Vulnerabilidades explotables hoy
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En catálogo KEV1,766
Nuevos KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,698
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- Crítico5,582
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CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExplotTítuloVis.
CVE-2022-2480—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8472—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8576—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-2673—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-21894—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-21990—97.3%
——29——CVE-2014-10037—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-14627—97.3%
——29——CVE-2000-0132—97.3%
——29——CVE-2021-212955.9 MED97.3%
——29Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.24dCVE-2025-24286—97.3%
——29——CVE-2023-0324—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-12533—97.3%
——29——CVE-2003-0815—97.3%
——29——CVE-2025-560059.8 CRÍ97.3%
——29An undocumented and unsafe feature in the PLY (Python Lex-Yacc) library 3.11 allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) via the `picklefile` parameter in the `yacc()` function. This parameter accepts a `.pkl` file that is deserialized with `pickle.load()` without validation. Because `pickle` allows execution of embedded code via `__reduce__()`, an attacker can achieve code execution by passing a malicious pickle file. The parameter is not mentioned in official documentation or the GitHub repository, yet it is active in the PyPI version. This introduces a stealthy backdoor and persistence risk. NOTE: A third-party states that this vulnerability should be rejected because the proof of concept does not demonstrate arbitrary code execution and fails to complete successfully.45dCVE-2013-0082—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-0257—97.3%
——29——CVE-2007-0465—97.3%
——29——CVE-2026-3662—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-2738—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-0862—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-1256—97.3%
——29——CVE-2016-0184—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-43571—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-27799—97.3%
——29——CVE-2016-3319—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-25246—97.3%
——29——CVE-2023-3206—97.3%
——29——CVE-2021-27174—97.3%
——29——CVE-2006-3990—97.3%
——29——CVE-2013-3158—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-5782—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-1988—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-1353—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-5278—97.3%
——29——CVE-2013-3157—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-37060—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-32994—97.3%
——29——CVE-2004-0526—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-1564—97.3%
——29——