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CVE Watch27 de out. de 2026

CVE-2026-116822

YesWiki before 4.7.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in BazarListeAction that allows unauthenticated attackers to select arbitrary t

CVSS

5.3

Média

EPSS

0.2%

p11

KEV

—

Exploit Today

3

0-100

Publicado: 27 de out. de 2026 · Última mod.: 27 de out. de 2026 · CWE-73

EPSS · 30d
0.2%EPSS · 30 dias0.2%
2026-10-272026-11-07
Descrição técnica

YesWiki before 4.7.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in BazarListeAction that allows unauthenticated attackers to select arbitrary templates within the @bazar Twig namespace via the template GET parameter. Attackers can append crafted template values to pages containing the bazarliste action to force unintended layouts, causing page defacement for visitors following the crafted link.

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