Vulnerabilidades exploráveis hoje
413,525na visualização atual
Score único que combina CVSS, presença no KEV e EPSS. Cada CVE com sua própria ficha — timeline da publicação até a exploração ativa.
No catálogo KEV1,779
Novos KEV · 24H0
Exploit Today ≥ 701,707
Distribuição · última janela
- Crítica5,739
- Alta22,705
- Média21,204
- Baixa2,175
Filtros
Janela
Severidade
Filtros
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTítuloMod.
CVE-2018-8524—97.3%
——29——CVE-2003-0026—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-0061—97.3%
——29——CVE-2024-21894—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-9800—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-19642—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8522—97.3%
——29——CVE-2004-0771—97.3%
——29——CVE-2006-6059—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-0811—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-8074—97.3%
——29——CVE-2011-2000—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-0246—97.3%
——29——CVE-2005-1664—97.3%
——29——CVE-2021-23394—97.3%
——29——CVE-2023-0324—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-1280—97.3%
——29——CVE-2008-0456—97.3%
——29——CVE-2019-0595—97.3%
——29——CVE-2013-3158—97.3%
——29——CVE-2000-0132—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-1028—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-0245—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-5097—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-8574—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-27799—97.3%
——29——CVE-2004-0526—97.3%
——29——CVE-2012-1545—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-1000375—97.3%
——29——CVE-2006-3652—97.3%
——29——CVE-2025-1025—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-43634—97.3%
——29——CVE-2015-6908—97.3%
——29——CVE-2018-1027—97.3%
——29——CVE-2020-5512—97.3%
——29——CVE-2010-4409—97.3%
——29——CVE-2021-212955.9 MÉD97.3%
——29Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.34dCVE-2011-3833—97.3%
——29——CVE-2022-3488—97.3%
——29——CVE-2017-0204—97.3%
——29——