Vulnerabilidades explotables hoy
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Score único combinando CVSS, membresía KEV y EPSS. Cada CVE con su ficha propia — timeline desde publicación hasta explotación activa.
En catálogo KEV1,766
Nuevos KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,698
Distribución · última ventana
- Crítico5,579
- Alto21,699
- Medio20,217
- Bajo2,100
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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2024-0088—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8576—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-2000—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-0197—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-1280—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-0245—97.3%
——29——CVE-2007-2194—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8553—97.3%
——29——CVE-2014-4071—97.3%
——29——CVE-2021-212955.9 MED97.3%
——29Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.23dCVE-2015-0286—97.3%
——29——CVE-2008-0456—97.3%
——29——CVE-2020-6507—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8524—97.3%
——29——CVE-2016-0053—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8539—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-3833—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-1401—97.3%
——29——CVE-2013-3912—97.3%
——29——CVE-2020-5512—97.3%
——29——CVE-2003-0233—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-0204—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-16516—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-21514—97.3%
——29——CVE-2025-1025—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-21894—97.3%
——29——CVE-2021-45511—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-6298—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8472—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8522—97.3%
——29——CVE-2009-2433—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-4231—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-0028—97.3%
——29——CVE-2020-1219—97.3%
——29——CVE-2006-3652—97.3%
——29——CVE-2006-0187—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-6053—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-3488—97.3%
——29——CVE-2014-9371—97.3%
——29——CVE-1999-0450—97.3%
——29——