allocation and cifs_buf_get() clears only the start of
it, so a short response whose data area extends past its end has
srch_entries_start point at bytes of the request that was just sent,
or at whatever the allocation held before, and those bytes are parsed
as directory entries. cifs_readdir() and find_cifs_entry() walk the
entries with nxt_dir_entry(), which checks every entry but the first
of a response against the end of the SMB; cifs_query_path_info() and
cifs_backup_query_path_info() read the first entry with no check at
all. Those reads stay inside the allocation, but what they return is
not part of the response. The last entry, which LastNameOffset locates
relative to the data area, is bounded against the received response
by an earlier patch of this series, as is every entry that
cifs_fill_dirent() parses; the walk itself and the two query functions
are not.
SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an
explicit vers=1.0 mount.
Reject a response whose data area extends past the received length,
with the -EINVAL that validate_t2() returns for the other malformed
transaction responses. cifs_query_path_info() and
cifs_backup_query_path_info() still read a whole entry from a data
area that may be smaller than one; that is not changed here.
A conforming server is not affected. The data block of a transaction
response is part of the SMB, so DataOffset + DataCount cannot exceed
the smbCalcSize() bytes that SendReceive() copies; coalesce_t2()
appends each secondary response to the data area and adds its length
to both DataCount and the byte count, which keeps that relation.11hCVE-2026-99381——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject short or out-of-range FIND response parameters
CIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() read the SearchHandle, SearchCount,
EndofSearch and LastNameOffset of a TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or
TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response at ParameterOffset. validate_t2() bounds
the offset at 1024 and ParameterCount below 512, and nothing compares
them with the number of bytes SendReceive() copied into the buffer or
with the size of the response parameters. smb_init() places the
request and the response in the same cifs_request allocation and
cifs_buf_get() clears only the start of it, so a short response with a
ParameterOffset past its end has the search handle, the entry count,
the end-of-search flag and the last-entry offset read out of the
request that was just sent, or out of whatever the allocation held
before, and a ParameterCount smaller than the parameters has them read
past the end of the parameter block. The reads stay inside the
allocation, but what they return is not part of the response, and
CIFSFindFirst() then hands back a search handle the server never sent.
That handle is sent back to the server in the next FIND_NEXT2 or
FIND_CLOSE2, so two bytes of the buffer leak at an offset the server
picks.
SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an
explicit vers=1.0 mount.
Reject a response whose parameter area is smaller than the response
parameters or extends past the received length, returning smb_EIO2()
with a new smb_eio_traces value for each of the two responses, like
the other response checks this file gained since v6.19. Backports to
trees before v6.19 need smb_EIO2() replaced with -EINVAL and the
trace.h hunk dropped.
A conforming server is not affected. The parameter block of a
transaction response is part of the SMB, so ParameterOffset +
ParameterCount cannot exceed the smbCalcSize() bytes that
SendReceive() copies, and the response parameters are 10 bytes for
FIND_FIRST2 and 8 bytes for FIND_NEXT2, which is what
T2_FFIRST_RSP_PARMS and T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS hold.
This patch depends on "smb: client: reject FIND data areas that run
past the received response", whose declarations it extends.11hCVE-2026-99379——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate SMB1 EA list bounds before parsing
CIFSSMBQAllEAs() checks the server-provided EA list length by adding it
to the response pointer. On 32-bit systems, a positive length can wrap
the pointer and pass the comparison. The parser then walks outside the
received response while reading the next FEA header.
A response with a list length of 0x40000000 reproduces this as a native
i386 page fault and kernel panic from listxattr() against an SMB1
server.
Check that the EA list starts within the SMB byte area before reading
its header. Keep its length unsigned and compare it with the bytes left
in the response without pointer addition.
SMB1 is not negotiated by default and requires an explicit vers=1.0
mount.11hCVE-2026-99377——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pnfs: bound the CB_NOTIFY_DEVICEID array count before allocating
decode_devicenotify_args() hands the server's notification count
straight to kmalloc_objs() as the array length, without checking it
against the message that carried it. Bound it the way nfs4xdr.c bounds
an attribute length, against xdr_stream_remaining().11hCVE-2026-99375——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/flexfiles: fail I/O to the data server once a lock is lost
When a client loses a byte-range lock, because its lease expired and it
may not recover the lock (nfs.recover_lost_locks=0) or because reclaim
failed, it marks the lock state NFS_LOCK_LOST and fails further I/O by
that lock owner. Otherwise an application that believes it holds a
lock over a range is never told that the lock is gone, and can
overwrite data that another client has since written under its own
lock on that range.
