CVE-2026-85685
AgentScope through 2.0.7.post1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in LocalWorkspace.add_skill that copies arbitrary server directories
CVSS
7.5
High
EPSS
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KEV
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Exploit Today
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0-100
Published: Sep 4, 2026 · Last modified: Sep 4, 2026 · CWE-22
Not enough EPSS history yet.
AgentScope through 2.0.7.post1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in LocalWorkspace.add_skill that copies arbitrary server directories into the agent workspace via an unconfined source path parameter. Attackers can supply any directory path in the skill_path request parameter to copy files into the skills directory, making them accessible through the workspace skill listing.
- github.comhttps://github.com/agentscope-ai/agentscope
- github.comhttps://github.com/agentscope-ai/agentscope/blob/v2.0.7.post1/src/agentscope/workspace/_local_workspace.py
- github.comhttps://github.com/agentscope-ai/agentscope/issues/2069
- www.vulncheck.comhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/agentscope-through-2.0.7-post1-arbitrary-directory-copy-via-add-skill
- github.comhttps://github.com/agentscope-ai/agentscope/issues/2069
CVECVSSEPSSKEVRExploitTitleMod.
CVE-2026-819399.1 CRI—
———A Zip Slip vulnerability in the SonicWall Network Security Manager (NSM) On-Prem file upload and archive processing functionality allows an attacker to extract files outside the intended destination directory using a specially crafted archive.17hCVE-2026-53757——
———Emlog is an open source website building system. In versions 2.6.29 and prior, the emUnZip() function extracts all ZIP entries via ZipArchive::extractTo() without validating entry paths for ../ traversal sequences. Only the first entry's subdirectory structure is checked. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary files on the server filesystem, including config.php for immediate RCE. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.19hCVE-2026-50553——
———Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. Prior to version 0.19.5, Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim. The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.5.19hCVE-2026-176226.5 MED—
———IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory.20hCVE-2026-176215.4 MED—
———IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing "dot dot " sequences ( /.. /) to view arbitrary files on the system.20hCVE-2026-144706.5 MED—
———IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 could allow an authenticated attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing "dot dot" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system.20h