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CVE-2026-64130——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free
__GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this
flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.
If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during
__free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path.
However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will
consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing
tag memory.
Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that
will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and
friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet
(PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them.
However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD
marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up
exposing whatever tags were still set for the pages.
The docs (Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst) state
that allocation tags are set to 0 when a page is first mapped to user
space. That no longer holds with the huge zero folio when init_on_free is
enabled.
Fix it by decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_ZERO, passing to
tag_clear_highpages() whether we want to also clear page content.
Invert the meaning of the tag_clear_highpages() return value to have
clearer semantics.
Reproduced with the huge zero folio by modifying the check_buffer_fill
arm64/mte selftest to use a 2 MiB area, after making sure that pages have
a non-0 tag set when freeing (note that, during boot, we will not actually
initialize tags, but only set KASAN_TAG_KERNEL in the page flags).
$ ./check_buffer_fill
1..20
...
not ok 17 Check initial tags with private mapping, sync error mode and mmap memory
not ok 18 Check initial tags with private mapping, sync error mode and mmap/mprotect memory
...
This code needs more cleanups; we'll tackle that next, like
decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/__GPF_ZERO/__GFP_ZERO/, per David]20hCVE-2026-64132——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()
Reported by Sashiko:
In ipv6_hop_ioam(), the hdr pointer is initialized to point into the
skb's linear data buffer. Later, the code calls skb_ensure_writable(),
which might reallocate the buffer:
if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, optoff + 2 + hdr->opt_len))
goto drop;
/* Trace pointer may have changed */
trace = (struct ioam6_trace_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb)
+ optoff + sizeof(*hdr));
ioam6_fill_trace_data(skb, ns, trace, true);
ioam6_event(IOAM6_EVENT_TRACE, dev_net(skb->dev),
GFP_ATOMIC, (void *)trace, hdr->opt_len - 2);
If the skb is cloned or lacks sufficient linear headroom,
skb_ensure_writable() will invoke pskb_expand_head(), which reallocates
the skb's data buffer and frees the old one, invalidating pointers to
it. While the code recalculates the trace pointer immediately after the
call to skb_ensure_writable(), it fails to recalculate the hdr pointer.
This patch fixes the above by recalculating the hdr pointer before
passing hdr->opt_len to ioam6_event(), so that we avoid any UaF.20hCVE-2026-64113——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ixgbevf: fix use-after-free in VEPA multicast source pruning
ixgbevf_clean_rx_irq() prunes frames whose source MAC matches the VF's
own address (VEPA multicast workaround) by freeing the skb and
continuing to the next descriptor:
dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);
continue;
The skb pointer is declared outside the while loop and persists across
iterations. Because the continue skips the "skb = NULL" reset at the
bottom of the loop, the next iteration enters the "else if (skb)" path
and calls ixgbevf_add_rx_frag() on the freed skb, dereferencing
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags - a use-after-free in NAPI softirq context.
The sibling driver iavf already handles this correctly by nulling the
pointer before continuing. Apply the same pattern here.
I do not have ixgbevf hardware; the bug was found by static analysis
(scan_drop_continue_loops.py + semgrep drop_continue_in_loop, multi-tool
corroboration with the highest score in the scan). The UAF was confirmed
under KASAN by loading a test module that reproduces the exact code
pattern (alloc skb, kfree_skb, then read skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ixgbevf_uaf_test_init+0x100/0x1000
Read of size 8 at addr 000000006163ae78 by task insmod/30
freed 208-byte region [000000006163adc0, 000000006163ae90)
QEMU emulates igb (82576) but not ixgbe (82599), and the igbvf VF
driver does not include the VEPA source pruning path, so a full
end-to-end reproduction with emulated hardware was not possible.20hCVE-2026-64112——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rbd: eliminate a race in lock_dwork draining on unmap
Given how rbd_lock_add_request() and rbd_img_exclusive_lock() are
written, lock_dwork may be (re)queued more than it's actually needed:
for example in case a new I/O request comes in while we are in the
middle of rbd_acquire_lock() on behalf of another I/O request. This is
expected and with rbd_release_lock() preemptively canceling lock_dwork
is benign under normal operation.
