CVE Watch8 de out. de 2026

CVE-2026-107229

The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. From 2

CVSS

4.0

Média

EPSS

0.3%

p18

KEV

—

Exploit Today

0-100

Publicado: 7 de out. de 2026 · Última mod.: 8 de out. de 2026 · CWE-384 · CWE-1275

EPSS · 30d

0.3%EPSS · 30 dias0.3%

2026-10-082026-11-05

Descrição técnica

The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. From 2.16.0 until 3.0.14, ThreadSafeCookieStore incompletely validates cookie Domain attributes. Missing private-section and default public-suffix rules, absent A-label normalization, locale-sensitive lowercasing, public-suffix host-only handling, and numeric or IP host checks allow one origin to store a cookie later sent to another origin. Applications sharing one client across trust domains can therefore receive attacker-injected cookies and may be exposed to session fixation. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.14.

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