PULSE
FEED
ransomaurora reclama a TraWell Co S.p.A. (d/b/a Safe Bag) · IT · Retail & E-Commerceransomeverstake reclama a al*****o.comransomrhysida reclama a Clarkesville Police Department, City of Clarkesville · GA · Government & Defenseransomaurora reclama a William Cook Holdings Limited · GB · Manufacturingransomakira reclama a Pecora · IT · Otherransombarracuda reclama a Dallas Theological Seminary · US · Educationransomblackout reclama a wakao.co.jp · JP · Otherransomincransom reclama a eni.it · IT · Energy & Utilitiesransomspacebears reclama a Inlandboatmen’s Union of the Pacific — Marine Division of the ILWU · US · Transportationransomspacebears reclama a SDJ Design Engineering Limited · GB · Manufacturingransomspacebears reclama a Rise | A Community Service Partnership (also known as NJ Rise) · US · Otherransomspacebears reclama a Epoch Residential · US · Hospitalityransomincransom reclama a Boeing · US · Government & Defenseransomhandsome boy hacking club reclama a FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) · CH · Otherransomaurora reclama a TraWell Co S.p.A. (d/b/a Safe Bag) · IT · Retail & E-Commerceransomeverstake reclama a al*****o.comransomrhysida reclama a Clarkesville Police Department, City of Clarkesville · GA · Government & Defenseransomaurora reclama a William Cook Holdings Limited · GB · Manufacturingransomakira reclama a Pecora · IT · Otherransombarracuda reclama a Dallas Theological Seminary · US · Educationransomblackout reclama a wakao.co.jp · JP · Otherransomincransom reclama a eni.it · IT · Energy & Utilitiesransomspacebears reclama a Inlandboatmen’s Union of the Pacific — Marine Division of the ILWU · US · Transportationransomspacebears reclama a SDJ Design Engineering Limited · GB · Manufacturingransomspacebears reclama a Rise | A Community Service Partnership (also known as NJ Rise) · US · Otherransomspacebears reclama a Epoch Residential · US · Hospitalityransomincransom reclama a Boeing · US · Government & Defenseransomhandsome boy hacking club reclama a FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) · CH · Other
CVE Watch418.896 no arquivo completo

Vulnerabilidades exploráveis hoje

418,896na visualização atual

Score único que combina CVSS, presença no KEV e EPSS. Cada CVE com sua própria ficha — timeline da publicação até a exploração ativa.

No catálogo KEV1,786
Novos KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,715

Distribuição · última janela

  • Crítica
    4,730
  • Alta
    18,258
  • Média
    18,062
  • Baixa
    1,977
Filtros
Filtros

Janela

Severidade

Filtros

Vulnerabilidades417,801–417,840 · 418,896
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2026-99755—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ptp: fix use-after-free in extts_fifo_show() reading tsevqs unlocked extts_fifo_show() walks ptp->tsevqs with list_count_nodes() and then list_first_entry() without holding ptp->tsevqs_lock, the spinlock that "protects tsevqs from concurrent access". Every other accessor of the list honours it: ptp_open() (list_add_tail), ptp_release() (list_del followed by kfree of the per-fd queue), ptp_clock_release() and ptp_clock_event() all take tsevqs_lock. extts_fifo_show() is the only one that does not. A per-fd timestamp queue is appended to tsevqs on open("/dev/ptpN") and removed and freed on close(), both under tsevqs_lock: scoped_guard(spinlock_irq, &ptp->tsevqs_lock) list_del(&queue->qlist); bitmap_free(queue->mask); kfree(queue); So a read of /sys/class/ptp/ptpN/fifo running concurrently with a close() of a /dev/ptpN fd can have list_count_nodes() walk into the queue that close() is removing and freeing, dereferencing freed memory (use-after-free) or a poisoned list pointer. Take tsevqs_lock around the list walk. The fifo only ever draws from the first queue, which is the registration-time queue created in ptp_clock_register() and freed only in ptp_clock_release(); that cannot run while the sysfs attribute is being read, so the dequeue from queue->buf under queue->lock may stay outside tsevqs_lock and the lock order is unchanged.13h
CVE-2026-99745—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/bugs: Select the BHI mitigation based on the attack vector properly The BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation (attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both the user->kernel and guest->host attack vectors. bhi_select_mitigation() only enables it when CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST is set; otherwise it selects BHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even if CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL is set. As a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically disabled, since CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST defaults to off without KVM. This is a bug, given that CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL still needs it: on affected Intel CPUs these kernels lose BHI_DIS_S or the BHB clearing loop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the same effect. Select BHI_MITIGATION_ON whenever user->kernel is mitigated, and keep BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY for the guest->host-only case. [ bp: Clarify commit title. ]13h
CVE-2026-1329724.8 MÉD
—
——0In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 stored XSS on the Slack Notifier settings page was possible22h
