CVE-2026-39454
SKYSEA Client View and SKYMEC IT Manager provided by Sky Co.,LTD. configure the installation folder with improper file access permission set
CVSS
7.8
High
EPSS
0.1%
p1
KEV
—
Exploit Today
0
0-100
Published: Apr 20, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 26, 2026 · CWE-276 · CWE-863
0.1%EPSS · 30 days0.2%
2026-10-042026-11-01
SKYSEA Client View and SKYMEC IT Manager provided by Sky Co.,LTD. configure the installation folder with improper file access permission settings. A non-administrative user may manipulate and/or place arbitrary files within the installation folder of the product. As a result, arbitrary code may be executed with the administrative privilege.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-119625—17.0%
——5The `/{username}` web route accepted personal access tokens over HTTP Basic authentication without checking their scope. A token confined to an unrelated scope, such as `read:issue`, could read its owner's private activity through the user RSS/Atom feed and the profile activity tab, and other members' activity in a private organization through the organization feed; a public-only token could list the owner's private repositories and organizations and render private profile READMEs. For a site administrator's token this applied to every account. Tokens are now accepted on this route only for feeds, which require `read:user` or `read:organization`.1dCVE-2026-119441—9.6%
——3`DELETE /api/v1/orgs/{org}/repos` deletes all repositories of an organization, but it did not enforce the public-only restriction of access tokens: the route only checked that the organization itself was public. A public-only token of an owner of a public organization could therefore permanently delete the organization's private repositories, which such a token must not reach. Routes that require organization ownership now reject public-only tokens.1dCVE-2026-118394—9.6%
——3The OAuth2 userinfo endpoint (`/login/oauth/userinfo`) decided whether to limit the `groups` claim to public organizations by re-parsing the `Authorization` header as an OAuth2 access token instead of using the scope of the credential that authenticated the request. When a public-only OAuth2 token was sent as a query parameter or form field, or a public-only personal access token was used, that scope came back empty and the claim listed the token owner's private organizations, teams and concealed memberships. The disclosure is limited to the owner's organization and team names and memberships; no repository content is exposed. The endpoint now uses the scope of the authenticating token.1dCVE-2026-118386—9.6%
——3Workflows triggered by a pull request review were read from the commit named in the review's `commit_id`, while the fork restrictions were decided by the reviewed pull request, and the commit was not checked to belong to that pull request. A user with read access to a repository could place a commit of their own in it, through a fork pull request or an AGit push, and submit a review naming that commit on a pull request whose head branch is in the same repository. On instances with a runner serving the repository, the attacker's workflow then ran without approval, received the Actions secrets of the repository and its owner, and got a `GITEA_TOKEN` with write access to the repository. Review-triggered workflows now run on the pull request head.1dCVE-2026-117685—9.6%
——3The OCI registry's cross-repository blob mount checked the target package against the token's `public-only` restriction, but checked the source blob only against the full account permissions of the token owner. A `public-only` token with `write:package` scope, whose owner can read a private package and write to a public package namespace, could mount a blob of the private package into the public package. The private blob, such as a container layer, could then be downloaded by anyone through the public package.1dCVE-2026-116289—9.6%
——3Gitea did not reject personal access tokens restricted to public resources (`public-only`) on the organization Actions runner registration-token endpoint, and the runner registered with the resulting token was not limited to public repositories. Holding only such a token with `write:organization` that belongs to an owner of a public organization, an attacker could register an organization-level runner and receive jobs of the organization's private repositories that have Actions enabled, including the workflow content, Actions secrets and variables, and a task token with access to the private repository. The issue widens what the restricted token can reach; it gives nothing beyond what the owner's full account can already do.1d