CVE-2026-105674
TP-Link Tapo C325WB V2 generates the pre-shared key used by its local media streaming service with a time-seeded pseudo-random number genera
CVSS
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Sem CVSS
EPSS
0.3%
p19
KEV
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Exploit Today
6
0-100
Publicado: 8 de out. de 2026 · Última mod.: 15 de out. de 2026 · CWE-330
0.2%EPSS · 30 dias0.3%
2026-10-092026-11-05
TP-Link Tapo C325WB V2 generates the pre-shared key used by its local media streaming service with a time-seeded pseudo-random number generator, making the key predictable and recoverable. An unauthenticated attacker on the adjacent network can recover the key and authenticate to the media streaming service without valid user credentials. Successful exploitation may allow an unauthenticated adjacent-network attacker to access and take over live video and audio streams, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of camera media.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-870434.8 MÉD8.0%
——2The entropy-device random number generator in subsys/random/random_entropy_device.c returned early with -ENODEV from rand_get() as soon as device_is_ready() failed, before reaching the non-cryptographic system-timer fallback further down the same function. Because z_impl_sys_rand_get() returns void and discards that error — and the public sys_rand_get() syscall is itself declared void, so it cannot report failure — the caller's output buffer was left untouched and its previous contents were handed back as random data. The thin wrappers make this a plain uninitialized read: sys_rand32_get() declares uint32_t ret;, calls sys_rand_get(&ret, sizeof(ret)) and returns ret.
The "not ready" state is a normal runtime condition rather than a fault. Entropy drivers initialise at PRE_KERNEL_1 with CONFIG_ENTROPY_INIT_PRIORITY (default 50), so any earlier initialiser — kernel objects run at priority 30 — observes an unready device; the sibling generator subsys/random/random_xoshiro128.c and z_early_rand_get() in kernel/init.c both already carried an explicit timer fallback for exactly this case. The state is also permanent for the boot when an entropy driver's init hook fails, which several in-tree drivers can do on real hardware (entropy_stm32 on an RNG clock configuration error, entropy_psa_crypto when psa_crypto_init() fails, entropy_nrf_cracen, entropy_esp32, entropy_virtio).
When this occurs, every non-cryptographic random value in the system is either a constant or stale memory. coap_next_token() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap.c fills a static buffer, so every CoAP token becomes the same .bss constant; tcp_init_isn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c returns an uninitialized stack word as the TCP initial sequence number; DHCPv4/DHCPv6 transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys and RTP SSRCs are similarly degraded, and arch/arm64/core/pac.c derives per-thread Pointer Authentication keys from the same source. Where the bytes are transmitted directly — SSH packet padding, the netmidi2 session nonce, a DTLS connection ID on builds without CONFIG_CSPRNG_ENABLED — stale caller stack or heap contents are disclosed on the wire.
The fix initialises ret to -ENODEV and only calls entropy_get_entropy() when the device is ready, so the not-ready case now falls through to the timer fallback and the buffer is always written. The cryptographically secure path is unchanged: sys_csrand_get() still propagates the error to the caller and never silently degrades. An attacker cannot induce the unready state, but can observe and exploit the resulting non-random values remotely on an affected device.2dCVE-2026-1202233.1 BAI24.7%
——7A vulnerability was identified in Oray Pugongying X5 Pro up to 7.6.1. This impacts the function session_get of the file session.lua of the component Session ID Handler. The manipulation of the argument _user leads to insufficiently random values. The attack can be initiated remotely. The attack's complexity is rated as high. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.4dCVE-2026-799816.5 MÉD2.2%
——1The DNS stub resolver in subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c binds one UDP socket per configured server when the resolver context is initialised (dns_resolve_init_locked() -> register_dispatcher() -> dns_dispatcher_register()), with the local port left at 0 so the stack picks an ephemeral port exactly once. dns_write() then sends every subsequent query from that same socket without re-binding, so the source port is constant for the lifetime of the resolver context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier (ctx->queries[i].id, drawn with sys_rand16_get()) varies per query. RFC 5452 section 9.2 requires both to vary; with a fixed port, an off-path attacker has to guess only the identifier.
The stable port is cheap to learn. Any single observed query reveals it permanently, and it can also be found by probing the ephemeral UDP range: subsys/net/ip/connection.c answers unmatched unicast UDP with an ICMP port-unreachable, so the resolver's socket is the one port in that range that stays silent. Acceptance of a reply is decided solely by get_slot_by_id() matching the transaction identifier and a CRC-16 of the queried name — the reply's source address is never checked (dispatcher_cb() does ARG_UNUSED(addr)), so forged answers need not even be spoofed to appear to come from the configured server; they only need to reach the resolver's port.
An attacker with UDP reachability to the device (same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment, or a globally routable device address) can therefore flood answers for a predictable query name across the 16-bit identifier space during a query window and race the legitimate server. A win makes the application resolve an attacker-chosen address, and with CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_CACHE enabled the forged record is retained for its attacker-chosen TTL. The attack still requires winning that race, and applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected.
The fix draws a fresh local port before each query to a server that has nothing outstanding: dns_randomize_source_port() unregisters the dispatcher, closes and reopens the socket, and re-registers it bound to port 0 so the system selects a new port, raising the per-query guessing space from roughly 16 to roughly 31 bits. Multicast DNS and LLMNR are excluded because their ports are protocol-fixed. The behaviour is controlled by CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT (default y).4dCVE-2026-1060744.8 MÉD26.9%
——8A flaw in Node.js `crypto` causes the internal entropy caches used by `crypto.randomUUID()`, `crypto.randomUUIDv7()`, and `crypto.randomInt()` to be saved into user-land startup snapshots (`--build-snapshot`) and single executable applications built with `useSnapshot`.
If any of these functions, or an API that relies on them such as `URL.createObjectURL()`, is called while the snapshot is built, every process started from that snapshot returns the same values until the cache is refilled: up to 127 UUIDs and about 1,000 `randomInt()` values. Identifiers expected to be unique can collide across processes, and values issued by one process can be predicted by observing another.
This vulnerability affects Node.js **26.x**, **24.x**, and **22.x**.4dCVE-2026-463476.8 MÉD16.9%
——5The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, when a password reset link is visited, the application generates a replacement password in a predictable way and emails it to the account holder. The insufficient entropy allows the password to be brute-forced by an attacker who can approximate the server-side generation time. Exploiting this finding in isolation requires the victim to have triggered the reset themselves and the attacker to infer the server time from network or email metadata. This issue has been patched in version 26.05.8dCVE-2026-463466.5 MÉD26.9%
——8The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, the password reset token is predictably based on the time of the reset request. An attacker who knows the target's email address can request a reset and then brute-force the token. Exploiting this finding alone forces an unauthorized password reset on any account. This issue has been patched in version 26.05.14d