The NFSv4 READ/WRITE and file layout I/O paths apply this in
rpc_call_prepare, where nfs4_set_rw_stateid() returns -EIO for a lost
lock. The flexfiles data server I/O path does not: the NFSv3 data
server path never checked, and the check on the NFSv4 path was removed
when the data server stateid began to be taken from the layout.
Fail read and write RPCs to the data server in rpc_call_prepare when the
lock is lost. The data server path has no use for the stateid that
nfs4_set_rw_stateid() selects, and selecting it looks up a delegation
or open stateid on every I/O.
Instead add nfs4_lock_context_lost(), which only tests NFS_LOCK_LOST,
and check it alongside the open state. Its lookup,
__nfs4_lookup_lock_state(), is split out of __nfs4_find_lock_state()
and takes no reference: a lock state is only unlinked from
state->lock_states under state->state_lock, so one found while holding
that lock cannot be freed before it is released. Use it in
nfs4_copy_lock_stateid() as well, which only reads the lock state under
that lock. That drops a reference get and put from stateid selection
for all NFSv4 I/O without changing the stateid selected.
Terminating the RPC in rpc_call_prepare is not enough on its own. The
done callback reads the -EIO as a data server connection error, forgets
the device ID, and resets the I/O to pNFS (or, for an NFSv4 data
server, possibly to the MDS). After a reset to pNFS a new LAYOUTGET is
granted and rpc_call_prepare fails the I/O again, without end. The
existing NFS_CONTEXT_BAD check does not loop, since the open state is
then invalid and pnfs_update_layout() fails the reset I/O, but it still
forgets the device ID.
So when an RPC that was never sent fails and the open context is bad,
the open state is invalid, or the lock is lost, complete it with -EIO
without error handling. An RPC that was sent and failed is handled as
before, so a real data server error is still reported to the MDS.11hCVE-2026-99374——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/flexfiles: Use the full 64-bit stripe_unit
ff_layout_alloc_lseg() decodes stripe_unit as the 64-bit value the
protocol defines and struct nfs4_ff_layout_segment stores it as one, but
both consumers narrow it back to 32 bits: nfs4_ff_layout_calc_dss_id()
divides with do_div(), which casts the divisor, and ff_layout_pg_test()
copies it into a u32 first. A stripe_unit that does not fit is silently
truncated, so the client stripes on a unit the server did not specify --
or divides by zero, if the low 32 bits happen to be clear.
Divide by the full value, with div64_u64() and div64_u64_rem().11hCVE-2026-1331066.8 MED—
———In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.2, 2026.1.6 stored XSS on the Projects Import page was possible4hCVE-2026-99373——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS/localio: detect a short read or write before the iterator has moved
nfs_local_call_read() and nfs_local_call_write() issue a misaligned
DIO as up to three segments and must stop at the first short one, or
the next segment lands at the wrong file offset. They test for that
by comparing the bytes transferred against iov_iter_count() of the
segment, read after read_iter() or write_iter() has advanced the
iterator, when the count is the residual rather than the request:
before the call: count == expected
after the call: count == expected - status
The test is therefore status < expected - status, and it fires only
when less than half of the segment was transferred. A short I/O that
covers between 50% and 99% of a segment slips through: the loop moves
on with ki_pos advanced by the short amount, the next segment is
issued at the wrong offset, and the header's byte count is
over-reported to the caller. A write that slips through also never
sets NFS_CONTEXT_WRITE_SYNC, which is what makes the writes that
follow a short one synchronous.
Take the segment's count before issuing it and compare against that.