A more problematic example is maybe_kick_acquire():
if (have_requests || delayed_work_pending(&rbd_dev->lock_dwork)) {
dout("%s rbd_dev %p kicking lock_dwork\n", __func__, rbd_dev);
mod_delayed_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->lock_dwork, 0);
}
It's not unrealistic for lock_dwork to get canceled right after
delayed_work_pending() returns true and for mod_delayed_work() to
requeue it right there anyway. This is a classic TOCTOU race.
When it comes to unmapping the image, there is an implicit assumption
of no self-initiated exclusive lock activity past the point of return
from rbd_dev_image_unlock() which unlocks the lock if it happens to be
held. This unlock is assumed to be final and lock_dwork (as well as
all other exclusive lock tasks, really) isn't expected to get queued
again. However, lock_dwork is canceled only in cancel_tasks_sync()
(i.e. later in the unmap sequence) and on top of that the cancellation
can get in effect nullified by maybe_kick_acquire(). This may result
in rbd_acquire_lock() executing after rbd_dev_device_release() and
rbd_dev_image_release() run and free and/or reset a bunch of things.
One of the possible failure modes then is a violated
rbd_assert(rbd_image_format_valid(rbd_dev->image_format));
in rbd_dev_header_info() which is called via rbd_dev_refresh() from
rbd_post_acquire_action().
Redo exclusive lock task draining to provide saner semantics and try
to meet the assumptions around rbd_dev_image_unlock().5hCVE-2026-64057——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix the locking used by afs_get_link()
The afs filesystem in the kernel doesn't do locking correctly for symbolic
links. There are a number of problems:
(1) It doesn't do any locking around afs_read_single() to prevent races
between multiple ->get_link() calls, thereby allowing the possibility
of leaks.
(2) It doesn't use RCU barriering when accessing the buffer pointers
during RCU pathwalk.
(3) It can race with another thread updating the contents of the symlink
if a third party updated it on the server.
Fix this by the following means:
(0) Move symlink handling into its own file as this makes it more
complicated.
(1) Take the validate_lock around afs_read_single() to prevent races
between multiple ->get_link() calls.
(2) Keep a separate copy of the symlink contents with an rcu_head. This
is always going to be a lot smaller than a page, so it can be
kmalloc'd and save quite a bit of memory. It also needs a refcount
for non-RCU pathwalk.
(3) Split the symlink read and write-to-cache routines in afs from those
for directories.
(4) Discard the I/O buffer as soon as the write-to-cache completes as this
is a full page (plus a folio_queue).
(5) If there's no cache, discard the I/O buffer immediately after reading
and copying if there is no cache.20hCVE-2026-64160——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix potential for tearing in ->remote_i_size and ->zero_point
Fix potential tearing in using ->remote_i_size and ->zero_point by copying
i_size_read() and i_size_write() and using the same seqcount as for i_size.
We need to make sure that netfslib and the filesystems that use it always
hold i_lock whilst updating any of the sizes to prevent i_size_seqcount
from getting corrupted.20hCVE-2026-64133——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: asihpi: Fix potential OOB array access at reading cache
find_control() to retrieve a cached info accesses the array with the
given index blindly, which may lead to an OOB array access.
Add a sanity check for avoiding it.5hCVE-2026-64174——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: advance loop vars in cfg80211_merge_profile()
cfg80211_merge_profile() reassembles a Multi-BSSID non-transmitted BSS
profile that has been split across multiple consecutive MBSSID elements.
Its while-loop calls
cfg80211_get_profile_continuation(ie, ielen, mbssid_elem, sub_elem)
but never advances mbssid_elem or sub_elem inside the body. Each
iteration therefore searches for a continuation that follows the same
fixed pair; the helper returns the same next_mbssid; and the same
next_sub bytes are memcpy()'d into merged_ie at a growing offset until
the buffer fills.
Advance both mbssid_elem and sub_elem to the just-consumed continuation
so the next call to cfg80211_get_profile_continuation() searches for a
further continuation beyond it (or returns NULL when none exists).