CVE-2026-99765—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: Fix demo-mode dynamic ACL dev-entry UAF vs LUN teardown A demo-mode (generate_node_acls=1) login that allocates a dynamic NodeACL populates that ACL's per-LUN dev entries in core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() *before* the ACL is linked onto tpg->acl_node_list by target_add_node_acl(): core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl(): ... core_tpg_add_node_to_devs(acl, tpg, NULL); /* builds deves */ target_add_node_acl(acl); /* only now listed */ The LUN teardown sweep, core_clear_lun_from_tpg(), enumerates only tpg->acl_node_list, so a dev entry whose ACL is still in the window above is invisible to the sweep and is never disabled. It is left on the se_lun->lun_deve_list after core_tpg_remove_lun() frees the se_lun; when the same unpacked_lun is later re-added and the se_lun is reallocated at the same address, the stale dev entry is rediscovered by target_nacl_find_deve() and core_enable_device_list_for_node() corrupts lun_deve_list: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free ... core_enable_device_list_for_node+0x5ce/0x880 core_tpg_add_node_to_devs+0x169/0x190 core_dev_add_lun+0x146/0x190 target_fabric_port_link+0xe9/0x1b0 configfs_symlink+0x381/0xae0 __x64_sys_symlink+0x55/0x80 The demo-mode login path that drives the ACL/dev-entry creation is reachable by an unauthenticated initiator; the colliding LUN add/remove is a local configfs operation. Commit 49cb77e297dc ("target: Avoid mappedlun symlink creation during lun shutdown") introduced se_lun->lun_shutdown and guarded the *explicit* ACL MappedLUN path (target_fabric_mappedlun_link()), but the demo-mode automatic path, core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() -> core_enable_device_list_for_node(), was never given the equivalent guard, and the publish-after-populate ordering in core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl() was left unchanged. Fix it in three cooperating parts: 1) Publish the dynamic NodeACL onto acl_node_list *before* creating its dev entries, so the teardown sweep can observe them. 2) Refuse to attach a dev entry to an se_lun that is shutting down, checked under nacl->lun_entry_mutex -- the same lock the sweep takes -- so once the sweep has passed an ACL any later enable for that LUN observes lun_shutdown and skips it. 3) In core_enable_device_list_for_node(), insert the new dev entry onto lun->lun_deve_list while still holding nacl->lun_entry_mutex, in both the replace and the new-entry branch. Previously the entry was added to nacl->lun_entry_hlist under the mutex but to lun->lun_deve_list only after dropping it; with the ACL now published early, the sweep could take the mutex in that gap, find the entry on the hlist, core_disable_device_list_for_node() it (list_del() on the not-yet- linked lun_link succeeds and the entry is freed), and then the enable would list_add_tail() the freed entry back onto lun_deve_list. Linking both lists under the mutex makes enable and the sweep mutually exclusive, closing that window. core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() already ignores the return value of core_enable_device_list_for_node(), so a shutting-down LUN is simply skipped.13h
CVE-2026-1317346.5 MÉD
—
——0Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Crocoblock JetEngine jet-engine allows Stored XSS.This issue affects JetEngine: from n/a through 3.9.1.1.4h
CVE-2026-99737—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: fix truncate loop after boundary swapin failure If swapping in a large entry at the new EOF fails, shmem_undo_range() leaves the entry in place. Its final scan skips the entry, then restarts from the same start index and finds it again. Truncation can loop forever while holding i_rwsem. Advance start past the skipped entry so that a restarted scan can finish, as we already do for folios that cannot be split. Note that this does not fix the missing zeroing when boundary swapin fails, it merely prevents the endless loop.13h
CVE-2026-99735—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mglru: don't use stack pointers when walking PUD and PMD tables MGLRU passes stack copies of page-table entries in walk_pud_range() and walk_pmd_range() when walking to the next level. These copies can become stale when khugepaged or MADV_DONTNEED (CONFIG_PT_RECLAIM) removes a PTE table concurrently. This pattern dates back to commit bd74fdaea146 ("mm: multi-gen LRU: support page table walks"). Likely, earlier locking masked the latent bug. Later changes exposed it: commit 1d65b771bc08 ("mm/khugepaged: retract_page_tables() without mmap or vma lock") allowed concurrent retraction, and commit cf4a65539c13 ("memcg-v1: no need for memcg locking for MGLRU") dropped the walker's outer RCU protection. The fix is simple, so just fix the original commit so we don't have to speculate. To fix it, pass the actual PMD/PUD pointers. This restores the RCU-protected lookup and validation against the live PMD. Note that the PUD handling is required as well to handle folded page tables correctly in all cases. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private. [ david: handle walk_pud_range() as well, clarify+simplify description, adjust Fixes: ]13h
CVE-2026-99730—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/filemap: finish fault cleanup before dropping the fault lock On a retried fault, a fatal signal interrupting the folio lock wait makes lock_folio_maybe_drop_mmap() drop the fault lock without pinning the file. However, filemap_fault() may still need to release mapping->invalidate_lock. A concurrent munmap() can release the last file reference and free the mapping before that unlock. Defer dropping the fault lock to filemap_fault()'s retry cleanup, after releasing invalidate_lock. If the fault lock was already dropped for I/O, release the existing file reference instead. Keep the fault lock held for FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT as before.13h
CVE-2026-99729—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/rmap: handle device-exclusive entries in folio_referenced_one() page_vma_mapped_walk() can return non-present device-exclusive entries, but folio_referenced_one() passes them to PTE young-bit accessors that require present PTEs. We must neither call clear_flush_young_ptes_notify() nor folio_pte_batch() with non-present entries. For example, clearing the young bit on non-present PTEs can corrupt the entry: on arm64 PTE_AF overlaps the swap type, so clearing it turns a device-exclusive entry into an ordinary swap entry. folio_pte_batch() will VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO. Apply the same approach as the previous fixes to e.g., damon_ptep_mkold(): treat these entries as old from the CPU's perspective and obtain their young state through the MMU notifier. Skip PTE batching and MGLRU look-around for non-present entries, and don't modify non-present PTEs.13h