This is the same defect that commit 250ec14932d5 ("nfsd: fix
partial-write detection in nfsd_direct_write") fixed in NFSD's version
of this loop.11hCVE-2026-1331056.1 MED—
———In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.2, 2026.1.6 reflected XSS on the Edit VCS Root page was possible4hCVE-2026-617988.1 ALT—
———netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java includes its private parameter, BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java renders the complete private-key byte array when isPrivate is true, and BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java includes rejected privateKeyBytes in an exception message. Applications that log affected key-pair objects or initialization exceptions can persist complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry. Anyone who can read those records can recover the key and may compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity expectations while the key remains usable. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.4hCVE-2026-99371——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: clear XDR padding in GETXATTR replies
nfsd4_vbuf_to_stream() uses a raw memcpy() for the first fragment of an
attribute value. xdr_reserve_space() aligns the reservation but does not
initialize the extra bytes. If the complete value fits in that fragment,
the loop that clears padding for the final fragment is never entered.
A remote client reading an attribute whose length is not a multiple of
four can therefore receive one to three stale bytes from the response
page.
Encode the first fragment with xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(), matching the
final-fragment path and ensuring that any XDR padding is zeroed.11hCVE-2026-99370——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: copy SETXATTR data from all XDR buffer segments
nfsd4_vbuf_from_vector() manually copies the head followed by whole
pages starting at offset zero. This assumes that all remaining data
starts at the beginning of the page array and that no data is stored
in the tail.
However, nfsd4_decode_setxattr() passes an xdr_buf returned by
xdr_stream_subsegment(). Such a sub-buffer can have a nonzero
page_base and can span its page and tail segments. Ignoring that
layout can copy the wrong bytes into the value passed to
vfs_setxattr().
Use read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(), which observes the complete xdr_buf
layout.11hCVE-2026-99369——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Destroy a recalled delegation the client does not hold
A client that answers CB_RECALL with NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE or
NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID has no record of the delegation, so the
FREE_STATEID that clears it from cl_revoked never arrives. Every later
SEQUENCE reply carries SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED, and the
client loops issuing TEST_STATEID.
Destroy such a delegation when it is reaped rather than revoking it
onto cl_revoked. RFC 8881 Section 20.2.4 completes the recall at the
reply when its status is neither NFS4_OK nor NFS4ERR_DELAY, so a
rejected recall leaves nothing to revoke. An administrative revoke
keeps that path, since NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED reports it. A destroyed
stateid returns NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID instead of NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED. A
client that rejects the recall but still holds the delegation gets no
notice that its state was revoked.
CB_RECALL can outrun the reply that granted the delegation, so honor
a rejection only once the client has seen that grant. Per RFC 8881
Section 2.10.6.3, retirement of the slot that carried the grant is that
proof; retry until then, and revoke when the retries lapse.11hCVE-2026-99367——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Don't complete a cld upcall the daemon has not read
cld_pipe_downcall() matches a reply to its upcall on the xid alone.
A write that arrives before the daemon has read that upcall
completes __cld_pipe_upcall() while its struct rpc_pipe_msg is still
queued on the pipe. The waiter returns, its stack frame goes away,
and the pipe keeps a list_head that points into it. The next
rpc_queue_upcall() walks that pointer:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __list_add_valid_or_report
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90007027950 by task syz.0.96/13066
__list_add_valid_or_report+0x6a/0x130
rpc_queue_upcall
cld_pipe_upcall
nfsd4_cld_grace_start
nfsd4_cld_tracking_init
The pipe is mode 0600 in rpc_pipefs, so the trigger is a broken or
hostile nfsdcld rather than an unprivileged task.
Record whether the daemon has consumed the whole message and
complete only when it has. cld_pipe_destroy_msg() runs on every path
by which the pipe releases a message, so it can maintain that flag
under cn_lock. nfsdcld sends its -EINPROGRESS downcalls only after
reading the upcall, so the new check does not break the GraceStart
record stream.11hCVE-2026-99366——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: don't modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply
nfsd4_sequence() claims a session slot by setting NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE
under nn->client_lock. A reply served from the slot's reply cache does
not claim it, and that distinction lived only in cstate->status, which
nfsd4_sequence() set to nfserr_replay_cache. Commit cc028a10a48c
("NFSD: Hoist status code encoding into XDR encoder functions") moved
nfsd4_proc_compound()'s cstate->status assignment below the out:
label, and the replay path's goto out was the one path that relied on
skipping it. The test in nfsd4_sequence_done() therefore no longer
identifies a replay, and every replay now stores its reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE as though it owned the slot.