A specially-crafted malicious beacon can take advantage of this bug
to cause the kernel to spend an excessive amount of time in
cfg80211_merge_profile (up to as much as 2ms per beacon received),
which could theoretically be abused in some way.20hCVE-2026-64096——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: mcast: fix use-after-free in orig_node RCU release
batadv_mcast_purge_orig() removes entries from RCU-protected hlists but
does not wait for an RCU grace period before returning. Concurrent RCU
readers may still accesses references to those entries at the point of
removal. RCU-protected readers trying to operate on entries like
orig->mcast_want_all_ipv6_node will then access already freed memory.
Fix this by moving batadv_mcast_purge_orig() to batadv_orig_node_release(),
just before the call_rcu() invocation. This ensures RCU readers that were
active at purge time have drained before the orig_node memory is reclaimed.20hCVE-2026-64186——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs
In iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write(), the variables
dbg_mmio_offset and dbg_cap_offset are declared as int. However, they
are populated using kstrtou32_from_user(). If a user provides a
sufficiently large value, it can become a negative integer.
Prior to this patch, the AMD IOMMU debugfs implementation was already
protected by different mechanisms.
1. #define OFS_IN_SZ 8 ensures the user string <= 8 bytes, so
e.g. 0xffffffff isn't a valid input.
if (cnt > OFS_IN_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
2. Implicit type promotion in iommu_mmio_write(), dbg_mmio_offset is int
and iommu->mmio_phys_end is u64
if (dbg_mmio_offset > iommu->mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64))
return -EINVAL;
3. The show handlers would currently catch the negative number and
refuse to perform the read.
Replace kstrtou32_from_user() with kstrtos32_from_user() to parse the
input, and check for negative values to explicitly prevent out-of-bounds
memory accesses directly in iommu_mmio_write() and
iommu_capability_write().20hCVE-2026-64090——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: avoid empty VLAN responses
The commit 16116dac2339 ("batman-adv: prevent TT request storms by not
sending inconsistent TT TLVLs") added checks to the local (direct) TT
response code. But the response can also be done indirectly by another node
using the global TT state. To avoid such inconsistency states reported in
the original fix, also avoid sending empty VLANs for replies from the
global TT state.20hCVE-2026-64146——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix metabuf leak in inode xattr initialization
commit bb88e8da0025 ("erofs: use meta buffers for xattr operations")
converted xattr operations to use on-stack erofs_buf instances.
erofs_init_inode_xattrs() uses such a metabuf while reading the inline
xattr header and shared xattr id array.
Some error paths after erofs_read_metabuf() leave through out_unlock
without dropping the metabuf, so the folio reference can leak.
Consolidate the cleanup at out_unlock. erofs_put_metabuf() is a
no-op if no folio has been acquired, and this keeps all paths after
taking EROFS_I_BL_XATTR_BIT covered by a single cleanup site.20hCVE-2026-64134——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: Don't setup bogus iov_iter for silencing
At transition to the iov_iter for PCM data transfer, we blindly
applied the iov_iter setup also for silencing (i.e. data = NULL), and
it leads to a calculation of bogus iov_iter. Fortunately this didn't
cause troubles on most of architectures but it goes wrong on RISC-V
now, causing a NULL dereference.
Handle the NULL data case to treat the silencing in interleaved_copy()
for addressing the bug above. noninterleaved_copy() has already the
NULL data handling, so it doesn't need changes.20hCVE-2026-64064——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix netfs_invalidate_folio() to clear dirty bit if all changes gone
If a streaming write is made, this will leave the relevant modified folio
in a not-uptodate, but dirty state with a netfs_folio struct hung off of
folio->private indicating the dirty range. Subsequently truncating the
file such that the dirty data in the folio is removed, but the first part
of the folio theoretically remains will cause the netfs_folio struct to be
discarded... but will leave the dirty flag set.
If the folio is then read via mmap(), netfs_read_folio() will see that the
page is dirty and jump to netfs_read_gaps() to fill in the missing bits.
netfs_read_gaps(), however, expects there to be a netfs_folio struct
present and can oops because truncate removed it.
Fix this by calling folio_cancel_dirty() in netfs_invalidate_folio() in the
event that all the dirty data in the folio is erased (as nfs does).
Also add some tracepoints to log modifications to a dirty page.