CVE-2026-99728—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/huge_memory: fix list corruption when deferred_split_scan() races with deferred_split_folio() Since the deferred split queue became a list_lru, the isolate callback moves the folios it took a reference on to an on-stack list, linked through folio->_deferred_list, and deferred_split_scan() takes them off that list with list_del_init() without holding the list_lru lock. deferred_split_folio() does not know about the on-stack list. It only holds the list_lru lock when it looks at the same list_head, and it can run for such a folio: a THP is queued when it is mapped, as a candidate for the underused check, and is queued "again" when a part of it gets unmapped: CPU0 deferred_split_scan() CPU1 deferred_split_folio() list_del_init(&folio->_deferred_list) next->prev = prev prev->next = next entry->next = entry list_lru_lock_irqsave() folio_set_partially_mapped() __list_lru_add() list_empty(item) -> true list_add_tail(item, &l->list) item->next = &l->list item->prev = tail entry->prev = entry The folio now sits on the list_lru with ->prev pointing to itself. The next removal leaves the neighbours pointing to it, and they still do so after the folio has been freed. With CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST: list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffd4000000270090, but was ffd4000000278090. (prev=ffd4000000270090) Fix it by grabbing the lock around list_del_init() so deferred_split_folio() cannot race with it.13h
CVE-2026-99725—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cipso: fix optlen corruption in cipso_v4_delopt() cipso_v4_delopt() recomputes the option length by walking the option buffer after the CIPSO option has been moved out. The walk then reads the stale bytes at the tail of the buffer as option data, and a crafted setsockopt(IP_OPTIONS) buffer can make it treat one of them as an option length, increasing opt->opt.optlen beyond the valid option data. The corrupted length stays on the socket and is later used as the copy length by getsockopt(IP_OPTIONS) and by the udp/raw/ping sendmsg paths, where it exceeds the size of the buffers they copy into. Compute the new length from the intact options before the move and subtract the CIPSO length, and fill the padding with IPOPT_END.13h
CVE-2026-99723—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost-vdpa: fix pinned page leak in vhost_vdpa_pa_map() error path When pin_user_pages() or vhost_vdpa_map() fails, vhost_vdpa_pa_map() is supposed to unpin the pages pinned after the last successfully mapped chunk, i.e. the range [map_pfn, last_pfn]. The unpin is guarded by nchunks, but nchunks is reset to 0 every time a chunk is mapped from inside the current page list, so a failure after any such boundary leaves that pending range pinned forever. With physically scattered memory nearly every page list contains a boundary, so the leak happens on practically every failed IOTLB update. The pending range is non-empty exactly when a page has been pinned, which last_pfn already tells us, so drop nchunks and test last_pfn.13h
CVE-2026-99722—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vringh: bound top-level re-entry into indirect tables In __vringh_iov(), the F_INDIRECT branch descends into the indirect table and continues before the descriptor accounting runs. A top-level indirect descriptor is therefore never charged to count. If such a descriptor sets NEXT to point back at itself, returning from the indirect table resumes at the same top-level descriptor, which is again not counted, so the walk never makes forward progress. Because count stays flat and indirect_count is reset to 0 on every return to the top-level table, neither bound in the loop check trips. A guest can spin the vringh worker at 100% CPU inside __vringh_iov(), an uninterruptible host DoS. Move the descriptor accounting above the indirect switch so that a top-level indirect descriptor is charged one top-level traversal step before the walk descends into its table, bringing this re-entry under the existing vrh->vring.num bound. Each top-level descriptor is still charged at most one step and indirect_count still bounds a single table, so legitimate chains (including the multiple-indirect case in tools/virtio/vringh_test.c) stay within vring.num, while a cyclic indirect descriptor is now rejected with -ELOOP.13h
CVE-2026-99721—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (aquacomputer_d5next) reject short status reports The HID raw_event callback runs before HID core validates the received report length. aqc_raw_event() reads device-specific status fields at fixed offsets, including multi-byte values, without first ensuring that the received buffer contains every field. A truncated report can therefore cause out-of-bounds reads and update hwmon state with unrelated data. The required length differs between supported devices and cannot be derived from the HID report descriptor. Define the minimum length needed by each asynchronous status format, select it while configuring the device, and reject reports that do not contain the last field accessed by that format. Keep the published length zero until probe configuration is complete, which also excludes legacy devices whose status is retrieved through feature reports.13h
CVE-2026-99720—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: chipcap2: fix IRQ teardown ordering The threaded IRQs are currently requested before the hwmon device is registered. Since devres releases resources in reverse order, the hwmon device is unregistered before the IRQs are freed during driver teardown. An IRQ may therefore still run after the hwmon device has been released and access the stale data->hwmon pointer. Separate IRQ discovery from IRQ registration so that the IRQ numbers and alarm visibility flags are initialized before registering the hwmon device while the IRQs are released before the hwmon device during devres cleanup.13h
