CVE-2026-48618
A flaw in Node.js TLS hostname handling can cause Node.js unicode dot separator handling can lead to tls wildcard-depth authentication bypas
CVSS
6.5
Média
EPSS
3.1%
p88
KEV
—
Exploit Today
26
0-100
Publicado: 26 de jun. de 2026 · Última mod.: 25 de out. de 2026 · CWE-176 · CWE-289
3.1%EPSS · 30 dias3.2%
2026-10-222026-11-18
A flaw in Node.js TLS hostname handling can cause Node.js unicode dot separator handling can lead to tls wildcard-depth authentication bypass due to resolver and verifier hostname normalization mismat. This can lead to confidentiality impact or bypass of the intended security boundary under affected configurations. This vulnerability affects all supported release lines: **Node.js 22**, **Node.js 24**, and **Node.js 26**.
- nodejs.orghttps://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/june-2026-security-releases
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28727
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29012
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30172
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:35841
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:35842
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:35891
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:35892
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:39246
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:39868
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41947
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:52399
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7378
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:9455
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48618
- bugzilla.redhat.comhttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2493337
- security.access.redhat.comhttps://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-48618.json
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-1040999.1 CRÍ—
———Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to 1.7.3, route/table.go selects targets using raw req.URL.Path, while proxy/http_proxy.go applies per-route ACL and basic-auth checks to the selected target and forwards the raw path to the origin. Dot-segment, encoded-dot, or repeated-slash variants can fall through to a less restrictive route that reaches the same backend; the backend then normalizes the path and serves the protected resource without the configured access controls. A less restrictive fallback route must reach the same backend; without one, the request returns 404. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.3.5hCVE-2026-116643—32.8%
——10An SSH certificate authentication bypass vulnerability in GitHub Enterprise Server allowed an authenticated organization member to read and modify another user's private repositories within the trusted certificate authority's scope. Exploitation required an instance using built-in authentication and a valid certificate issued to the attacker by a trusted SSH certificate authority. This vulnerability affected supported GitHub Enterprise Server releases prior to 3.23 and was fixed in versions 3.19.16, 3.20.12, 3.21.10, and 3.22.5. This vulnerability was reported via the GitHub Bug Bounty program.1dCVE-2026-114737—31.1%
——9The fix for CVE-2026-23903 https://shiro.apache.org/security-reports.html#cve_2026_23903 was incomplete for manually-created ShiroFilterFactoryBean, which still matched paths case-sensitively by default.
This issue affects Apache Shiro version 3.0.1, only when ShiroFilterFactoryBean is created manually by the application and static files are served from a case-insensitive filesystem.
Applications that let Shiro Spring (Boot) Starter create the bean are not affected.
Mitigation: Upgrade to version 3.0.2 or later, which fixes the issue.
Alternatively, call setCaseInsensitive(true) on the ShiroFilterFactoryBean.3dCVE-2026-1263493.1 BAI15.8%
——5Addressable is an alternative implementation to the URI implementation that is part of Ruby's standard library. From 2.0.0 until 2.9.1, Addressable::IDNA.to_unicode can decode Punycode labels that contain bidirectional controls, zero-width characters, control characters, or other default-ignorable format characters. Addressable::URI#display_uri can consequently show a reordered or visually indistinguishable hostname even though host, normalized_host, and network connections use the original encoded hostname. The pure-Ruby backend accepts the full prohibited set, while the native libidn backend is affected from 2.5.2 for characters added after Unicode 3.2. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.1.3dCVE-2026-1266155.3 MÉD19.3%
