CVE-2026-94440
Parsing a multipart form can bypass memory limits and read an arbitrarily long line into memory when the remaining limit at the start of a p
CVSS
7.5
Alta
EPSS
0.5%
p44
KEV
—
Exploit Today
13
0-100
Publicado: 8 de out. de 2026 · Última mod.: 9 de out. de 2026 · CWE-770
0.2%EPSS · 30 dias0.5%
2026-10-092026-11-05
Parsing a multipart form can bypass memory limits and read an arbitrarily long line into memory when the remaining limit at the start of a part is less than 400 bytes.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-85111——
———Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Apache James Mime4J library prior version 0.8.15 allows Denial of Service upon parsing Mime messages.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache James server 3.9.1 that relies on fixed MIME4J 0.8.15 which addresses the issue.
See CVE-2026-85108 in Apache James MIME4J library.3hCVE-2026-85108——
———Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Apache James Mime4J library prior version 0.8.15 allows Denial of Service upon parsing Mime messages.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.8.15 which fixes the issue by enforcing new limits and providing better defaults.3hCVE-2026-841614.9 MÉD—
———When an operator enables store.analysis_statistics_dir, a network client with PRODUCT_STORE permission for a product can call that product's storeAnalysisStatistics Thrift-over-HTTP method. CodeChecker 6.29.0 decodes the attacker-controlled Base64 string and passes the complete compressed input to one-shot zlib.decompress(). No maximum decompressed size is enforced.
This gives a correctly authorized, non-superuser store account a high-ratio memory and persistent-disk amplification primitive. The complete output is first materialized as a Python bytes object and is then written to the configured statistics directory. A sufficiently scaled payload can exhaust the API worker or host memory and impair CodeChecker availability.
The shipped value of store.analysis_statistics_dir is null, so the affected feature is disabled by default. The primary assessment does not rely on authentication being disabled. There is no authorization bypass and no path traversal in this report.4hCVE-2026-1233363.1 BAI—
———In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.19728 the attachment size limit could be bypassed via AI assistant thread conversion4hCVE-2026-115701——
———Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowboy allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust connection process memory over HTTP/1.1.
Once a request has been received in full and its handler is still running, cowboy_http:parse/2 in src/cowboy_http.erl appends every further byte that arrives on the keep-alive connection to the connection buffer and returns to the receive loop without parsing it. The socket stays in active mode and no limit applies to this buffer: max_request_line_length, max_headers and the other parser limits only take effect once the handler returns and parsing resumes, and the only timer in this state is idle_timeout (default 60 seconds), which is reset on every received chunk. A client can therefore send an arbitrary amount of data on one connection for as long as the handler runs, and a few connections to an endpoint that holds requests open can drive the Erlang VM into out-of-memory conditions.
This issue affects cowboy: from 2.18.0 onward.4hCVE-2026-113431——
———Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows an unauthenticated remote peer to exhaust the memory of an HTTP/2 endpoint via HPACK-indexed header fields.
cow_http2_machine:headers_decode/4 in src/cow_http2_machine.erl decodes every HEADERS block with cow_hpack:decode/3. It bounds the compressed block size and the number of fields, but not the size of the decoded header list that RFC 9113 section 6.5.2 places under SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE. A peer stores one header value of up to the dynamic table size (4096 bytes by default) and then references it with one-byte indexed fields, so about 100 bytes on the wire decode to a header list of about 390 KB. A consumer that copies the decoded values, as Cowboy does when cowboy_http2:headers_to_map/2 joins repeated cookie fields into one binary, allocates that amount for every stream. The total across streams and connections is not bounded.
This issue affects cowlib: from 2.7.0 onward.4h