This can be reproduced with something like:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/xfstest.test/foo bs=1M count=1
umount /xfstest.test
mount /xfstest.test
xfs_io -c "w 0xbbbf 0xf96c" \
-c "truncate 0xbbbf" \
-c "mmap -r 0xb000 0x11000" \
-c "mr 0xb000 0x11000" \
/xfstest.test/foo
with fscaching disabled (otherwise streaming writes are suppressed) and a
change to netfs_perform_write() to disallow streaming writes if the fd is
open O_RDWR:
if (//(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) || <--- comment this out
netfs_is_cache_enabled(ctx)) {
It should be reproducible even without this change, but if prevents the
above trivial xfs_io command from reproducing it.
Note that the initial dd is important: the file must start out sufficiently
large that the zero-point logic doesn't just clear the gaps because it
knows there's nothing in the file to read yet. Unmounting and mounting is
needed to clear the pagecache (there are other ways to do that that may
also work).
This was initially reproduced with the generic/522 xfstest on some patches
that remove the FMODE_READ restriction.20hCVE-2026-64175——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mld: stop TX during firmware restart
When iwlwifi firmware crashes (e.g., NMI_INTERRUPT_UNKNOWN on Intel
BE201/Wi-Fi 7), iwl_mld_nic_error() sets mld->fw_status.in_hw_restart
to true. However, iwl_mld_tx_from_txq() does not check this flag before
dequeuing frames from mac80211 and pushing them to the transport layer.
Since the firmware is dead, iwl_trans_tx() returns -EIO for each frame,
which then gets freed immediately. Under high-throughput conditions
(e.g., Tailscale UDP traffic or active SSH sessions), this creates a
tight dequeue-send-fail-free loop that wastes CPU cycles and generates
rapid skb allocation churn, leading to memory pressure from slab
fragmentation.
The RX path already has this guard (iwl_mld_rx_mpdu checks
in_hw_restart at rx.c:1906), and so does the TXQ allocation worker
(iwl_mld_add_txqs_wk at tx.c:156). Add the same guard to
iwl_mld_tx_from_txq() to stop all TX during firmware restart.
Frames left in mac80211's TXQs are naturally drained after restart
completes, when queue reallocation triggers iwl_mld_tx_from_txq()
via iwl_mld_add_txq_list(), or when new upper-layer traffic invokes
wake_tx_queue.
Tested on ASUS Zenbook 14 UX3405CA with Intel BE201 (Wi-Fi 7) on
kernel 6.19.5 where the firmware crashes approximately every 10-15
minutes under Tailscale traffic.20hCVE-2026-64065——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: fix VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO() issue in netfs_write_begin() call
The multiple runs of generic/013 test-case is capable
to reproduce a kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1504 with
probability of 30%.
while true; do
sudo ./check generic/013
done
[ 9849.452376] page: refcount:3 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000e58ff252 index:0x10781 pfn:0x1c322
[ 9849.452412] memcg:ffff8881a1915800
[ 9849.452417] aops:ceph_aops ino:1000058db9e dentry name(?):"f9XXXXXX"
[ 9849.452432] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 9849.452441] raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88816110d248
[ 9849.452445] raw: 0000000000010781 0000000000000000 00000003ffffffff ffff8881a1915800
[ 9849.452447] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_locked(folio))
[ 9849.452474] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 9849.452476] kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1504!
