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CVE Watch20 de nov. de 2026

CVE-2026-133613

Flowintel's community data launcher script passes the admin API key as a command-line argument to a child Python helper process. On Unix-lik

CVSS

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Sem CVSS

EPSS

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KEV

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Exploit Today

0

0-100

Publicado: 20 de nov. de 2026 · Última mod.: 20 de nov. de 2026 · CWE-200 · CWE-522

EPSS · 30d

Ainda não há histórico EPSS suficiente.

Descrição técnica

Flowintel's community data launcher script passes the admin API key as a command-line argument to a child Python helper process. On Unix-like systems, process arguments are readable by all local users via standard tools such as ps or by reading /proc/<pid>/cmdline, allowing any local user to observe the key while the helper process is running. An attacker with local access to the host can capture the admin API key during the brief window in which the helper process is active. Possession of the key grants full administrative access to the Flowintel REST API, enabling unauthorized creation, modification, or deletion of threat intelligence data, users, roles, and organisations. Preconditions: - The victim must invoke the community data import or deletion command (launch.sh -tdc or -dtdc) with the API key supplied as a positional argument. - The attacker must have a local user account on the same host and be able to observe process listings during the helper execution window. Impact: - Disclosure of the Flowintel admin API key to any local user. - Subsequent full administrative control over the Flowintel instance via its REST API. Affected: <4.1.0

Referências oficiais
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