——6The sign-in of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.2.22-pre2 through 6.3.7 takes for an account names that are not its address but under which the database's own comparison finds it, while the per-name lockout and the compromised-account hold are kept by the name as the client gave it. This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to go on guessing an account's password beyond the lockout's threshold, and anyone who has the password of an account held for review to sign in to it. The per-name lockout (from 6.2.22-pre2; AccountLockoutThreshold in hMailServer.ini, 0, off, by default) locks a name after repeated failed sign-ins. The hold (from 6.3.4, where the compromised-account detection is set to enforce, which is not the default) refuses an account judged to have been taken over. Both are asked, before the password, of the name the client gave: trimmed, in lower case and with a domain alias or the default domain applied. The account whose password the sign-in then checks is whichever one the database finds under that name. The databases find an account under spellings that this key counts apart. MySQL and MariaDB find it under one with accented letters in place of plain ones, and MariaDB 11.8, in a database made before 6.3.4, also under one with full-width letters, with a single letter in place of a pair of plain ones, or with characters its comparison ignores in any number. SQL Server and SQL Server Compact find it under one with full-width letters or with characters their comparison ignores in any number, and SQL Server also under one with a single letter in place of a pair of plain ones, with a character of Latin-1 in place of a digit and, for an address holding letters of Latin-1 outside ASCII, under those letters in the other case, and, under an accent-insensitive collation, with accented letters. PostgreSQL finds it under one holding a letter whose lower case under the database's locale is a plain letter, and, for an address holding letters outside ASCII, under those letters in the other case; on the build for musl (from 6.3.6) the server's own lower case folds nearly all of these too. On every database, a domain alias saved with white space at the end of its name gives such a spelling too, and on every database but PostgreSQL so does an account's bare local part where the default domain was saved with spaces at its end and no other white space (neither is the default). Each such spelling has a lockout threshold of its own, so the lockout limits the guesses at an account only to its threshold times the number of the account's spellings. That is far beyond any threshold for most addresses on MySQL and MariaDB, and without limit on SQL Server, on SQL Server Compact, the database the Windows installer uses by default, and before 6.3.4 on MariaDB 11.8. A locked name is got round under another spelling. A held account is signed in to under another spelling with its password over IMAP, POP3 and SMTP AUTH, and, where they are turned on (off by default), over ManageSieve, the REST API and the webmail. IMAP LOGIN, offered as installed, carries such spellings on MySQL, MariaDB and SQL Server Compact, and, on SQL Server and PostgreSQL, for some addresses; the sign-ins that carry a name as UTF-8 carry them for the others on SQL Server, and on PostgreSQL for those holding one of the plain letters another letter lowers to or a letter outside ASCII with another case. The same lookup mapped to accounts the names given by an OAuth 2.0 token, a client certificate, a Kerberos ticket and an OpenID Connect or SAML identity provider, where those are set up (none is by default), so that a name an issuer gave to one party could sign in to another's account; OAuth 2.0 tokens were mapped so from 6.2.0, before the per-name lockout existed. A name holding a NUL character, carried from 6.3.0 on Linux and 6.3.3 on Windows, failed the statement on MySQL, MariaDB and PostgreSQL.2dCVE-2026-62374—13.4%
——4SD JWT JS is a JavaScript implementation of the Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) specification. In version 0.19.0 and earlier, `@sd-jwt/decode`, also used by `@sd-jwt/core`, silently drops a tampered Disclosure whose digest no longer matches the Issuer-signed `_sd` array and returns a reduced claim set, reporting success while the Issuer signature remains valid. Both a tampered Disclosure that remains valid JSON and a Disclosure containing invalid UTF-8 bytes reach this silent-drop behavior. In the latter case, the `TextDecoder / Buffer` decoding path substitutes U+FFFD replacement characters, recovering syntactically valid disclosure data instead of rejecting the malformed input. This violates RFC 9901 section 7.1 step 5, which requires rejection of unreferenced Disclosures, and section 7.1 step 3 / section 4.2.1, which require rejection of invalid Disclosures. A malicious holder can exploit this omission primitive, including through `SDJwtInstance.verify()` when key binding is required. An on-path attacker can also tamper with a Disclosure when the relying party does not enforce key binding; enforced key binding rejects on-path tampering because it invalidates the KB-JWT `sd_hash` binding. If the relying party defaults to allowing access when a constraining age, role, or restriction claim is absent, the silent claim reduction can change an authorization decision without an error. This issue is fixed in `@sd-jwt/core` version 0.20.0; no patched version of the standalone `@sd-jwt/decode` package is identified.16d