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is the interlock: check_slot_seqid() rejects every
sequence id for a slot that is in use, before replay_matches_cache()
runs. A replay never sets it, so two replays can be in flight on the
same slot at once. One can read slot->sl_cred under nn->client_lock
while the other's completion frees and rebuilds it from the XDR
encoder without that lock. Two completions can also collide with each
other and release the same group_info twice. free_svc_cred() leaves
cr_uid, cr_gid and cr_flavor intact, so the reader passes every
earlier test in same_creds() and dereferences a NULL cr_group_info.
From a 6.12.91 production server:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004
CPU: 63 UID: 0 PID: 39015 Comm: nfsd
RIP: 0010:same_creds+0x38/0xa0 [nfsd]
RDX: 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
nfsd4_sequence+0x6a8/0x910 [nfsd]
nfsd4_proc_compound+0x345/0x670 [nfsd]
nfsd_dispatch+0x100/0x220 [nfsd]
svc_process_common+0x311/0x700 [sunrpc]
svc_process+0x131/0x1c0 [sunrpc]
svc_recv+0x7ef/0x9c0 [sunrpc]
nfsd+0xa3/0x100 [nfsd]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Since v6.14 a live session's slot table can shrink, and the unowned
store becomes a use-after-free write. nfsd4_sequence() defers the
shrink while a slot is in use, but it tests NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, which a
replay does not set, so free_session_slots() can kfree() the slot the
replay still holds in cstate->slot.
Record the claim in cstate->slot_owned when nfsd4_sequence() accepts a
request and test that in nfsd4_sequence_done(), so only the request
that claimed the slot updates its cached reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE. svc_generic_init_request() zeroes the compound
response before each request, so the flag starts clear.11hCVE-2026-1331046.4 MED—
———In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.2 stored XSS in external change viewer links was possible4hCVE-2026-99365——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: Fix id-to-name cache entry leak in idtoname_parse()
idtoname_lookup() returns the id-to-name cache entry with a new
reference. The name is parsed between the lookup and the update call,
and when the parsed name is malformed (negative length or longer than
IDMAP_NAMESZ), idtoname_parse() jumps to the error label without
dropping the reference returned by idtoname_lookup(), leaking the cache
entry.
Release the reference with cache_put() before taking the error exit.11hCVE-2026-99362——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot
nfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session's cached
reply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate
ca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and
nfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A
COMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the
SEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows.
nfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running
nfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves
op->status at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having
succeeded.
nfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that
returned an error. That test reads the status the operation
reported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and
takes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the
zero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so
the client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390
Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24
__asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60
read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390
nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810
nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240
Check that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following
operation's error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing
the buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply
cache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of
an error returned from SEQUENCE.11hCVE-2026-99361——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: propagate SETXATTR value decode errors
nfsd4_decode_setxattr() stores the status returned while assembling a
non-empty attribute value, but then unconditionally returns nfs_ok. An
allocation failure can therefore leave a NULL value buffer paired with a
non-zero length and allow compound processing to continue.
Return the decoder status so that the operation stops on the original
error.11hCVE-2026-116600——
———Missing release of memory after effective lifetime vulnerability in Apache Tomcat via WebSocket.
This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.0-M1 through 11.0.27, from 10.1.0-M1 through 10.1.61, from 9.0.22 through 9.0.123
The following versions were EOL at the time the CVE was created but are known to be affected: from 8.5.0 through 8.5.100, from 7.0.43 through 7.0.109. Other unsupported versions may also be affected.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.29, 10.0.62 or 9.0.124, which fix the issue.
Note: Tomcat 11.0.28 was not released4hCVE-2026-99360——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Set nn->cld_net before registering the cld pipe
rpc_mkpipe_dentry() instantiates the pipe's dentry before it returns,
so the cld pipe can be opened as soon as nfsd4_cld_register_net() has
run. __nfsd4_init_cld_pipe() does not store the new cld_net in
nn->cld_net until after that call. cld_pipe_downcall() reaches the
cld_net only through that pointer and takes cn_lock without checking
it, so a write() that lands in the window oopses.
Store nn->cld_net once @cn is fully initialized and before the pipe is
registered, and clear it again when registration fails.11hCVE-2026-1331024.9 MED—
———In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.2, 2026.1.6 out-of-band data exfiltration via DNS resolution was possible in the Kotlin DSL sandbox4hCVE-2026-99358——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: zero NFSv4 COMPOUND tag padding
nfs4svc_encode_compoundres() copies the tag bytes into reserved XDR space
and skips directly to the aligned end of the field. xdr_reserve_space()
rounds the reservation up but does not initialize the padding bytes.
