CVE-2026-39362
InvenTree is an Open Source Inventory Management System. Prior to 1.2.7 and 1.3.0, when INVENTREE_DOWNLOAD_FROM_URL is enabled (opt-in), aut
CVSS
7.1
High
EPSS
0.2%
p14
KEV
—
Exploit Today
4
0-100
Published: Apr 8, 2026 · Last modified: Jul 24, 2026 · CWE-918
0.2%EPSS · 30 days0.2%
2026-07-282026-08-24
InvenTree is an Open Source Inventory Management System. Prior to 1.2.7 and 1.3.0, when INVENTREE_DOWNLOAD_FROM_URL is enabled (opt-in), authenticated users can supply remote_image URLs that are fetched server-side via requests.get() with only Django's URLValidator check. There is no validation against private IP ranges or internal hostnames. Redirects are followed (allow_redirects=True), enabling bypass of any URL-format checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.2.7 and 1.3.0.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-773105.3 MED—
——0jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. Prior to versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1 on their respective release lines, the java.net.InetAddress branch of FromStringDeserializer.Std._deserialize() calls InetAddress.getByName() on attacker-controlled input, causing eager DNS resolution during deserialization and enabling DNS-based server-side request forgery and internal-host enumeration. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1.14hCVE-2026-768388.5 HIG—
——0Hi.Events validates a webhook destination only when it is registered, never when it is used. NoInternalUrlRule in backend/app/Validators/Rules/NoInternalUrlRule.php resolves the hostname with gethostbyname() and rejects private and reserved ranges, which any public hostname passes. At dispatch, WebhookDispatchService takes the stored URL and calls it through spatie/laravel-webhook-server without repeating the check, and backend/config/webhook-server.php sets no Guzzle options, so redirect following remains enabled by default. A destination that answers with a redirect to a loopback, private or cloud metadata address therefore causes the server to issue that request, and changing the hostname's DNS record after registration reaches the same result because no resolution is repeated. The response is not discarded: WebhookResponseHandlerService stores the body on the webhook log and WebhookLogResource returns it from the webhook logs endpoint, so the requester reads what the internal service replied rather than inferring it. Both event and organizer webhooks share the rule and the dispatch path. Version 1.11.1-beta revalidates at dispatch, pins the validated address, checks every redirect hop, and decodes IPv6 transition addresses that previously bypassed the filter.2dCVE-2026-713667.7 HIG—
——0A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was found in multiple AWX notification backends. The webhook, Mattermost, Rocket.Chat, and Grafana notification backends use notification template URLs as direct HTTP request targets without validating the target address against private, loopback, or reserved IP ranges. An organization notification administrator can create notification templates pointing to internal or loopback addresses, causing the AWX control node to issue HTTP requests to services that are not externally accessible. Additionally, the webhook notification backend follows HTTP redirects and resends configured Basic Authentication credentials to redirect targets regardless of host change, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate notification credentials by redirecting to an attacker-controlled host. The Grafana backend sends its API key in the Authorization header to the configured target URL.1dCVE-2026-78385——
——0RansomLook contains insufficient resource validation in the analysis PDF generation functionality. Analysis documents are converted from Markdown to HTML and passed to WeasyPrint for PDF rendering. Prior to the fix, WeasyPrint used its default URL fetcher, allowing resource references contained in an analysis to be resolved without restrictions.
An authenticated attacker able to create or modify an analysis could embed crafted resource references using schemes such as file:// or http://. When the analysis was subsequently rendered as PDF, WeasyPrint would process these references with the privileges and network access of the RansomLook server.
A malicious file:// reference could cause the renderer to access arbitrary files readable by the RansomLook process, potentially exposing sensitive configuration, credentials, or other local data through rendered resources. Network URLs could cause the server to initiate requests to localhost, internal network services, or external systems, resulting in server-side request forgery (SSRF) and potentially bypassing network-level access restrictions.
The patch introduces a dedicated WeasyPrint URL fetcher that permits only data: resources, the RansomLook report logo, and files contained within the analysis asset directory. Network resources and filesystem paths outside these explicitly permitted locations are rejected.2dCVE-2026-782774.9 MED—
——0Subscriber Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in FluentCRM Pro <= 3.1.12 versions.2dCVE-2026-782696.4 MED—
——0Contributor Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Shared Files <= 1.7.69 versions.2d