[ 9849.478635] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 9849.481772] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 84223 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #18 PREEMPT(full)
[ 9849.482881] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-9.fc43 06/1
0/2025
[ 9849.484539] RIP: 0010:folio_unlock+0x85/0xa0
[ 9849.485076] Code: 89 df 31 f6 e8 1c f3 ff ff 48 8b 5d f8 c9 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 31 ff c3 cc
cc cc cc 48 c7 c6 80 6c d9 a7 48 89 df e8 4b b3 10 00 <0f> 0b 48 89 df e8 21 e6 2c 00 eb 9d 0f 1f 40 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84
[ 9849.493818] RSP: 0018:ffff8881bb8076b0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 9849.495740] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffea00070c8980 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 9849.498678] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 9849.500559] RBP: ffff8881bb8076b8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 9849.501097] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000010782000
[ 9849.502108] R13: ffff8881935de738 R14: ffff88816110d010 R15: 0000000000001000
[ 9849.502516] FS: 00007e36cbe94740(0000) GS:ffff88824a899000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9849.502996] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9849.503810] CR2: 000000c0002b0000 CR3: 000000011bbf6004 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
[ 9849.504459] PKRU: 55555554
[ 9849.504626] Call Trace:
[ 9849.505242] <TASK>
[ 9849.505379] netfs_write_begin+0x7c8/0x10a0
[ 9849.505877] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9849.506384] ? __pfx_netfs_write_begin+0x10/0x10
[ 9849.507178] ceph_write_begin+0x8c/0x1c0
[ 9849.507934] generic_perform_write+0x391/0x8f0
[ 9849.508503] ? __pfx_generic_perform_write+0x10/0x10
[ 9849.509062] ? file_update_time_flags+0x19a/0x4b0
[ 9849.509581] ? ceph_get_caps+0x63/0xf0
[ 9849.510259] ? ceph_get_caps+0x63/0xf0
[ 9849.510530] ceph_write_iter+0xe79/0x1ae0
[ 9849.511282] ? __pfx_ceph_write_iter+0x10/0x10
[ 9849.511839] ? lock_acquire+0x1ad/0x310
[ 9849.512334] ? ksys_write+0xf9/0x230
[ 9849.512582] ? lock_is_held_type+0xaa/0x140
[ 9849.513128] vfs_write+0x512/0x1110
[ 9849.513634] ? __fget_files+0x33/0x350
[ 9849.513893] ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
[ 9849.514143] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 9849.514394] ksys_write+0xf9/0x230
[ 9849.514621] ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
[ 9849.514887] ? do_syscall_64+0x25e/0x1520
[ 9849.515122] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9849.515366] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x178/0x1c0
[ 9849.515655] __x64_sys_write+0x72/0xd0
[ 9849.515885] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x24/0x1c0
[ 9849.516130] x64_sys_call+0x22f/0x2390
[ 9849.516341] do_syscall_64+0x12b/0x1520
[ 9849.516545] ? do_syscall_64+0x27c/0x1520
[ 9849.516783] ? do_syscall_64+0x27c/0x1520
[ 9849.517003] ? lock_release+0x318/0x480
[ 9849.517220] ? __x64_sys_io_getevents+0x143/0x2d0
[ 9849.517479] ? percpu_ref_put_many.constprop.0+0x8f/0x210
[ 9849.517779] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 9849.518073] ? do_syscall_64+0x25e/0x1520
[ 9849.518291] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9849.518519] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x178/0x1c0
[ 9849.518799] ? do_syscall_64+0x27c/0x1520
[ 9
---truncated---20hCVE-2026-64155——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix error path leaks in some WMI WOW calls
Fix two instances where we used to directly return the result of
ath11k_wmi_cmd_send(...). Because we did not check the return value, we
also did not free the skb in the error path.20hCVE-2026-64145——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix dma_buffer leak on bus acquire failure
wilc_wlan_firmware_download() allocates dma_buffer with kmalloc() at
the top of the function and uses a 'fail:' label to free it via
kfree(dma_buffer) on error.
All later error paths correctly use 'goto fail' to route through this
cleanup. However, the early failure path after the first acquire_bus()
call uses a bare 'return ret;', which leaks dma_buffer whenever the bus
acquire fails.
Replace the early return with goto fail so the existing cleanup path
runs.
Found via a custom Coccinelle semantic patch hunting for kmalloc'd
locals leaked on early-return error paths in driver firmware-download
code.20hCVE-2026-64116——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ioam: add NULL check for idev in ipv6_hop_ioam()
Reported by Sashiko:
The function ipv6_hop_ioam() accesses
__in6_dev_get(skb->dev)->cnf.ioam6_enabled without validating the returned
idev pointer. Because addrconf_ifdown() can concurrently clear dev->ip6_ptr
via RCU, __in6_dev_get() can return NULL during interface teardown, which
could cause a NULL pointer dereference when processing an IOAM Hop-by-Hop
option.