A remote client can choose a tag length that is not a multiple of four,
causing one to three stale bytes from the response page to be returned in
the COMPOUND reply.
Use xdr_encode_opaque_fixed() to copy the tag and clear its XDR padding.11hCVE-2026-99355——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: fix oversized GSS proxy token copy
gss_read_proxy_verf() allocates one page per token chunk, but it copies the
entire linear head of an RPC request into in_token->pages[0]. A UDP datagram
can leave more than PAGE_SIZE bytes in the linear head, so a large
RPCSEC_GSS INIT token overwrites following pages.
Copy the linear head in page-sized chunks before switching to the request
page array. The linear head itself can span multiple pages.11hCVE-2026-99354——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: pin gss module across auth_domain RCU free
A gss auth_domain stores a raw pointer to svcauthops_gss in
dom->flavour, and its release queues svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu()
via call_rcu(). Both live in auth_rpcgss.ko text, and nothing pins the
module while a domain referencing it is reachable. rmmod auth_rpcgss
can therefore unmap that text while an NFSD export still holds a
reference to the domain.
The export cache is one such holder. When the export is finally
released, the domain reference drops from module text:
svc_export_put()
auth_domain_put(exp->ex_client)
auth_domain_release()
dom->flavour->domain_release(dom) /* into module text */
svcauth_gss_domain_release()
call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head,
svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu)
Once auth_rpcgss is unloaded, the domain_release call lands in
unmapped memory. The rcu_barrier() in exit_rpcsec_gss() does not
help: it waits only for callbacks already queued, and this one is
not queued until the export goes away.
NFSD's NFSv4 objects import symbols from auth_rpcgss.ko, so only a
server built without CONFIG_NFSD_V4 can unload auth_rpcgss while
exports still name a gss domain.
Take a module reference in svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() before
publishing the domain and drop it at the end of
svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu(). The rcu_barrier() then holds the
module image until this callback has returned.
[ cel: rewrote description ]11hCVE-2026-99353——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Reject a socket that already has an svc_sock attached
Writing the same socket descriptor to /proc/fs/nfsd/portlist twice
attaches a second svc_sock to one socket. svc_setup_socket() saves
the socket's callbacks before installing its own, so the second
attach records svc_write_space() as the old write_space callback.
svc_udp_init() invokes that callback by way of svc_sock_setbufsize(),
and svc_write_space() then calls itself until the kernel stack is
exhausted:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc900037d7ff8
svc_write_space+0x90/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:429
svc_write_space+0xe6/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:430
... 700 more ...
svc_sock_setbufsize+0x18d/0x220 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:386
svc_udp_init net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:854 [inline]
svc_setup_socket+0xb2f/0x1090 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1498
svc_addsock+0x2fd/0x760 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1547
__write_ports_addfd fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:742 [inline]
write_ports+0xa5b/0xcc0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:861
nfsctl_transaction_write+0x106/0x1a0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:112
svc_data_ready() and svc_tcp_state_change() chain through their saved
callbacks the same way, so a TCP descriptor added twice recurses on
the next incoming segment instead. Reaching any of this takes a
writer on portlist, and the nfsd filesystem sets no FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
so the reproducer needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace.
Reject a socket that already carries sk_user_data. svc_setup_socket()
overwrites that field unconditionally, so a socket some other
consumer has claimed is one NFSD would corrupt whether or not the
callbacks recurse.11hCVE-2026-99351——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: treat empty auth.unix.gid replies as negative entries
When rpc.mountd cannot resolve a uid (getpwuid() or getgrouplist()
failure, e.g. while winbind or sssd is briefly unreachable), it
answers the auth.unix.gid upcall with zero groups. unix_gid_parse()
installs that as a valid positive entry, and svcauth_unix_set_client()
then replaces the credential's group list with the empty one on
every request, RPCSEC_GSS included via svcauth_gss_set_client().
