CVE-2026-77205
Libreswan in FIPS mode has a vulnerability where badly formed received certificates are rejected, but not deleted from the NSS cache. As a r
CVSS
3.7
Low
EPSS
0.2%
p7
KEV
—
Exploit Today
2
0-100
Published: Oct 13, 2026 · Last modified: Oct 13, 2026 · CWE-772
0.2%EPSS · 30 days0.2%
2026-10-142026-10-15
Libreswan in FIPS mode has a vulnerability where badly formed received certificates are rejected, but not deleted from the NSS cache. As a result, any real certificates with the same serial number are rejected as well. This can be abused to lock out legitimate peers from connecting. The add_decoded_cert() function missed a call to CERT_DestroyCertificate() due to an incorrect fix for CVE-2026-14957. Sending bogus certificates with new serial numbers could prevent the real certificates with those serial numbers from connecting until the service has restarted.
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-59951—38.2%
——11The MCP Python SDK, called mcp on PyPI, is a Python implementation of the Model Context Protocol (MCP). From 1.8.0 until 1.30.0 and 2.2.0, stateful Streamable HTTP servers, including FastMCP, MCPServer, Server.streamable_http_app(), and StreamableHTTPSessionManager, retain session entries without an idle expiration or aggregate session-count limit. DELETE, refused opening requests, and completed sessions do not reliably discard their entries, and each entry can retain parsed initialize parameters. A client that can reach the endpoint can therefore create ordinary short requests that grow server memory without bound until restart. Stateless HTTP, stdio, and SSE transports are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 1.30.0 and 2.2.0.1dCVE-2026-199375.7 MED7.4%
——2The Bluetooth Mesh Access layer delayable-message machinery in subsys/bluetooth/mesh/delayable_msg.c manages a static pool of CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG_COUNT message contexts (default 4) threaded onto a free_ctx or busy_ctx list. release_delayable_msg_ctx() returned a context to free_ctx only when sys_slist_find_and_remove() found it on busy_ctx. The chunk-exhaustion error path in bt_mesh_delayable_msg_manage() releases a context that was already popped off free_ctx but not yet inserted on busy_ctx, so the context was appended to neither list and was permanently lost from the pool. Because bt_mesh_delayable_msg_init() runs only once from bt_mesh_init(), and node reset/suspend only drain busy_ctx, the loss survives unprovision, re-provision and suspend/resume — it is cleared only by a reboot.
The error path is reached when the chunk pool (CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG_CHUNK_COUNT, default 40 chunks) is short of the chunks a new delayed message needs and the oldest pending message cannot be flushed because bt_mesh_access_send() returns -EBUSY or -ENOBUFS (all segmented-TX contexts busy, or advertising/segment buffers exhausted). A peer that is provisioned into the mesh network — holding a valid NetKey plus an AppKey or DevKey bound to a server model — can drive both conditions by flooding the victim with requests that elicit segmented responses while withholding the Segment Acknowledgment, which keeps the transmit contexts occupied while queued responses hold the chunk pool. Each further request that arrives in that window leaks one context.
Once the pool is drained, bt_mesh_delayable_msg_manage() returns -ENOMEM for every subsequent send and bt_mesh_model_send() propagates that error with no fallback to an immediate transmit. Since CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG and CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG_CTX_ENABLED are both enabled by default, ctx->rnd_delay is set for every received access message, so all replies from Configuration Server, Health Server and application server models are silently dropped. The node keeps receiving and processing traffic but never answers, a persistent denial of service until the device is restarted. There is no memory corruption, information disclosure or integrity impact; releases before the fix compute the chunk count from the transmit buffer capacity rather than its payload length, making chunk-pool starvation — and therefore the leak — considerably easier to provoke.2dCVE-2026-166784.5 MED9.8%
——3IBM Power Systems Firmware FW1110.00 through FW1110.31, FW1120.00 through FW1120.01, and FW1060.00 through FW1060.81 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service by exhausting connection resources due to improper resource management.3dCVE-2026-197406.5 MED1.0%
——0The Link Layer Control Procedure (LLCP) implementation of the Zephyr software Bluetooth LE Controller retains the receive node that carried an accepted LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND so that it can later be reused for the host notification when the update instant is reached (llcp_rx_node_retain() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp.c, and the node is deliberately not recycled while marked NODE_RX_TYPE_RETAIN). The invalid-PDU arms of llcp_lp_pu_rx() and llcp_rp_pu_rx() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_phy.c completed the procedure via llcp_lr_complete() / llcp_rr_complete() without first releasing that retained node, so the procedure context — the only remaining reference to the node — was freed while the node was still held out of the receive pool.