Let's add a check and use SKB_DROP_REASON_IPV6DISABLED accordingly.20hCVE-2026-64049——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/adreno: fix userspace-triggered crash on a2xx-a4xx
Before a5xx Adreno driver will not try fetching UBWC params (because
those generations didn't support UBWC anyway), however it's still
possible to query UBWC-related params from the userspace, triggering
possible NULL pointer dereference. Check for UBWC config in
adreno_get_param() and return sane defaults if there is none.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/717778/20hCVE-2026-64117——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: capture fast-RX rate before mesh reuses skb->cb
ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() reads RX status through
IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), which aliases the same skb->cb storage
that ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() reuses as IEEE80211_TX_INFO. In the
unicast forward path, mesh_data does:
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(fwd_skb);
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
on the same skb the caller still names via rx->skb, then either
queues the skb for TX (success) or kfree_skb()'s it (no-route)
before returning RX_QUEUED. The caller's RX_QUEUED arm then
calls sta_stats_encode_rate(status) on memory that is either
zeroed (success path) or freed (no-route path). The latter is
KASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle.
Fix by encoding the rate from status before invoking
ieee80211_rx_mesh_data(), so the RX_QUEUED arm consumes a value
captured while status was still backed by valid memory.20hCVE-2026-64148——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pds_core: fix error handling in pdsc_devcmd_wait
Fix two cases where pdsc_devcmd_wait() returns stale success from
the completion register instead of an error:
1. FW crash: If firmware stops running, the wait loop breaks early with
running=false. The condition "if ((!done || timeout) && running)" is
false, so error handling is bypassed and stale status is returned.
Check !running first and return -ENXIO.
2. Timeout: If a command times out, err is set to -ETIMEDOUT but then
overwritten by pdsc_err_to_errno(status) which reads stale status.
Return -ETIMEDOUT immediately after cleaning up.
Both errors now propagate to pdsc_devcmd_locked() which queues
health_work for recovery.20hCVE-2026-64089——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: fix negative last_changeset_len
batadv_piv_tt::last_changeset_len len was declared as s16, but the field is
never intended to hold a negative value. When a value greater than 32767 is
assigned, it wraps to a negative signed integer.
In batadv_send_my_tt_response(), last_changeset_len is temporarily widened
to s32. The incorrectly negative s16 value propagates into the s32, causing
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data() to allocate a full sized buffer but
populates only a small portion of it with the collected changeset. All
remaining bits are kept uninitialized.
Using an u16 avoids this type confusion and ensures that no (negative) sign
extension is performed in batadv_send_my_tt_response().20hCVE-2026-64179——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: iosm: fix potential memory leaks in ipc_imem_init()
The memory allocated in ipc_protocol_init() is not freed on the error
paths that follow in ipc_imem_init(). Fix that by calling the
corresponding release function ipc_protocol_deinit() in the error path.20hCVE-2026-64066——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix netfs_read_to_pagecache() to pause on subreq failure
Fix netfs_read_to_pagecache() so that it pauses the generation of new
subrequests if an already-issued subrequest fails.20hCVE-2026-64067——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix missing barriers when accessing stream->subrequests locklessly
The list of subrequests attached to stream->subrequests is accessed without
locks by netfs_collect_read_results() and netfs_collect_write_results(),
and then they access subreq->flags without taking a barrier after getting
the subreq pointer from the list. Relatedly, the functions that build the
list don't use any sort of write barrier when constructing the list to make
sure that the NETFS_SREQ_IN_PROGRESS flag is perceived to be set first if
no lock is taken.
Fix this by:
(1) Add a new list_add_tail_release() function that uses a release barrier
to set the pointer to the new member of the list.
(2) Add a new list_first_entry_or_null_acquire() function that uses an
acquire barrier to read the pointer to the first member in a list (or
return NULL).
(3) Use list_add_tail_release() when adding a subreq to ->subrequests.
(4) Use list_first_entry_or_null_acquire() when initially accessing the
front of the list (when an item is removed, the pointer to the new
front iterm is obtained under the same lock).20hCVE-2026-64184——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: call missing mem_cgroup_iter_break()
damon_sysfs_memcg_path_to_id() breaks mem_cgroup_iter() loop without
calling mem_cgroup_iter_break(). This leaks the cgroup reference. Fix
the issue by calling mem_cgroup_iter_break() before the break.
