CVE-2026-133240
OpnForm before 2.8.2 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in PublicWebhookUrl::isPublicIp that fails to reject CGNAT, NAT64
CVSS
3.1
Baixa
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Publicado: 19 de nov. de 2026 · Última mod.: 19 de nov. de 2026 · CWE-918
Ainda não há histórico EPSS suficiente.
OpnForm before 2.8.2 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in PublicWebhookUrl::isPublicIp that fails to reject CGNAT, NAT64 and 6to4 address ranges. Authenticated users can configure webhook, form import or PDF image URLs resolving to these ranges to make the server send HTTPS requests to internal hosts.
- github.comhttps://github.com/OpnForm/OpnForm
- github.comhttps://github.com/OpnForm/OpnForm/blob/v2.8.1/api/app/Service/Security/PublicWebhookUrl.php#L181-L188
- github.comhttps://github.com/OpnForm/OpnForm/commit/d279d0acbb67648364ed5a58db7f45928e98751f
- github.comhttps://github.com/OpnForm/OpnForm/pull/1371
- github.comhttps://github.com/OpnForm/OpnForm/releases/tag/v2.8.2
- www.vulncheck.comhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/opnform-before-2.8.2-ssrf-guard-bypass-via-publicwebhookurl-ispublicip
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-773167.1 ALT—
———Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, validate_url_ssrf() in src/core/utils.py validates one DNS answer and then returns the hostname, while guarded_aiohttp_request(), enforce_outbound_url(), and validate_url_with_env_config() allow the outbound connection to perform an independent second lookup. A caller with control of the hostname's DNS can make validation see a public address and make the connection see an internal address, bypassing the guard across its outbound consumers and exposing readable internal or metadata-service responses. The attack requires low or zero DNS TTL behavior and a successful timing-dependent answer change; static multiple-address answers are checked and do not provide the same bypass. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8.5hCVE-2026-773158.5 ALT—
———Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, http.paginate in src/core/modules/atomic/http/paginate.py validates only the initial base_url, and _paginate_link_header then follows a server-supplied Link: rel="next" URL without calling the SSRF guard again. A low-privileged caller can make an allowed first page point the next request at an internal or metadata service, causing a readable second-order SSRF whose response body is aggregated into all_items and returned. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8.5hCVE-2026-773137.1 ALT—
———Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, validate_url_ssrf in src/core/utils.py resolves and checks a hostname but returns the hostname URL rather than the validated address, and session.get in http.get performs an independent DNS lookup when connecting. A low-privileged caller with control of the hostname's DNS can make the first lookup return a public address and the connection-time lookup return an internal address, bypassing the SSRF guard for all modules that call it and exposing readable internal or metadata-service responses. Successful exploitation requires attacker-controlled DNS and a successful timing-dependent answer change between the two lookups. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8.5hCVE-2026-929074.3 MÉD—
———IBM watsonx.data 2.4.0 through 2.4.0 patch 8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to conduct a server-side request forgery due to a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.6hCVE-2026-1302358.7 ALT—
———In the Okta .NET SDK Abstractions library, outbound HTTP requests are not restricted to the configured Okta organization domain when processing certain URL formats. If a URL parameter is modified to specify an external host, the library may transmit the configured SSWS API token to that unintended destination.6hCVE-2026-1301615.3 MÉD—
———Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework. Prior to 1.7.2, an authenticated user can bypass the recipe-autofill SSRF check by submitting a hostname under the user's control through the Autofill from URL feature; the hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and a private or internal address during the later connection. In app/myrecipes/routes.py, is_safe_autofill_url validates the first DNS response, but recipe autofill passes the original URL to requests.get, which independently resolves the hostname and can connect to the internal address. The fetched response is parsed into recipe fields, enabling internal-service reconnaissance and potential data exposure; no redirect is required, and disabling redirects does not stop this DNS-rebinding bypass. This issue is fixed in 1.7.2.5h