CVE-2026-85783
Crypt::Age versions before 0.004 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via an unbounded number of recipient stanzas, each costing an X25519 scalar m
CVSS
7.5
Alta
EPSS
0.6%
p47
KEV
—
Exploit Today
14
0-100
Publicado: 20 de out. de 2026 · Última mod.: 30 de out. de 2026 · CWE-405 · CWE-770
0.2%EPSS · 30 dias0.6%
2026-10-212026-11-05
Crypt::Age versions before 0.004 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via an unbounded number of recipient stanzas, each costing an X25519 scalar multiplication in unwrap_file_key. The header parser accepts any number of recipient stanzas, and unwrap_file_key tries every identity against every X25519 stanza. Each attempt runs a scalar multiplication, an HKDF and a ChaCha20-Poly1305 open. The header MAC cannot be checked first, because its key comes from the file key, which only a successful unwrap produces. Each stanza is 98 bytes of attacker-chosen header and buys one scalar multiplication per identity held, and the file is rejected only after every one of them has run. A caller reaches this through decrypt, decrypt_file or decrypt_filehandle whenever it decrypts a file it did not write.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-121006——
———HTTP::Body versions before 1.24_02 for Perl parse the trailer in quadratic time.
Everything after the last chunk in the same call to add() is parsed with HTTP::Headers, which takes time quadratic in the number of fields of one name. For example, it takes several seconds to parse 16 KiB of "a:" lines.
A remote attackercan exhause the CPU with a single request.
HTTP::Body version 1.25 limits the size and number of lines in the trailer.58mCVE-2026-734735.5 MÉD—
———A flaw was found in GStreamer gst-plugins-good (avidemux). In the subindex parser, missing validation of the entry count can cause excessive memory allocation and denial of service. Because avidemux is auto-plugged by playbin, decodebin, and gst-discoverer, opening or previewing a crafted AVI is sufficient to trigger the issue. Fixed upstream in gst-plugins-good 1.28.6 (GStreamer-SA-2026-0072).2hCVE-2026-772997.5 ALT—
———Regexp2 is a feature-rich RegExp engine for Go. Prior to version 2.3.0, when regexp2 compiles and matches a pattern containing a large fixed-count quantifier applied to a zero-width subexpression — e.g. (?:){50000000} — the match engine executes the empty loop body m-1 times, pushing two integers onto the backtracking stack on every iteration. Because the parser accepts any repetition count up to math.MaxInt32 and the backtracking stack grows without bound, a pattern of fewer than 20 bytes matched against an empty input can force multi-gigabyte allocation and OOM-kill the process. MatchTimeout does not fully mitigate this because the memory is allocated faster than the 100 ms timeout clock can fire. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.0.7hCVE-2026-1117687.5 ALT—
———The Model Context Protocol TypeScript SDK provides TypeScript client and server implementations of the Model Context Protocol. From 1.3.0 until 1.32.0 in @modelcontextprotocol/sdk and from 2.0.0 until 2.3.0 in @modelcontextprotocol/server, HTTP servers did not enforce a limit on the number of array elements and object keys validated in one request. The affected surface is validation of HTTP requests containing arrays or object keys. The trigger is an array-element or object-key validation workload large enough to exhaust memory while remaining within the request size limit. A single request within the default 4 MiB limit can terminate the process with JavaScript heap exhaustion. No credentials are required unless the application authenticates before SDK processing. Tools accepting arrays or records carry the greatest risk. stdio-only servers do not expose the HTTP request path. Upgrading alone does not enable the new validation bound. Operators must configure both a tool-input element bound and an appropriate request body size limit. This issue is fixed in @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.32.0 and @modelcontextprotocol/server 2.3.0.11hCVE-2026-77622——
———Sliver is a command and control framework. Prior to 1.7.6, an HTTP(S) listener using the PNG encoder accepts attacker-controlled PNG dimensions without an effective decoded-size or pixel limit in util/encoders/images.go, while the listener nonce space implemented in server/encoders/encoders.go is small enough to search remotely. An unauthenticated attacker who identifies a valid nonce can submit a highly compressed image to PNGEncoder.Decode, where it expands during png.Decode, exhausting server memory and causing a complete loss of availability. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.6.12hCVE-2026-112899——
———Pillow is a Python imaging library. In versions 2.3.0 through 12.3.0, EPS rendering does not validate the scaled image dimensions before invoking Ghostscript. Applications that process untrusted EPS or PostScript files using an application-selected scale greater than one can incur excessive Ghostscript CPU and temporary disk consumption. In versions with decompression-bomb protection, the scaled output is checked only after Ghostscript has completed rendering, allowing resource consumption beyond the configured pixel limit. The amplification depends on the scale selected by the application, not an attacker-controlled scale value. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.12h