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko.20hCVE-2026-64097——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating
[Why&How]
The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and
bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS
table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.
However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits
within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than
the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,
causing an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed
structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the
loop in both functions.
(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)5hCVE-2026-64157——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix partial invalidation of streaming-write folio
In netfs_invalidate_folio(), if the region of a partial invalidation
overlaps the front (but not all) of a dirty write cached in a streaming
write page (dirty, but not uptodate, with the dirty region tracked by a
netfs_folio struct), the function modifies the dirty region - but
incorrectly as it moves the region forward by setting the start to the
start, not the end, of the invalidation region.
Fix this by setting finfo->dirty_offset to the end of the invalidation
region (iend).20hCVE-2026-64118——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qed: fix double free in qed_cxt_tables_alloc()
If one of the later PF or VF CID bitmap allocations fails,
qed_cid_map_alloc() jumps to cid_map_fail and frees the previously
allocated CID bitmaps before returning an error. qed_cxt_tables_alloc()
then calls qed_cxt_mngr_free(), which invokes qed_cid_map_free()
again.
Fix this by setting each CID bitmap pointer to NULL after bitmap_free()
to avoid double free.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc3.
Runtime reproduction was not attempted because exercising the failing
allocation path requires device-specific setup.20hCVE-2026-64098——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: use uninterruptible resv lock for plane updates
virtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update() and virtio_gpu_resource_flush() lock
the framebuffer BO's dma_resv via virtio_gpu_array_lock_resv() and
ignore its return value. The function can fail with -EINTR from
dma_resv_lock_interruptible() (signal during lock wait) or with
-ENOMEM from dma_resv_reserve_fences() (fence slot allocation),
leaving the resv lock not held. The queue path then walks the object
array and calls dma_resv_add_fence(), which requires the lock held;
with lockdep enabled this trips dma_resv_assert_held():
WARNING: drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c:296 at dma_resv_add_fence+0x71e/0x840
Call Trace:
virtio_gpu_array_add_fence
virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs
virtio_gpu_queue_fenced_ctrl_buffer
virtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update
drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes
drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail
commit_tail
drm_atomic_helper_commit
drm_atomic_commit
drm_atomic_helper_update_plane
__setplane_atomic
drm_mode_cursor_universal
drm_mode_cursor_common
drm_mode_cursor_ioctl
drm_ioctl
__x64_sys_ioctl
Beyond the WARN, mutating the dma_resv fence list without the lock
races with concurrent readers/writers and can corrupt the list.
Both call sites run inside the .atomic_update plane callback, which
DRM atomic helpers do not allow to fail (by the time it runs, the
commit has been signed off to userspace and there is no clean
rollback path). Moving the lock acquisition to .prepare_fb was
rejected because the broader lock scope deadlocks against other BO
locking paths in the same atomic commit.
Introduce virtio_gpu_lock_one_resv_uninterruptible() that uses
dma_resv_lock() instead of dma_resv_lock_interruptible(). This
eliminates the -EINTR failure mode -- the realistic syzbot trigger
-- without extending the lock hold across the commit. The helper
locks a single BO and rejects nents > 1 with -EINVAL; both fix
sites lock exactly one BO.
Use it from virtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update() and
virtio_gpu_resource_flush(); check the return value to handle the
remaining -ENOMEM case from dma_resv_reserve_fences() by freeing
the objs and skipping the plane update for that frame. The
framebuffer BOs touched here are not shared with other contexts
and lock contention is expected to be brief, so the loss of
signal-interruptibility is acceptable.
Other callers of virtio_gpu_array_lock_resv() (the ioctl paths)
continue to use the interruptible variant.
The bug was reported by syzbot, triggered via fault injection
(fail_nth) on the DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CURSOR path, which forces the
-ENOMEM branch in dma_resv_reserve_fences().20hCVE-2026-11950——
——0Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.19dCVE-2026-64035——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: set tx buffer type for SMD frames
Sashiko pointed out that igc_fpe_init_smd_frame() initializes
igc_tx_buffer fields for an SMD skb, but does not set the buffer type:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260415025226.114115-1-kohei%40enjuk.jp
Since igc_tx_buffer entries are reused, a stale XDP or XSK type can
remain and make TX completion use the wrong cleanup path.