One failed lookup strips that uid of all supplementary groups on
every export for up to mountd's configured TTL (30 minutes by
default), long after the NSS backend has recovered.
mountd cannot send an empty list for a successful lookup, since
getgrouplist(3) always includes at least the user's primary group,
so a zero-group reply can only mean the lookup failed. Record it as
a negative entry: unix_gid_find() then returns -ENOENT and
svcauth_unix_set_client() keeps the groups the RPC credential
already carries. This is the fallback that
commit 3fc605a2aa38 ("[PATCH] knfsd: allow the server to provide a
gid list when using AUTH_UNIX authentication") promised when no
answer is available, and the same state try_to_negate_entry()
already creates when no listener holds the channel open.11hCVE-2026-99350——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix update of call->tx_pending without holding lock
Currently, rxrpc_send_data() updates call->tx_pending just before it
returns - but it won't be holding the call->user_mutex when it does this if
a wait was interrupted by a signal. This would allow a parallel sendmsg()
to race.
Further, both the callers of rxrpc_send_data() call it with the lock held,
and then it returns an indication through the parameter list to say whether
it has dropped the lock or not - after which the callers both just drop the
lock if it's still held.
Fix this by:
(1) Moving the release of call->user_mutex down into rxrpc_send_data() and
get rid of the indicator parameter. This makes it easier to see where
the lock is held.
(2) After waiting, if the attempt to reacquire the mutex is interrupted,
just return directly there rather than going to out_unlock
(3) Restricting the txb variable to inside the buffering loop and leaving
->tx_pending set until we've queued the buffer.
Note that there's a slight change in behaviour in that wait_for_space
failure now doesn't check for completion because it doesn't hold the call
user_mutex. The caller, however, should re-issue the send and pick up any
error at a second attempt.11hCVE-2026-99349——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix lack of short-send handling in rxrpc_kernel_send_data()
Fix rxrpc_kernel_send_data() to loop around if it detects a short send.
David Laight suggested doing it here rather than wrapping all the calls in
loops. Further, remove the len argument and use the iterator count instead
and return 0 on success, not the amount copied.
Note this is also a prerequisite for changing the way rxrpc_send_data()
works to return a short send rather than an error if some data was
buffered.11hCVE-2026-99346——
———In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Trigger new ASID allocation in both VMCBs on pCPU switch
When the pCPU where the VMCB was most recently used is switched, reset
the ASID generation in both VMCBs, triggering new ASID allocation for
the immediate VMRUN as well as the next VMRUN on the other VMCB.
The ASID is shared between vmcb01 and vmcb02, and gets flushed on every
nested transition. However, since pCPU tracking is done per VMCB, it is
possible for one VMCB to allocate a new ASID when migrated to a new
pCPU, and then the other VMCB reuses that ASID on the old pCPU. This can
result in the same ASID being used by multiple vCPUs on the old pCPU.
Example scenario:
- vCPU runs on pCPU A, vmcb01 is active, asid=1.
- vCPU migrates to pCPU B, vmcb01 pCPU changes, new asid=2.
- Another vCPU runs on pCPU A and allocates asid=2 as well.
- vCPU migrates back to pCPU A, and then switches to vmcb02 before it
runs again with vmcb01.
- No pCPU switch is detected for vmcb02, so VMRUN is done with asid=2.
- Two vCPUs end up using asid=2 on the same pCPU.
Keep the VMCB dirtying to the active VMCB only. Clean bits are tracked
by a pCPU for each VMCB, so do not unnecessarily dirty a VMCB if its
pCPU does not change.
Additionally, initialize the tracked pCPU for vmcb02 to -1 on nested
enablement as hardening, so that a new ASID allocation is always
triggered when nested is disabled and re-enabled.
No performance regression was noticed when overcommitting L1 vCPUs in L0
(to force rescheduling), pinning L1 <-> L2 vCPUs, and running CPUID in a
tight loop bouncing between 2 vCPUs in L2.
An alternative (and perhaps more proper) fix would be tracking the ASID
per-VMCB instead (e.g. [1]). However, that's a more involved change, and
it would result in having different ASIDs for L1 and L2 without actually
properly maintaining them. It would probably work because all TLB
flushes target the current VMCB, and the other VMCB is always flushed on
nested transitions, but the code ends up in an arguably more fragile
state. Punt a proper clean fix to an incoming (and overdue) overhaul of
SVM's ASID usage [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250205182402.2147495-2-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260728003557.1136583-1-yosry@kernel.org11h