CVE-2026-99744—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atl1c: drop oversized RX frames instead of panicking atl1c sizes its receive buffers from the netdev MTU plus a fixed set of L2 overheads, which comes to 1522 bytes at the default MTU. A link partner that sends a longer frame - in practice a MikroTik CCR2004-1G-2XS-PCIe, whose RouterOS side defaults to l2mtu 1600 while the host stays at MTU 1500 - makes the length reported by the RX return descriptor exceed what the hardware wrote, and skb_put() then either includes bytes that were never received or trips skb_over_panic and takes the host down. Compare the descriptor length against buffer_info->length, the length the hardware was given, rather than against skb_tailroom(): the skb carries 64 bytes of slack for the DMA erratum, so tailroom is larger than the DMA buffer and a frame in between would pass the check and still be delivered with a tail the device never wrote. The same test rejects frames shorter than ETH_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN; before this change a reported length below ETH_FCS_LEN underflowed in skb_put(). The frame is dropped with kfree_skb_reason(SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_BIG) so drop_monitor and the kfree_skb tracepoint see it, and counted through dev_core_stats_rx_dropped_inc(), which survives atl1c_get_stats() overwriting the hardware counters on every read. It also counts as work: atl1c_clean_rfd() has already recycled the RFD, and the refill at the end of the poll only runs when work_done is non-zero, so sustained oversized traffic would otherwise drain the ring and stop RX. Tested on a MikroTik CCR2004-1G-2XS-PCIe (4x AR8151) in a Proxmox VE host, with atl1c built from a DKMS tree carrying this change: the l2mtu-1600 traffic that panics the stock driver is dropped and counted with the patch applied, and received normally once the host MTU is raised to match. This complements commit 36c2009d90f2 ("net: atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read"), which fixed the TX side of the same "host dies while the card resets" problem.13h
CVE-2026-99719—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (lm87) Fix drvdata type confusion in vrm_show() and vrm_store() When an LM87 or ADM1024 device is probed with VID support enabled, reading from or writing to the vrm sysfs attribute triggers a driver data type confusion in vrm_show() and vrm_store() in drivers/hwmon/lm87.c. In lm87_probe(), the driver stores the struct lm87_data pointer on the I2C client via i2c_set_clientdata() and passes the struct i2c_client pointer as the drvdata argument to devm_hwmon_device_register_with_groups(), which attaches the attribute groups to the registered hwmon device with client as its driver_data. Unlike the other sysfs callbacks that retrieve client via dev_get_drvdata() and then obtain data via i2c_get_clientdata(), vrm_show() and vrm_store() assign dev_get_drvdata(dev) directly to struct lm87_data *. Dereferencing data->vrm therefore accesses the struct i2c_client instance at offsetof(struct lm87_data, vrm), causing vrm_show() to leak an unrelated byte from struct i2c_client to userspace and vrm_store() to corrupt a byte within struct i2c_client while failing to update the actual VRM value. Fix the problem by assigning the return value from dev_get_drvdata(dev) to struct i2c_client *client and using i2c_get_clientdata() to get the actual client data.13h
CVE-2026-99717—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pmbus/q54sj108a2) Add missing NULL pointer check When CONFIG_DEBUG_FS is enabled and per-client PMBus debugfs directory creation fails during pmbus_do_probe(), q54sj108a2_probe() passes the NULL pointer returned by pmbus_get_debugfs_dir() to debugfs_create_dir() without validation, creating its debugfs directory at the debugfs root instead of under the client directory. If pmbus_init_debugfs() fails to create the client directory, data->debugfs is left as NULL or an ERR_PTR, which pmbus_get_debugfs_dir() converts to NULL. Passing a NULL parent to debugfs_create_dir() places q54sj108a2_dir in the root of the debugfs filesystem and populates it with attribute files whose private data pointers reference psu->debugfs_entries. Because this root-level directory is outside the client debugfs hierarchy, PMBus core cleanup does not remove it on device unbind, leaking the debugfs entries and causing a use-after-free of the devm-allocated struct q54sj108a2_data if the orphaned files are accessed via q54sj108a2_debugfs_read() or q54sj108a2_debugfs_write() after device removal. Fix the problem by adding the missing NULL pointer check.13h
CVE-2026-99709—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit. inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int. If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket. This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace, raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core(). Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of legitimate traffic.13h
CVE-2026-99705—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: memory: fix truncation removing mapped folios Ayush reported an issue that shmem/tmpfs folios are still mapped when truncating them on production: " BUG: Bad page cache in process ... pfn:... page dumped because: still mapped when deleted " I reproduced the issue with Ayush's reproducer [1] with the latest mm-unstable branch, and I got the following crash info. From the dump message, we can see that truncate_inode_folio() is really trying to remove mapped folios, which is incorrect. " [ 189.171977] page: refcount:3 mapcount:1 mapping:00000000fe168ee1 index:0x3880 pfn:0x191647 [ 189.171995] memcg:ffff0000cc073d40 [ 189.171997] aops:shmem_aops ino:3c01 dentry name(?):"memfd:runsc-memory" [ 189.172006] flags: 0x17fffef0002022d(locked|referenced|uptodate|lru| workingset|swapbacked|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff) ....... [ 189.172017] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_mapped(folio)) [ 