Set the buffer type to IGC_TX_BUFFER_TYPE_SKB.20hCVE-2026-64034——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Fix TOCTOU double-fetch of hwc_msg_id from DMA buffer
In mana_hwc_rx_event_handler(), resp->response.hwc_msg_id is read from
DMA-coherent memory and bounds-checked, then mana_hwc_handle_resp()
re-reads the same field from the same DMA buffer for test_bit() and
pointer arithmetic.
DMA-coherent memory is mapped uncacheable on x86 and is shared,
unencrypted, in Confidential VMs (SEV-SNP/TDX), so each load goes
directly to host-visible memory. A H/W can modify the value
between the check and the use, bypassing the bounds validation.
Fix this by reading hwc_msg_id exactly once using READ_ONCE() into a
stack-local variable in mana_hwc_rx_event_handler(), and passing the
validated value as a parameter to mana_hwc_handle_resp().20hCVE-2026-64122——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free in mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover
mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover() accesses sq->netdev after
mlx5e_safe_reopen_channels() has torn down and freed the channel (and
its embedded SQs). Replace the three sq->netdev references with
priv->netdev which is safe because priv outlives channel teardown.
The netdev_err() call already used priv->netdev for this reason; make
the trylock/unlock and health_channel_eq_recover calls consistent.
This fixes the following KASAN splat:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover+0x1dd/0x360 [mlx5_core]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff889860ed0b28 by task kworker/u113:2/5277
Call Trace:
mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover+0x1dd/0x360 [mlx5_core]
devlink_health_reporter_recover+0xa2/0x150
devlink_health_report+0x254/0x7c0
mlx5e_reporter_tx_timeout+0x297/0x380 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x109/0x170 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x677/0xf20
worker_thread+0x51f/0xd90
kthread+0x3a5/0x810
ret_from_fork+0x208/0x400
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3020hCVE-2026-64123——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hsr: defer node table free until after RCU readers
HSR node-list and node-status generic-netlink operations run under
rcu_read_lock(). They walk hsr->node_db through hsr_get_next_node() and
hsr_get_node_data(), but RTM_DELLINK teardown removes the same node table
with plain list_del() and frees each node immediately.
That lets a generic-netlink reader hold a struct hsr_node pointer across
hsr_dellink(). In a KASAN build, widening the reader window after
hsr_get_next_node() obtains the node reproduces a slab-use-after-free
when the reader copies node->macaddress_A; the freeing stack is
hsr_del_nodes() from hsr_dellink().
Use list_del_rcu() and defer the free through the existing
hsr_free_node_rcu() callback. This matches the lifetime rule used by the
HSR prune paths, which already delete nodes with list_del_rcu() and
call_rcu().20hCVE-2026-64144——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtk: fix urb->setup_packet leak in error paths
The setup_packet of control urb is not freed if usb_submit_urb fails or
the submitted urb is killed. Add free in these two paths.20hCVE-2026-64167——
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kho: skip KHO for crash kernel
kho_fill_kimage() unconditionally populates the kimage with KHO
metadata for every kexec image type. When the image is a crash kernel,
this can be problematic as the crash kernel can run in a small reserved
region and the KHO scratch areas can sit outside it.
The crash kernel then faults during kho_memory_init() when it
tries phys_to_virt() on the KHO FDT address:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address xxxxxxxx
...
fdt_offset_ptr+...
fdt_check_node_offset_+...
fdt_first_property_offset+...
fdt_get_property_namelen_+...
fdt_getprop+...
kho_memory_init+...
mm_core_init+...
start_kernel+...
kho_locate_mem_hole() already skips KHO logic for KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH
images, but kho_fill_kimage() was missing the same guard. As
kho_fill_kimage() is the single point that populates image->kho.fdt
and image->kho.scratch, fixing it here is sufficient for both arm64
and x86 as the FDT and boot_params path are bailing out when these
fields are unset.20hCVE-2026-50268—0.0%
——0——CVE-2026-14278——
——0Rejected reason: After further coordination, CVE was determined to not be warranted.11d