CVE Watch8 de nov. de 2026

CVE-2026-123594

Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a

CVSS

4.8

Média

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

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0-100

Publicado: 8 de nov. de 2026 · Última mod.: 8 de nov. de 2026 · CWE-345

EPSS · 30d

Ainda não há histórico EPSS suficiente.

Descrição técnica

Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.

Referências oficiais

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CVE-2026-1235993.7 BAI

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———Hickory DNS hickory-proto before 0.26.0-beta.1 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because verify_rrsets() ignores DNS class when partitioning RRsets, so non-IN records skip signature verification yet are marked secure when the IN records verify. Attackers able to supply DNS responses can include forged CH or HS class records, including DS records, to authenticate any DNSKEY and forge child zone responses.4h CVE-2026-1235968.8 ALT

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———Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records, causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for the negative TTL.4h CVE-2026-1235958.8 ALT

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———Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC3 handler, which matches the closest encloser by hash alone without checking the type bitmap and so accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC3 records as proof of nonexistence. An attacker who delivers one response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC3 records can cause NXDOMAIN or NODATA to be cached with AD=1, denying resolution of existing names at and below the zone cut.4h CVE-2026-1235915.9 MÉD

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———Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 fail to verify, per RFC 6840 §4.4, that an NSEC or NSEC3 record denying a DS RRset also proves the delegation's NS record exists. Attackers can reuse child-side NSEC or NSEC3 records to fake an insecure delegation and forge child-zone records.4h CVE-2026-1235823.7 BAI

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———The validating recursive resolver and validating forwarder in Hickory DNS (hickory-server) 0.25.0 before 0.26.2 do not check whether the SOA record passed DNSSEC validation when assembling NXDOMAIN or NODATA responses. An attacker able to supply forged DNS responses can have a forged SOA record returned to clients with the AD bit set, misleading clients that rely on the server's DNSSEC validation.4h CVE-2026-1235815.3 MÉD

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———Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw that accepts a response as a positive answer when any valid RRset appears in the answer section, without checking that the RRset is responsive to the query. Attackers can supply signed but unrelated RRsets so that responses lacking matching records are validated as positive answers instead of as no-data responses.4h