189.172026] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 189.172027] kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:155! [ 189.172057] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP ....... [ 189.177721] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5521 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Tainted: 7.3.0-rc4+ #277 PREEMPT(lazy) ....... [ 189.183986] Call trace: [ 189.184124] filemap_unaccount_folio+0xf0/0x1e8 (P) [ 189.184391] __filemap_remove_folio+0x34/0x160 [ 189.184633] filemap_remove_folio+0x4c/0xb0 [ 189.184859] truncate_inode_folio+0x34/0x58 [ 189.185087] shmem_undo_range+0x220/0x658 [ 189.185308] shmem_fallocate+0x2f0/0x470 [ 189.185527] vfs_fallocate+0x128/0x328 ...... [ 189.187078] el0t_64_sync+0x184/0x188 " After analysis, I believe the race exists between truncation and MADV_DONTNEED, and shmem's ->map_pages() merely makes the issue easier to reproduce. Since MADV_DONTNEED synchronously releases the pagetable page before calling tlb_flush_rmaps(), this could cause another thread's truncation to skip zap_pte_range() (due to pmd is none) but still observe the folio's mapcount as non-zero. A possible race scenario is as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 shmem_fallocate madvise_dontneed_single_vma unmap_mapping_range ....... ...... (filemap_map_pages() remap folios) zap_pte_range truncate_inode_folio zap_empty_pte_table(pmd clear) unmap_mapping_folio ...... zap_pmd_range (saw pmd none, skip) filemap_remove_folio BUG_ON(folio_mapped) tlb_flush_rmaps(remove rmaps) To fix this issue, we should move the pmd clear operation (via zap_empty_pte_table()) to after tlb_flush_rmaps() and use sync_with_folio_pmd_zap() to sync with concurrent zapping, so that when we find a pmd_none() while unmapping a folio without holding the PTL, the folio's mappings are guaranteed to have been removed via tlb_flush_rmaps(). Meanwhile move the second pmd_none() check to where it belongs: if splitting zapped the PMD.13h
CVE-2026-99742—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mempolicy: charge shared policy nodes Any local user can bypass memory.max with mbind() on a tmpfs file, and allocate unbounded kernel memory. mbind() sets a NUMA memory policy for a range of a mapping. If the mapping is of a shmem and friends, the kernel also stores the policy on the inode, in a tree with one entry per range of the file. Each mbind() on a single page of a mapping can add one shared policy node (struct sp_node) and one struct mempolicy to that tree. They outlive the mapping and stay around until the inode is destroyed. The tree is not bounded by the file size, so the file can be empty. Memory that user space can allocate must be charged to a memory cgroup. A slab cache does that for all of its objects if it is created with SLAB_ACCOUNT. numa_policy_init() creates the slab caches for both structs without SLAB_ACCOUNT, so they are not charged to any cgroup. Reproduced with mbind() on single pages of an empty tmpfs file, from a cgroup with memory.max=8M: the global OOM killer killed tasks owned by root, and the machine panicked. Fix this by creating both caches with SLAB_ACCOUNT. This change implies that mbind() can now fail when running into memcg limits. Further, the policy_cache also serves task and VMA policies, so they are similarly accounted now. Note that per-file limits are not really helpful, as the user could simply use many files; having limits per user is tricky as well. Fix generated by an LLM and submitted by Chris Mason in private. [ david: smaller description tweaks ]13h
CVE-2026-99699—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/cma: accept memory of multi-range CMA areas Patch series "mm/cma: accept memory of CMA areas reserved with memblock_reserve()", v1. Pages of allocated CMA areas are released to the buddy allocator with __free_pages(), which does not check for unaccepted memory. This usually works because memblock accepts the memory it allocates. However, multi-range CMA areas, used by hugetlb_cma, and fixed CMA areas requested with cma=<size>@<base> are reserved with memblock_reserve() and their memory is never accepted. On TDX and SEV-SNP guests the first access to such a page is fatal. To ease the backporting, each case is addressed by a separate patch: - patch 1 accepts the memory of multi-range CMA areas - patch 2 does the same for the fixed CMA areas The second patch won't apply cleanly to 6.6 and 6.12, but I believe the stable team LLMs will take care of that :) This patch (of 2): On systems with unaccepted memory, memblock allocations accept the allocated range, but when cma_declare_contiguous_multi() uses open coded allocation of multiple ranges, it reserves them with memblock_reserve() and they are never accepted. These pages are released to the buddy allocator by cma_activate_area() with __free_pages() that does not check for unaccepted memory, so the first access to such a page in a TDX or SEV-SNP guest is fatal. Accept the memory of each range when it is reserved.13h
CVE-2026-99696—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: find the xattr entry again after defragmenting a bucket ocfs2_xattr_set_entry_bucket() hands loc.xl_entry to ocfs2_xa_set() twice: once for the bucket as it stands, and, if that reports -ENOSPC, once more after ocfs2_defrag_xattr_bucket() has packed the name/value pairs down. Defragmenting ends by sorting the entry array on xe_name_hash. Buckets are kept sorted, so the sort only permutes entries that share a hash, but lib/sort.c is an unstable heapsort and it does permute them. loc.xl_entry is an address inside xh_entries[], so afterwards it denotes whichever entry landed in that slot rather than the one the search found. The second ocfs2_xa_set() then works on the wrong entry. Nothing on that path compares the entry's name with xi->xi_name, so what happens depends on how the two entries compare in size: ocfs2_xa_reuse_entry() trips its BUG_ON() when the padded name sizes differ, and otherwise the new value is written into the neighbouring attribute's value slot while the attribute being set is left untouched. setxattr() reports success either way. Remember the entry's hash before defragmenting and look the entry up again afterwards, the way ocfs2_xattr_bucket_find() does. An entry that cannot be found again means the bucket no longer holds what the search found, so fail with -EFSCORRUPTED rather than writing through the stale pointer.13h
