CVE-2026-97875
Rojo's "rojo serve" HTTP API (default port 34872) has no Host/Origin header validation, making it vulnerable to DNS rebinding. A malicious w
CVSS
8.1
Alta
EPSS
0.3%
p18
KEV
—
Exploit Today
5
0-100
Publicado: 25 de set. de 2026 · Última mod.: 25 de set. de 2026 · CWE-350
0.3%EPSS · 30 dias0.3%
2026-10-212026-11-17
Rojo's "rojo serve" HTTP API (default port 34872) has no Host/Origin header validation, making it vulnerable to DNS rebinding. A malicious webpage can read all project source, write malicious code to files on disk, and launch local programs via opener::open() with no user interaction beyond visiting the page.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-77283——
———obsidian-sync-mcp is an MCP server that gives AI agents access to Obsidian vaults. Prior to 0.5.7, deployments running without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN install no serverOptions.authenticate check for the HTTP /mcp endpoint, so requests are dispatched without validating the Host or Origin headers. A malicious website visited by the operator can use DNS rebinding to reach loopback, LAN, VPN, or container-published addresses, or directly issue a cross-origin request to loopback, and invoke the MCP tool surface to read, create, overwrite, delete, or move vault notes. Deployments using MCP_AUTH_TOKEN are not affected because browsers do not attach the bearer token. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.7.2hCVE-2026-768079.3 CRÍ—
———Todoist MCP Server provides tools that allow AI agents to access and modify a Todoist account. Prior to 10.3.3, the optional todoist-mcp-http server accepts browser-origin requests to POST /mcp without validating the Host and Origin headers or authenticating the browser caller. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to reach the loopback listener and invoke MCP tools through StreamableHTTPServerTransport, which uses the server-held Todoist API key. This exposes Todoist account data and permits operations such as task creation, updates, completion, and deletion. The stdio transport is not browser-reachable and is not affected by this attack path. This issue is fixed in version 10.3.3.4hCVE-2026-927048.3 ALT5.0%
——2SharpEmu is an experimental PlayStation 5 emulator for Windows and Linux. In version 0.0.3-release.3 and earlier, the repository-provided debugger frontend tooling is vulnerable while running. This tooling is not included in the release archives. The frontend exposes an HTTP API on 127.0.0.1:8765 without authentication or CSRF token. Its do_POST handler in tools/SharpEmu.DebuggerFrontend/debugger_frontend.py does not validate the Origin, Referer, Sec-Fetch-Site, or Host headers. The _read_json_body() function also accepts JSON sent with browser-simple content types instead of requiring application/json . A malicious page that can reach the loopback listener can send cross-origin requests to /api/launch , /api/command , and /api/connect . Chromium may require Local Network Access permission for pages served from public origins. Local-origin pages and other delivery paths are not consistently subject to this restriction. The /api/launch endpoint accepts an attacker-selected emulatorPath if it points to an existing file on the victim’s host. On POSIX systems, that file must also be executable. The endpoint additionally requires an existing ebootPath . The /api/command endpoint exposes debugger operations, including write-memory , set-register , and continue . The /api/connect endpoint can initiate outbound TCP connections. These operations can let an attacker execute an existing binary with the victim’s privileges, control the attached emulated process, or reach network services accessible from the host. DNS rebinding can additionally let the attacker read API responses interactively. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.3-release.3-patch.16dCVE-2026-61546—7.8%
——2AnkiMCP is an Anki addon that implements an MCP server, enabling AI assistants to interact with the Anki flashcard application. Prior to version 0.21.0, `anki_mcp_server/mcp_server.py` globally disables FastMCP DNS-rebinding protection through `TransportSecuritySettings` with `enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False`, including for the default local Streamable HTTP listener. The defaults in `anki_mcp_server/config.py` enable `http_enabled` on `127.0.0.1:3141`, with an empty `http_path` selecting the root endpoint. No bearer token, API key, session secret, strict `Host` allowlist or strict `Origin` allowlist is enforced before `initialize`, `tools/list` and `tools/call` reach MCP dispatch. A victim who visits a malicious web page while Anki and the listener are running can have browser requests rebound to loopback, allowing the attacker to `initialize` MCP, enumerate tools, read the local collection, and perform enabled non-destructive note/deck creation or updates. The attacker needs neither LAN position nor a local process. Available operations depend on enabled tool filters; destructive tools are hidden unless `enabled_destructive_tools` is opted into, limiting deletion-level impact but not the exposed read/write operations. The reported harness confirms real MCP tool dispatch with substituted Anki bridge responses rather than demonstrating destructive changes to a real collection. Disabling protection for tunnels/proxies also disables it for the normal loopback configuration. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.0.20dCVE-2026-1072926.4 MÉD2.9%
——1Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building applications and workflows with Generative AI. From 1.34.0 until 2.30.0, the Agent.to_web() and clai web development chat server does not validate the Host header, allowing a website visited by a developer to use DNS rebinding to reach a loopback-hosted agent as a same-origin service. The hostile page can read the served UI and submit chat requests that execute agent tools with the local process's privileges and credentials, causing data disclosure or unwanted side effects. Binding to localhost, Origin checks, and CSRF tokens do not prevent the same-origin DNS rebinding path. This issue is fixed in versions 1.107.5 and 2.30.0.36dCVE-2026-617436.3 MÉD35.4%
——11Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.2, Chartbrew's server/modules/safeRequest.js calls validateOutboundUrl() to resolve and validate a target hostname, but request-promise performs a separate DNS resolution for the actual connection. An authenticated user who can create or test API connections and controls the target DNS name can return a public address during validation and a private address during the request, bypassing the protections implemented by server/modules/outboundTargetPolicy.js. This DNS rebinding condition can expose internal services, localhost resources, or cloud metadata endpoints. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.2.55d