CVE-2026-127131
SOGo before 5.12.13 contains a missing rate limiting vulnerability in its web login TOTP verification that allows attackers who already poss
CVSS
7.4
Alta
EPSS
—
KEV
—
Exploit Today
—
0-100
Publicado: 12 de nov. de 2026 · Última mod.: 12 de nov. de 2026 · CWE-307
Ainda não há histórico EPSS suficiente.
SOGo before 5.12.13 contains a missing rate limiting vulnerability in its web login TOTP verification that allows attackers who already possess a victim's password to brute-force the second-factor code without triggering any lockout. Attackers can send repeated POST requests to /SOGo/connect with wrong verification codes at high speed since failed TOTP attempts never increment the failed-login counter and SOGoMaximumFailedLoginCount does not apply, enabling indefinite guessing across 30-second code windows to bypass two-factor authentication.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-1271117.4 ALT—
———SOGo before 5.12.13 contains an improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to reset account passwords by repeatedly guessing secret-question answers via the passwordRecoveryCheck endpoint without lockout or rate limiting. Attackers can submit unlimited candidate answers to obtain a valid recovery JWT, then use it to change the account password without the old credential and log in via the connect endpoint, achieving full account takeover on accounts without TOTP enabled.3hCVE-2026-68512——
——0Paaster is a pastebin application. Prior to version 3.3.0, Paaster's account login has no rate limiting, lockout, or CAPTCHA of any kind, and a companion endpoint openly discloses whether a username exists along with that account's password-hashing salts. Together these let an attacker enumerate real accounts and then brute-force their passwords with unlimited, unthrottled attempts. This issue has been patched in version 3.3.0.21hCVE-2026-1266185.3 MÉD38.0%
——11The auto-ban of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0-B1 through 6.3.7 can be kept from banning an address after repeated failed logons, which allows a remote unauthenticated attacker who can connect from two or more addresses to go on guessing account passwords - over SMTP AUTH, IMAP and POP3, and over ManageSieve, CalDAV/CardDAV and the REST API where those are turned on (off by default) - without being banned. When the failed logons counted from one address reach MaxInvalidLogonAttempts (3 by default), the server clears that address's count, saves an IP range that refuses the address for AutoBanMinutes (60 by default) and drops the connection. The range is named "Auto-ban: " followed by the user name of the logon that reached the limit, and no two ranges may have the same name. The server chooses the name by checking candidates as written - the name, then the name with a number, a random suffix or a GUID added - and only then cuts it to the 100 characters the database column holds, so that with a user name of 90 characters or more every candidate is the same once cut. While one range named after such a user name stands, every later ban named after a user name with the same first 90 characters therefore fails at the database: no range is saved, the address is not refused, and, its count having already been cleared, it is given the next full set of attempts. A user name of 78 to 89 characters makes later bans fail in the same way: from the second, the third or the twelfth on, depending on its length and the database, or, from 78 to 85 characters, by chance. An attacker who has once had an address banned under such a name can in this way keep guessing passwords from any other address, ending each set of attempts with a logon under a name of that kind; each failed save is reported in the server's error log (as the database error HM5032, and from 6.2.19 also as HM6099). On SQL Server a user name holding characters outside the database's code page has the same effect at any length, because the check compared names in that code page; that save is refused by the server's own check of the name, with no database error, and is reported only from 6.2.19 (HM6099). A user name holding a NUL character, which the web services listener's HTTP Basic sign-in (off by default) carries from 6.3.3 and, on the Linux builds, IMAP LOGIN, offered as installed, from 6.3.0, makes bans fail at any length: on MySQL, MariaDB and PostgreSQL the statements that check the name and save the range end at the character, so that every ban named after such a name fails, from the first and from a single address, and, its count having already been cleared, the address is given the next full set of attempts; on SQL Server and SQL Server Compact the name is bound only as far as the character, so that while one range under the part before it stands, every later ban named after such a name fails. On SQL Server, and on MySQL and MariaDB for an account whose local part has nine characters or more, a guess at the account can itself carry a name of that kind, since those databases find an account under its address followed by spaces (and SQL Server also under one holding characters its comparison ignores), so that not even a MaxInvalidLogonAttempts of 1, which bans each failed logon under the name it gave, avoids it there.1dCVE-2026-1266165.3 MÉD34.8%