CVE-2026-99689—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix temporary cursor leak in btree shift corruption paths In xfs_btree_lshift and xfs_btree_rshift, when XFS_IS_CORRUPT detects an invalid firstrec/lastrec result after xfs_btree_dup_cursor has successfully allocated a temporary cursor, the error path jumps to error0 which returns without freeing tcur. This leaks the cursor memory, the xfs_group reference, and the per-level buffer references held by the duplicated cursor. Jump to error1 instead, which calls xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_ERROR) to properly release all resources.13h
CVE-2026-99688—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_qfq: prevent aggregate self-replacement qfq_change_class() snapshots the current aggregate settings while holding the qdisc tree lock, but drops the lock before selecting the destination aggregate. During that gap, qfq_enqueue() can move the class to an aggregate matching the requested settings. When qfq_change_class() resumes, qfq_find_agg() then returns cl->agg. If it is a singleton, qfq_deact_rm_from_agg() frees the aggregate before qfq_add_to_agg() immediately accesses the same pointer, causing a use-after-free. While holding the tree lock, skip the replacement when the destination is already the current aggregate. Any estimator replacement has already completed, so the class change can finish normally.13h
CVE-2026-99686—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost: fix used ring index wrap in vhost_add_used_n_in_order vhost_add_used_n_in_order() advances start by nheads[i] but wraps it with a single subtraction. If start + nheads[i] >= 2 * vq->num, start can remain outside the ring. With used-ring logging enabled, start > vq->num makes (vq->num - start) underflow. log_write() then sets bits beyond the dirty-log bitmap, potentially corrupting adjacent userspace memory. This is reachable on the vhost-net TX path with VIRTIO_F_IN_ORDER: done_idx can reach VHOST_NET_BATCH (64), triggering the issue with a 32-entry ring. Wrap start with a mask to keep it within the ring. VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM enforces a nonzero power-of-two ring size, allowing start to be wrapped using & (vq->num - 1).13h
CVE-2026-99683—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vduse: fix VA/PA confusion in the coherent page fault path vduse_domain_get_coherent_page() assumes that iotlb entries above bounce_size were installed by vduse_domain_alloc_coherent(), so it treats map->addr as a physical address. But vduse registers with use_va = true, and when the device is bound to vhost_vdpa, vhost_vdpa_va_map() stores a userspace virtual address in map->addr, which vduse_domain_set_map() then copies into the same iotlb. A process holding the domain file descriptor across a rebind can therefore fault in an arbitrary physical page with read/write access, ignoring the entry permissions. Additionally, since the domain file mmap lacks VM_IO, the domain file itself can be mapped and passed to vhost_vdpa_va_map(), producing self-referential entries that bypass the coherent path check. To fix, only translate entries whose backing file is the domain file itself in vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(), reject such entries in vduse_domain_set_map() since only external mappings should be imported, and set VM_IO on the domain file mmap so vhost_vdpa_va_map() refuses to map it in the first place.13h
CVE-2026-99682—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_blk: use synchronous quiesce in virtblk_freeze_priv() blk_mq_run_work_fn() can call blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests() through blk_mq_run_dispatch_ops(). The dispatcher checks QUEUE_FLAG_QUIESCED while the flag is clear. It can then be preempted before it gets a request. At that time, it has no queue usage reference, so blk_mq_freeze_queue() does not wait for it. virtblk_freeze_priv() then calls blk_mq_quiesce_queue_nowait() and blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(). A new request can enter the queue. The old dispatcher can run again, use its old flag check, get the new request, and call virtio_queue_rq(). At the same time, virtblk_freeze_priv() can reset the device, delete the virtqueues, and free vblk->vqs. The old dispatcher can then use a deleted virtqueue or a NULL vblk->vqs, and the kernel can crash. Fix this by using blk_mq_quiesce_queue(), which waits for dispatch code that was already running. Keep the existing freeze and unfreeze order. The queue remains quiesced until virtblk_restore_priv() calls blk_mq_unquiesce_queue().13h
CVE-2026-99681—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-mq: fix out-of-bounds read in blk_mq_free_rqs A KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read can occur in blk_mq_free_rqs() when there is a mismatch between the number of hardware queues allocated for the IO scheduler (et->nr_hw_queues) and the number of hardware queues in the block tag set (set->nr_hw_queues). This mismatch can happen if blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues() fails halfway through (e.g., due to memory pressure during blk_mq_prealloc_tag_set_tags()). In this error path, the elevator is restored with a larger number of hardware queues than the block tag set actually has. When the elevator is later freed, blk_mq_free_sched_tags() iterates up to the new et->nr_hw_queues and calls blk_mq_free_rqs(). In blk_mq_free_rqs(), it attempts to access set->tags[hctx_idx] to get the driver tags. Because set->nr_hw_queues was not updated due to the earlier failure, set->tags still has the old (smaller) size, leading to an out-of-bounds read. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in blk_mq_free_rqs+0xde/0x680 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88818d67fc28 by task syz-executor117/5839 Call Trace: blk_mq_free_rqs+0xde/0x680 blk_mq_free_map_and_rqs+0x40/0xf0 blk_mq_free_sched_tags blk_mq_free_sched_res+0xeb/0x280 elevator_change_done+0x1d2/0x5c0 elevator_change+0x34f/0x480 elv_iosched_store+0x504/0x630 queue_attr_store+0x207/0x2b0 To fix this, explicitly check if hctx_idx < set->nr_hw_queues before accessing set->tags[hctx_idx]. If hctx_idx >= set->nr_hw_queues, the hardware queue doesn't exist in the tag set, meaning there are no driver tags to clear mappings from. In this case, safely set drv_tags to NULL. The subsequent call to blk_mq_clear_rq_mapping() already handles a NULL drv_tags pointer and will safely return.13h