A peer device on an established LE connection can drive this deterministically and without pairing or encryption. Against a peripheral it sends LL_PHY_REQ, receives LL_PHY_RSP, sends a valid LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND with an instant a few connection events in the future (so the node becomes retained), and then, before the instant is reached, sends any other LL Control PDU such as LL_LENGTH_REQ; ull_cp_rx() routes it to the active remote PHY Update procedure, which takes the invalid-PDU path. The mirror case applies to a locally initiated PHY Update followed by an LL_REJECT_IND.
In the default configuration (CONFIG_BT_ASSERT and CONFIG_BT_CTLR_ASSERT_DEBUG both default y) the violated invariant in llcp_lr_check_done() / llcp_rr_check_done() triggers a controller assertion, ending in k_oops() (or k_panic()) — a single crafted PDU sequence from radio range faults the device. With those assertions compiled out, each attempt silently leaks one receive PDU node and its memq link; because the controller receive pool is small (PDU_RX_CNT, driven by CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS, which defaults to 1) and each attempt costs the attacker only a reconnect, a few repetitions exhaust the pool and leave Bluetooth inoperable until reboot. On releases v3.4.0 through v3.7.x the assertion is never reached, whatever the configuration, so every attempt leaks silently.
The impact is limited to availability: the orphaned node leaves no dangling pointer that is later dereferenced and is never delivered to the host, so there is no memory corruption or information disclosure. The same pull request applies the identical release to the Connection Update and CIS-create procedures, whose invalid-PDU arms had the same omission.3dCVE-2026-197396.5 MED0.9%
——0The Bluetooth Link Layer control procedure code in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_conn_upd.c retains the received RX node while a Connection Update / Connection Parameter procedure waits for its instant, so the node can later carry the host notification (llcp_rx_node_retain(), which marks it NODE_RX_TYPE_RETAIN and thereby suppresses the normal recycling in ull.c). The default: arm of llcp_rp_cu_rx() and llcp_lp_cu_rx() — the "invalid PDU, terminate the connection" path — completed the procedure without releasing that retained node. llcp_rr_check_done() then dequeued and freed the procedure context with ctx->node_ref.rx still pointing at the retained node, dropping the last reference to it.
A peer device in radio range can reach this without pairing, bonding, or encryption. Against a peripheral, the peer sends a well-formed LL_CONNECTION_UPDATE_IND with an instant a few connection events in the future (the node is retained and the procedure enters RP_CU_STATE_WAIT_INSTANT), then, before the instant is reached, sends any other LL Control PDU such as LL_LENGTH_REQ. ull_cp_rx() routes that PDU into the active remote Connection Update procedure, which takes the invalid-PDU path. The central role is reachable symmetrically after accepting an LL_CONNECTION_PARAM_REQ, and the local-procedure variant is reachable with LL_REJECT_IND.
With CONFIG_BT_CTLR_ASSERT_DEBUG enabled (its default), the resulting state violates the invariant asserted in llcp_rr_check_done(), so the two-PDU sequence produces an immediate fatal error in the controller. With those asserts disabled, each occurrence permanently loses one node from the controller's small fixed RX pool (sized from CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS, which defaults to 1); repeating the sequence across reconnections exhausts the pool, after which the link-layer receive path operates on a NULL node. The impact is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service persisting until reboot; there is no memory-disclosure or memory-corruption consequence, since the leaked node simply becomes unreachable.3dCVE-2026-1078345.3 MED23.6%
——7OWASP Coraza WAF is a golang modsecurity compatible web application firewall library. From 3.0.0 until 3.8.0, the multipart loop in internal/bodyprocessors/multipart.go executes defer temp.Close() for every uploaded file part, so each temporary-file descriptor remains open until the complete request returns. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a multipart body containing many minimal file parts and exhaust the process file-descriptor table within the request-body size limit, causing os.CreateTemp failures, MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR responses, blocked legitimate uploads, and process-wide inability to open files or sockets. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.0.3d