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No catálogo KEV1,779
Novos KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,707
Distribuição · última janela
- Crítica5,739
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Filtros
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2014-9371—97.4%
——29——CVE-2016-0052—97.4%
——29——CVE-2015-0042—97.4%
——29——CVE-2007-3930—97.4%
——29——CVE-2020-17438—97.4%
——29——CVE-2021-3239—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-6908—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-9800—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-2673—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-1027—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-27799—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-0020—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-7658—97.3%
——29——CVE-2013-1861—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-0595—97.3%
——29——CVE-2013-3158—97.3%
——29——CVE-2016-7273—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-4409—97.3%
——29——CVE-2025-560059.8 CRÍ97.3%
——29An undocumented and unsafe feature in the PLY (Python Lex-Yacc) library 3.11 allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) via the `picklefile` parameter in the `yacc()` function. This parameter accepts a `.pkl` file that is deserialized with `pickle.load()` without validation. Because `pickle` allows execution of embedded code via `__reduce__()`, an attacker can achieve code execution by passing a malicious pickle file. The parameter is not mentioned in official documentation or the GitHub repository, yet it is active in the PyPI version. This introduces a stealthy backdoor and persistence risk. NOTE: A third-party states that this vulnerability should be rejected because the proof of concept does not demonstrate arbitrary code execution and fails to complete successfully.56dCVE-2022-38393—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-4414—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-1028—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-0088—97.3%
——29——CVE-2002-0569—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-0247—97.3%
——29——CVE-2003-1028—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-1039—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-12735—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-4597—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-4026—97.3%
——29——CVE-2003-0026—97.3%
——29——CVE-2014-0263—97.3%
——29——CVE-2021-212955.9 MÉD97.3%
——29Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.34dCVE-2010-0245—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8553—97.3%
——29——CVE-2008-4814—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-1761—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-0204—97.3%
——29——CVE-2005-0249—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-19642—97.3%
——29——