CVE-2026-17386
IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 could allow a remote attacker to gain full administrative control due to the use of a cryptograph
CVSS
8.1
Alta
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Publicado: 7 de nov. de 2026 · Última mod.: 7 de nov. de 2026 · CWE-338
Ainda não há histórico EPSS suficiente.
IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 could allow a remote attacker to gain full administrative control due to the use of a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-173935.1 MÉD—
———IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to the use of a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator.6hCVE-2026-1215534.8 MÉD29.4%
——9Cotonti through 1.0.0 generates registration and email-change validation tokens with md5(microtime()), allowing attackers to bypass email-ownership verification by predicting tokens. Attackers can derive the generation time from the HTTP Date header and compute candidate tokens offline. They then submit these tokens to the users.register.php validate handler to activate accounts or confirm email addresses they do not control.7hCVE-2026-1189867.5 ALT5.0%
——1CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand().
The secret that signs session cookies is built from two calls to the built-in rand(), which is seeded with 32 bits. The secret therefore has at most 2**32 possible values, and one signed cookie is enough to test each candidate offline.
An attacker who obtains a single session cookie can recover the secret and sign cookies for any user, including an administrator.18hCVE-2026-102813—9.7%
——3An authentication flaw exists in the password-recovery functionality of TP-Link RE305 V3. The verification-code interface allows an unauthenticated attacker on the same local network to trigger generation of an administrator password-reset verification code. Because the interface lacks an effective attempt counter or lockout mechanism and uses a predictable verification-code generation process, an attacker may obtain or brute-force the code and reset the administrator password.
Successful exploitation may allow an unauthenticated attacker on the local network to reset the administrator password and subsequently access privileged device-management functions.3dCVE-2026-197423.7 BAI16.2%
——5The IPv6 stack derived the long-lived secret key used to compute RFC 7217 stable interface identifiers (gen_stable_iid() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6.c) and RFC 8981 temporary interface identifiers (gen_temporary_iid() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_pe.c) with sys_rand_get(). That API is documented as not cryptographically secure, while both RFCs require this key to be an unpredictable random value of at least 128 bits — the unpredictability of every generated IID rests entirely on it.
Depending on the platform, sys_rand_get() resolves either to a hardware entropy device or, on boards whose entropy driver sets CONFIG_ENTROPY_NEEDS_PRNG, to the non-cryptographic xoshiro128++ generator in subsys/random/random_xoshiro128.c, which keeps a single global 128-bit state shared with every other sys_rand_get() consumer. Many of those consumers put their output directly on the wire (ephemeral source ports, DNS query IDs, CoAP message IDs and tokens, DHCPv6 transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys), and the xoshiro state transition is invertible, so an observer of a device's traffic can recover the generator state and reconstruct the IID secret key. Additionally, with the entropy-device backend sys_rand_get() silently falls back to k_cycle_get_32() samples when the entropy driver fails, and returns no error, so the key could be derived from the cycle counter without the caller noticing.
With the key known, stable IIDs become directly computable for any prefix (the remaining HMAC inputs — prefix, interface index, interface name, DAD counter — are guessable), and temporary IIDs become linkable after a cheap search over the mixed-in k_uptime_get_32() value. This defeats the properties both features exist to provide: an attacker can track a device across networks and prefixes, and can predict its address inside a /64 without scanning, removing the usual barrier to directly targeting the host. There is no memory-safety, integrity, or availability impact.
The fix generates the key with sys_csrand_get() and aborts IID generation with -EIO when no cryptographic randomness is available, instead of silently deriving addresses from a predictable key. Both CONFIG_NET_IPV6_IID_STABLE and CONFIG_NET_IPV6_PE are experimental and disabled by default; builds using CONFIG_TEST_RANDOM_GENERATOR remain predictable by design, as sys_csrand_get() is deliberately routed back to the test generator there.3dCVE-2026-112240—33.0%
——10The download link for files uploaded through a form relied on a token that could be predicted. The file name in the request was also not verified in a way that resisted guessing. An unauthenticated attacker could use this to access files uploaded by other visitors. In addition, the token was shown in plain text in the text version of the notification email.18d