CVE-2026-108162
Pingvin Share X before 1.22.0 contains a rate limit bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to evade per-IP thrott
CVSS
6.5
Média
EPSS
0.2%
p8
KEV
—
Exploit Today
2
0-100
Publicado: 10 de out. de 2026 · Última mod.: 16 de out. de 2026 · CWE-348
0.2%EPSS · 30 dias0.2%
2026-10-112026-11-05
Pingvin Share X before 1.22.0 contains a rate limit bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to evade per-IP throttling because backend/src/main.ts unconditionally trusts proxy headers. Attackers can rotate spoofed X-Forwarded-For values against /api/auth/signIn, /api/auth/signIn/totp, and /api/auth/resetPassword to brute-force passwords and TOTP codes and forge logged client IP addresses.
- github.comhttps://github.com/smp46/pingvin-share-x
- github.comhttps://github.com/smp46/pingvin-share-x/blob/68ebf191fe1362592ffd5517e662f087e36c10b2/backend/src/main.ts#L57
- github.comhttps://github.com/smp46/pingvin-share-x/commit/25e9cee7fb1c155300b5663fc5fedeea32d20954
- github.comhttps://github.com/smp46/pingvin-share-x/releases/tag/v1.22.0
- github.comhttps://github.com/smp46/pingvin-share-x/security/advisories/GHSA-7gx2-g6x2-7mjg
- www.vulncheck.comhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/pingvin-share-x-before-1.22.0-rate-limit-bypass-via-spoofed-x-forwarded-for
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-774636.5 MÉD—
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——1CGI versions before 5.00 for Perl trust the client X-Forwarded-Host header in url, self_url, virtual_host and virtual_port.
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——4PipesHub before 0.10.0 contains a rate limit bypass vulnerability in getClientIp() that allows unauthenticated attackers to evade per-IP throttling by spoofing X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP headers. Attackers can rotate header values to obtain fresh rate-limit buckets on authentication endpoints, enabling password spraying and OTP or password-reset email flooding.2dCVE-2026-1182655.3 MÉD3.3%
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