CVE-2026-99741—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tmpfs: keep the quota soft limits of an unused id When the last reference to a dquot goes away, shmem_release_dquot() stores its limits in the rb tree of the mount, unless shmem_is_empty_dquot() says that there is nothing worth storing. That function looks at the usage and at the two hard limits only. So if the administrator sets nothing but soft limits for an id that owns no file yet, the entry is thrown away as soon as the dquot that Q_SETQUOTA used is released, and the id never gets to see a limit. To fix it, compare the soft limits as well: an entry can be empty only if both soft limits are zero as well, which is exactly what shmem_acquire_dquot() sets for a new entry. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private. [ david: slightly adjusted description ]13h
CVE-2026-99673—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: replace ARPHRD_CAN type checks with can_get_ml_priv() Commit 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device") introduced an explicit way to assign the midlayer private pointer (dev->ml_priv) to named users like ML_PRIV_CAN. A valid pointer returned by can_get_ml_priv() therefore identifies a real CAN device. The referenced commit only converted the j1939 and proc code to this check, while the other parts of the CAN subsystem still rely on dev->type == ARPHRD_CAN. The TUNSETLINK ioctl allows a down TUN/TAP device to set its hardware type to ARPHRD_CAN while dev->ml_priv remains NULL. Such a repurposed netdevice passes the ARPHRD_CAN checks. Commit 8aa59e355949 ("can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_register()") already made can_rx_register() reject such devices. But can_rx_unregister() still only checks dev->type and dereferences the NULL ml_priv when it walks the receive lists of the device. CAN_ISOTP reaches this path: isotp_bind() ignores the return values of can_rx_register() and binds the socket anyway. When the socket is released or the device is unregistered, isotp_release() and isotp_notify() remove the filters that have never been registered and trigger the NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_unregister(). This only requires owning a TUN/TAP device or CAP_NET_ADMIN in an unprivileged user namespace. Convert the remaining ARPHRD_CAN checks in af_can, bcm, gw, isotp and raw to can_get_ml_priv().13h
CVE-2026-99662—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/gup: fix out-of-bounds write for nr_pages == 0 in GUP-fast With nr_pages == 0, GUP-fast still enters its page table walk and can write past the caller's page array. The old end <= start check caught empty ranges, but was replaced with an overflow check. Users such as OrangeFS can pass a zero page count derived from a userspace-supplied length. So let's return zero for nr_pages == 0 before starting the walk, just like GUP-slow. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private. [ david: simplify description ]13h
CVE-2026-99740—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: stop retrying folios that cannot be split A fault or collapse can insert a large folio crossing EOF after shmem_undo_range() has handled the boundary folios. If splitting that folio fails, truncate_inode_partial_folio() retains it when it is dirty. The final scan then repeatedly finds it because it restarts from an unchanged start. Truncation keeps the inode lock and ignores fatal signals while looping. A concurrent unlink() can then block other directory operations while holding the directory lock and waiting for the file's lock. Advance start past the retained folio, whose truncated part has already been zeroed. Do not move start backwards if the failed split has shrunk the folio. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private. [ david: split fixes, simplify descriptions, adjust comments ]13h
CVE-2026-99739—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: fix truncate hang in large swap entry Truncating a tmpfs file or memfd to a page-aligned size inside a large swap entry can loop indefinitely in shmem_undo_range(). The task holds the inode lock and cannot be killed. A large swap entry represents a whole swapped-out folio. For example, truncate a file whose pages 0-7 share one swap entry to four pages: [ 0 1 2 3 | 4 5 6 7 ] keep | discard ^ new EOF, start = 4 i_size has already been updated when boundary handling asks shmem_get_partial_folio() for page 4. Since it is swapped out, the helper calls shmem_get_folio() with SGP_READ. That rejects page 4 with -EINVAL because its starting offset equals i_size. Nothing is read back. The final scan cannot free the entry without losing pages 0-3. It skips it, restarts from start = 4, and finds it again indefinitely. An unaligned truncate avoids this particular failure because the requested page starts below i_size. Folios already in the page-cache cannot trigger it as the direct lookup will return them beyond EOF. Fix it by letting shmem_get_partial_folio() call shmem_swapin_folio() directly for swap entries. This bypasses the read path's i_size check, allowing the existing boundary handling to zero and split the folio. If swap-in returns a smaller folio, it also splits the swap entry so the final scan can free the entries beyond EOF. Retry the lookup if the entry changes during swap-in. Handling swap-in allocation failures remains broken and is unchanged by this commit. Even when shmem_swapin_folio() correctly returns -ENOMEM instead of -EEXIST, shmem_get_partial_folio() returns NULL and shmem_undo_range() skips boundary handling. If the large swap entry remains intact, truncation can still loop in the final scan, while hole punching can return without zeroing the boundary. This may read an entire large folio back from swap while holding i_rwsem, only to discard part of it. Avoiding that I/O would require splitting both the swap entry and any large folio still in the swap cache. That, however, is much bigger work.13h