——10The auto-ban of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.2.0 through 6.3.3, with a MySQL or MariaDB database, can be kept from banning an address after repeated failed logons, which allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to go on guessing account passwords from a single address without being banned. The server makes its MySQL tables in MySQL's utf8 character set, which holds no character outside the Basic Multilingual Plane, sends its statements as UTF-8 over a utf8mb4 connection and leaves the database's default strict mode in place. From 6.2.0 it decodes the user name of a SASL PLAIN logon as UTF-8, so the name can hold such a character. When the failed logons counted from one address reach MaxInvalidLogonAttempts (3 by default), the server clears that address's count, saves an IP range named "Auto-ban: " followed by the user name of the logon that reached the limit, and drops the connection. If such a character is in the part of the user name that the range's name keeps (the name is cut to 100 characters), the database refuses the range: no range is saved, the address is not refused, and, its count having already been cleared, it is given the next full set of attempts. An attacker can in this way spend all but the last attempt of each set on password guesses, and make the last under such a name. On Windows, POP3 AUTH PLAIN reaches it on a server as installed, and IMAP AUTHENTICATE PLAIN where IMAP SASL authentication is turned on (off by default); on Windows and on Linux (from 6.3.0), SMTP AUTH PLAIN reaches it where plain-text authentication is allowed (off by default), and ManageSieve and CardDAV where they are turned on (off by default). Each failed save is reported in the server's error log. A database whose strict mode has been turned off stores the character as a question mark and makes the first such ban, but refuses every later ban named after the same user name, or after one holding other such characters in their place, as a duplicate while the first stands, since the server cannot look up a name holding such a character there.1dCVE-2026-1266145.3 MÉD38.0%
——11The web services listener of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.3 through 6.3.7 does not apply the server's IP ranges to the connections it accepts, which allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to go on guessing account passwords at the listener's sign-ins after the auto-ban has banned the attacker's address. The listener is off by default (WebServicesHttpPort and WebServicesHttpsPort 0). From 6.3.3 its CardDAV, and from 6.3.4 its CalDAV and its Outlook Autodiscover answer to a request that carries credentials, sign an account in with HTTP Basic over HTTPS. A failed sign-in there counts towards the auto-ban as a failed logon on any other protocol does: when the failures counted from one address reach MaxInvalidLogonAttempts (3 within 30 minutes by default), the server writes an IP range that refuses the address for AutoBanMinutes (60 by default), and the SMTP, POP3, IMAP and ManageSieve listeners refuse it. The web services listener asked no IP range when it accepted a connection (in 6.3.3 nothing, from 6.3.4 the country policy alone), so it went on serving such an address, whether its ban had been earned there or on another protocol, and also an address that an administrator's IP range allowing nothing holds. Each failed sign-in there closed only its own connection, and the next connection was accepted, during the ban and after it. The firewall rule and command the auto-ban can drive (AutoBanFirewall and AutoBanCommand, off by default) are told only the SMTP, POP3 and IMAP ports, so that the firewall rule and the packaged hook did not close the listener's ports, and the fail2ban jail packaged for Linux (off by default) lists only the mail and ManageSieve ports. The only limit left on the guesses at one account there was the per-name lockout (AccountLockoutThreshold in hMailServer.ini, 0, off, by default), which has a separate defect fixed in the same release. The flaw is reached on the listener's HTTPS port: behind a TLS-terminating proxy the listener sees the proxy's address for every client, and a ban never named the client there.1dCVE-2026-1265714.8 MÉD29.4%
——9Padloc 4.0.0 before 4.3.1 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the legacy retrieveMFAToken handler that never counts wrong email verification codes toward the attempt limit. Unauthenticated attackers knowing a victim's email can brute force the 6-digit code to obtain verification tokens usable in signup, login and account recovery flows.2d