CVE-2026-99738—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: preserve allocation errors when swapping in large entries shmem_swapin_folio() adjusts swap to the requested slot within a large swap entry before allocating a folio. If allocation or charging fails, the error path compares this adjusted value with the original entry still stored in the XArray in shmem_confirm_swap(). Unless the index is at the start of the entry, this turns -ENOMEM into -EEXIST even though nothing changed. The caller retries -EEXIST, so persistent allocation failures can leave the task spinning instead of returning the error. Restore swap to index_entry on allocation failure so the existing error path checks the original entry. This preserves the allocation error if the entry is unchanged and still retries if it changed concurrently.13h
CVE-2026-99661—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/gup: check for overflow when converting nr_pages to bytes in GUP-fast The overflow check in gup_fast_fallback() only covers the addition to start. The preceding nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT can already have truncated the length on 32bit. Users such as RapidIO's rio_dma_transfer() can derive such page counts from a 64-bit userspace length. Let's just check_shl_overflow() to reject any such overflow with -EOVERFLOW early.13h
CVE-2026-99656—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/madvise: fix data loss from MADV_FREE on a KSM page MADV_FREE can clear the dirty flag of a singly mapped KSM folio. The folio remains in the stable tree and can gain new mappings without being dirtied again. Once marked lazyfree, reclaim can discard data that those mappings still need. KSM always marks a folio dirty when converting it to a KSM folio in try_to_merge_one_page(). Marking a folio lazyfree clears PG_swapbacked but leaves PG_dirty unchanged. Preserving PG_dirty makes reclaim restore PG_swapbacked instead of discarding the folio. This also protects folios that were already lazyfree when KSM converted them. Skip KSM folios before clearing their dirty flag, checking under the folio lock to serialize with KSM conversion.13h
CVE-2026-99736—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: fix accounting of swapin-error markers A failed swap read replaces the swap entry with a swapin-error marker in the page-cache and subtracts its pages from "alloced" and "swapped"; however, it leaves their block charge in place. Removing the marker during truncate then subtracts from "swapped" again. This can underflow the counters or make swapped reach zero while other pages remain swapped out, causing swapoff to loop without finding them. When installing the marker, subtract only from "swapped" and let shmem_recalc_inode() reduce "alloced" and release the block charge. Make shmem_free_swap() report successful removal separately from the number of swap pages freed, so removing a swapin-error marker does not subtract from "swapped" again. It's a bit confusing, but replacing a swapped out page by a swapin-error marker in shmem_set_folio_swapin_error() behaves as follows: Initially: alloced=1, swapped=1, nrpages=0 Calling shmem_recalc_inode(inode, 0, -1) -> swapped = 0 -> freed = 1 - 0 - 0 = 1 -> alloced -= freed -> alloced=0, swapped=0, block charge released13h
CVE-2026-99654—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: fix unmap_mapping_range() beyond 4 GiB on 32-bit Commit 9eab0421fa94 ("mm: fix unmap_mapping_range high bits shift bug") made holebegin and holelen unsigned before they are shifted, by casting them to pgoff_t. That is an unsigned long: on a 32-bit kernel the cast cuts off the upper half of the two loff_t values, so a hole which begins at 4 GiB or beyond is taken for one in the first 4 GiB of the file. truncate_pagecache() passes the new size of the file and asks for private COWed pages to be unmapped as well. If a file of 6 GiB is truncated to 5 GiB, everything from 1 GiB on is unmapped, and what a process has written to a private mapping of the range between 1 GiB and 5 GiB is lost: it reads the contents of the file again. Where the range has an end, the wrong range is unmapped instead of the right one. The page cache copes with that, as it unmaps every folio that it removes. The callers which only have unmap_mapping_range() to get rid of user mappings do not, for example drm_vma_node_unmap(), whose fake offsets reach beyond 4 GiB on 32-bit, and revoke_iomem() with physical addresses of more than 32 bits. Cast to u64 instead. Nothing changes for 64-bit kernels. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private.13h
CVE-2026-99644—
—
——0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory-tiers: unregister empty tiers outside memory_tier_lock When offlining a node's last memory empties its tier, clear_node_memory_tier() calls device_unregister() while holding memory_tier_lock. A concurrent sysfs read can hold a kernfs active reference and block in nodelist_show() on that mutex. device_unregister() then waits in kernfs_drain() for the read to finish and release its active reference, while the reader waits for the offlining task to release the mutex. Return the node's former tier from clear_node_memory_tier(), making the helper more similar to set_node_memory_tier(), which also returns a memory_tier pointer. Let the caller unlink an empty tier under memory_tier_lock before rebuilding demotion targets, then unregister its device after dropping the lock.13h